Address by
the late Brigadier General Ted Mataxis, U.S. Army ret, at the 70th ID mini
reunion in Columbus, GA held in conjunction with the dedication of the
Trailblazer Monument at Fort Benning, Ga.
LTC Keith E. Bonn mentioned in his book, “When the
Odds Were Even”, the 70th ID was an erratically trained outfit. That is
absolutely true. We were erratically trained. I was the Asst Division G-3 for
nine months during our year of training and I helped draw up the programs for
it. I can tell you, we were erratically trained. In spite of this we did in
combat what we we were supposed to do. That we were erratically trained is not
our fault. The bad part is that because of this incomplete training, we took too
many casualties. It’s like training a football team where you teach them their
positions and the plays, but never let them go out on the field for a practice
game. You can’t expect them to show up at their first game against live
opposition and play like professionals. That is what happened to us. It wasn’t
our fault; it wasn’t anyone’s fault. The U. S. Army took more casualties than
anyone expected in Europe, in Africa and in the Pacific. As a result, it was
short of people and had to throw us in there. To show you that our situation was
impacted by major events leading up to our commitment in Europe, first we’ll
look at the Army Mobilization Plan, beginning with a short snapshot of the WW
I-WW II inter-war period--in other words, where we started from; then a quick
look at our WW II Army 52 week Mobilization Plan for new divisions. Then I’ll
show you how divisions were built, what we did, what training we did have, and
what training we did not have. I’ll show you that we were to go to Seventh Army
in Europe, finish our training that was not completed in the States, and then
be committed in the final offensive in the spring of 1945. But as you know, we
were not used that way. Because of the Bulge and Nordwind, more Infantry troops
were very badly needed, and we were rushed off to Europe despite the fact that
a significant portion of our training was incomplete. With that as
introduction, we’ll start with the Army Mobilization Plan for WW II.
Between WW I and WW II, you may recall, the
Kellogg Briand Pact was signed in which nations pledged never to use force
again. At that time, everything was great. All our enemies were destroyed, the
stock market was going through the ceiling, and everything was wonderful in
America. And everyone forgot about the military. Doesn’t that remind you of
today? Then, you remember what happened: the stock market crashed in ‘29, a
worldwide depression followed, Mussolini attacked in Africa, Japan invaded
Manchuria, Hitler began to rearm. All that only a few years after the halcyon
times of the mid 20’s. Keep in mind what can happen to us in only a few years
down the road. You always have to be prepared for the worst.
Now to mobilization planning for WW II: At the
time, we had had nine divisions in the U.S. Army. They weren’t really divisions.
The Infantry companies were 90 men each, with one officer. Infantry battalions
were commanded by a major and had a 2d lieutenant, usually just out of West
Point, who was the adjutant and detachment commander. The entire battalion
staff was made up of sergeants. That was the peacetime Army. Then we had the
draft in 1940. The Army had the Mobilization Plan laid out.
Phase 1 was building up the nine Regular Army
divisions. At that time I went to my first regiment. All the draftees came in
and the companies went up to 215 men. We took them down to the warehouses and
opened up the uniform boxes. Some boxes had long handle underwear that was older
than I was. Others had hobnailed boots, wrap leggings, three quarter length
overcoats made out of blankets. The Army came up to wartime strength.
Phase 2 was calling up the National Guard
divisions, which ran from the 25th to the 45th with some in between missing.
They were called to active duty in the fall of 1940. The Regular Army moved out
to tents in the snow so the National Guard could move into the barracks. In the
meantime with the National Guard called up, my division, which had the 1st,
20th and 3rd regiments, was tasked to send one regiment to Newfoundland. We
had to take the draftees out, as they couldn’t be sent overseas. They stripped
the regular soldiers out of the other two regiments to fill up the regiment
bound for Newfoundland. Then they took another regiment from my division,
stripped out the draftees, refilled it with regular army soldiers and sent it to
Alaska, then refilled the division with draftees. So you can see how the units
were watered down in experience. In addition, they went through the NCOs; most
first sergeants with good records were made lieutenants and captains and sent to
the Provost Marshall Corps so they could start giving these young draftees some
law and order. They pulled still others out for the training base to support the
divisions. You can see how we lost experienced people from the divisions.
Phase 3 was calling up the reserve divisions.
