Roger Conarty (L/276) told us of
of a study done on material collected by the War Department in WW
II, a portion of which was based on interviews of 70th Infantry
Division soldiers conducted during division training at Camp Adair
and follow up interviews after the war. Karl Landstrom located a
copy at the Library of Congress and photo copied the pages
applicalble to us. This portion of the study is Volume II, Combat and
its Aftermath. It relates the attitudes of a sample of infantry
recruits to their individual combat performance in Europe over a
year later. The authors indicated that this study represents the
only available data directly relating attitudes to the performance
of individual men.
"In the fall and winter of 1943 it was
possible to ascertain attitudes of a sample of a newly activated
division, then in training at Camp Adair, OR and to identify the
questionnaires by background information like induction date, age,
and state of birth with information on the Form 20 personnel cards.
The questionnaires were filled our anonymously and faith was kept
with the men, since by agreement with the division commander the
identifying information was known only to the Research Branch and
never released to the division.
The study recognizes that the division lost
more than half of its infantrymen as overseas replacements in early
1944, thus reducing greatly the number that could be followed up in
their original units. However, it was found that the questionnaire
responses of those transferred and those remaining were almost
identical on all items , so that those remaining proved to be
representative of the division with respect to attitudes.
The 274th Infantry Regiment, to which was
assigned the greater part of the men for whom pre-combat data were
available, arrived in France in December 1944 with the other two
regiments as part of a task force and were attached to other
divisions as needed. In February 1945, they operated as part of the
70th Infantry Division. Their battle history includes heavy fighting
at Phillipsbourg, France and in cracking the Siegfried Line outside
of Saarbrucken. In their main actions, they suffered quite severe
casualties. The 275th and 276th Infantry Regiments and the 270th
Engineer Battalion had much the same history. The division was
withdrawn from combat March 25th, 1945.
Shortly after VE Day, a team of psychologists
from the Research Branch, ETO, was sent to the 70th Division to
obtain data on the combat performance of as many as possible of the
individuals who had participated in the attitude surveys in Oregon.
A carefully planned interview procedure was employed, and out of the
interviewing were obtained reliable evaluations of the combat
performance of individuals. The conditions were perhaps optimal for
obtaining the kind of evaluation sought. Most of the men had been on
line for about three months-long enough to provide a thorough test
under fire, yet short enough that there were still some men left to
tell about it. And memories were still fresh.
Usable combat ratings were obtained for 393
men for whom the questionnaire data were also available. The rating
interviews were conducted by specially trained interviewers, and in
almost all cases the raters were the officers or noncoms who had
worked most closely with the man being rated. These men fell into
three categories of combat performance: Above average 33%, Average
or indeterminate 39%, Below average 28%.
Because it was desired to control the
influence of education, AGCT score, age and marital condition on
performance and to evaluate the relationship between attitudes and
combat ratings with these background factors held constant,
the sample was reduced to 279 cases in the process of matching the
three performance groups on these background factors.
Attitudes Relating to Combat as
Correlated with Combat Performance
In the initial attitude surveys at Camp
Adair, four questions were asked:
1. If you went into actual fighting after
finishing one year of training, how do you think you would do?
2. Do you ever worry about whether you will be
injured in combat before the war is over?
3. How do you think you would feel about
killing a Japanese soldier?
4. How do you think you would feel about
killing a German soldier?
Percentage giving
indicated responses
Combat Performance
Groups
| |
Below Average |
Average |
Above Average |
|
Answers to Question #1 |
|
|
|
| I think I would do all
right. |
23 |
29 |
31 |
| I think I would have
trouble at first but after a while I'd do ok. |
42 |
39 |
55 |
| I haven't any idea how
I would do. |
17 |
20 |
9 |
| I don't think I would
do very well. |
18 |
12 |
0 |
| |
Below Average |
Average |
Above Average |
|
Answers to Question #2 |
|
|
|
| Never worry about it. |
31 |
42 |
42 |
| Hardly ever worry
about it. |
38 |
33 |
40 |
| No Answer. |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Worry about it fairly
often. |
26 |
20 |
15 |
| |
Below Average |
Average |
Above Average |
|
Answers to Question #3 |
|
|
|
| I would really like to
kill a Japanese soldier. |
38 |
44 |
48 |
| I would feel it is
part of the job, without liking it or disliking it. |
35 |
32 |
34 |
| I would feel it is
part of the job, but would still feel bad about killing a man
even if he was a Japanese soldier. |
16 |
18 |
17 |
| I would feel I should
not kill anyone, not even a Japanese soldier. |
5 |
6 |
1 |
| Some other idea or no
answer. |
4 |
2 |
3 |
| |
Below Average |
Average |
Above Average |
|
Answers to Question #4 |
|
|
|
| I would really like to
kill a German soldier. |
5 |
6 |
9 |
| I would feel it is
just a part of the job, without liking it or disliking it. |
45 |
52 |
55 |
| I would feel it is
part of the job, but would still feel bad about killing a man
even if he was a German soldier. |
41 |
34 |
32 |
| I would feel I should
not kill anyone, not even a German soldier. |
5 |
6 |
1 |
"The foregoing charts indicate that the men
rated above average in combat tended to show, during their training
period-over a year before combat-atitudes with respect to combat
which were superior from, the Army point-of -view, as compared with
the other men. That is, they were more likely to manifest confidence
they would perform satisfactorily in combat, they were more likely
not to express anxiety about future injury in combat, and they were
somewhat more likely to accept killing as their business. The
attitude differences between the above and below average performance
groups are consistent on all four items and are statistically
significant on all items except that on killing Japanese."
"It is also of interest to note that
corresponding attitude differences between above and below average
combat performance groups, analyzed separately for the smaller
sample of men who fought in line Infantry companies, tended to be
even more marked than the differences charted. For example, in line
companies of the 274th Infantry Regiment the proportion who said
during training that they 'never' worried about combat injuries was
48% against 24% for the below average group."
"The better educated, the men with the
highest AGCT scores and highest mechanical aptitude scores (120 or
over) and over 24 years of age, the older men, and the married men
tend to get the better performance ratings."
"If we consider only men with high
school education, relatively high AGCT (Class 1, II or III),
relatively high mechanical aptitude (120 or over), and over 24 years
of age at the time of the attitude survey (33 cases in all), we find
that 58% are in the above average group on combat performance and 6%
in the below average combat performance group. At the other extreme,
if we take men with grade school education only, mechanical aptitude
scores below 120, and under 24 years of age (58 cases in all), we
find only 2 % rated above average in combat performance but 40%
rated below average."
The findings in the remainder of this
volume are based on data from divisions other than the 70th. While I
found no real surprises, I have summarized what I found to be the
more interesting data and I hope you find it of interest also:
Military units at
division level and below carry close interpersonal ties, and serve
two principal functions in combat motivation: Set and enforce group
standards of behavior, and support and sustain the individual in
stresses he would otherwise not have been able to withstand. The
units enforced standards principally by offering or withholding
recognition, respect and approval, which are among the supports they
had to offer and the more subjective reward of following an
internalized group code enhanced the soldier's resources for dealing
with the situations that confronted him.
Masculinity and the Combat Soldier