These divisions ran from the 46th to the 106th with a few in between missing and
they were basically cadre only. They had few officers and the senior officers
they had were old and fat, and couldn’t fit into their uniforms. However, there
were thousands of lieutenants from ROTC units of land grant colleges. The cadre
for reserve divisions also had to come from the Regular Army. Key officers for
the National Guard and Reserve divisions attended a one month course before
reporting to their new assignment. At their new units, they organized and
conducted the orientation courses for the key officers and non-commissioned
officers of their subordinate units. This is how we went from 9 to 90 plus
divisions.
Our training was to be done in accordance with
the training portion of the MTP, so 172 of the division senior officers were
given a one month course. When the division was to be activated, they went to
the post where the new division was to be activated and conducted. A minimal
cadre there assisted in training of key positions in the battalions and
companies. All headquarters and staff positions were filled and planning for the
training of draftee fillers was done. When the draftees arrived, basic and
advanced unit (infantry, artillery, signal, medical, etc) was begun. This
training was restarted several times because of draw downs and refills to the
units of the division. In this regard, by the time we left Fort Wood for Europe,
73.9 % had received only 5-10 weeks of training with the division and 26% had
received from 0-5 weeks of training with the division. Most of that training
was basic and advanced individual training. The maneuver and combined arms
training that the division was to take for the final weeks before deployment to
a combat theater was eliminated, except for 9 days of field training conducted
in September at Fort Wood. Even this training was changed so that instead of
free movement that would provide realistic training to commanders and staffs,
the action was of the set-piece variety where everyone knew ahead of time just
what was to happen and when. You can see why I use the word erratic to describe
our training.
During the summer of 1944, we were running
short of divisions. Ike and General Marshall decided to call up the 70th, the
63rd, and 42nd Infantry divisions for deployment to Europe even though none had
completed programmed training. We were supposed to be employed in the rear of
Seventh Army so we could complete our training. As you remember, when we landed
the Bulge happened. So they stripped riflemen from us to fill the divisions in
the Bulge that had been heavily pounded. Then we found from the super secret
Ultra, that the Nordwind offensive was coming. The Germans were to come from
Bitche and Strasbourg to pinch off VI Corps in the Vosges. The American forces
did not have enough troops to stop the Germans, so it was first decided to use
these nine new regiments on the Rhine River in defensive positions for
additional training. Then our commanders got the word that the Germans were
pouring south from Bitche. They hit an American cavalry screen which consisted
of a cavalry group and an armored infantry battalion. It disintegrated. They had
to use something and Task Force Herren and the other six new regiments were all
that were available. All the plans for completion of our training were wiped
out. The 274(-) and 276 were moved to the Moder River in Corps reserve in time
for the 6th SS to hit them and you know what happened. Second Battalion 274 and
276 were on one side of the gap and 274 (-) and 275 were holding the flank. We
freed a lot of American prisoners there, most from the 45th ID. The 45th tries
to blame us but we were in the corps reserve line--they got caught in a trap,
were captured and we freed them from captivity at the church there--in spite
of our incomplete training program.
As a result of our incomplete training, we took
more casualties than we should have. But they had no one else to put in--like
during the Civil War when the Confederacy put in the VMI cadets. You use
whatever you’ve got, and we were there. So that is the bad aspect of our erratic
training program. Just what would have happened if they didn’t have those nine
regiments and the Germans had broken through? We might have lost part of the VI
Corps. From General Marshall at the top on down, they knew the situation and
what we did without that missed training.
In closing I would mention our third battle star
for our ETO ribbon. When the division left Europe, we were authorized two battle
stars--the Rhineland Campaign and the Central Europe Campaign. We were not
included in the Ardennes campaign, which was awarded to those who participated
in the Battle of the Bulge. General Devers and General Patch asked Ike to have
those units that participated in the fighting in the Vosges included in the
Ardennes Campaign, but Ike would not agree. Devers and Patch were extremely
upset with Ike’s decision and subsequently went to see General Marshall in the
fall of ‘45 with that request. Marshall agreed and renamed the Ardennes Campaign
as Ardennes-Alsace Campaign, and included all units that participated in the
Vosges. That is how we got our third battle star. By the time it was distributed
in Army documentation, many, if not most, of our vets were discharged and that
is why that campaign is not reflected in their records.