Defense of the Saare Front
The following extract comes from the Seventh US Army
Report of Operations, France and Germany, pp 661 - 665. Reprinted by
the Battery Press, 1988.
Defense on the Sarre Front
Holding the west flank, southwest of Saarbruecken, was the 106th
Cavalry Group. On 11 February these troops were relieved in their
defensive positions by the newly-arrived 101st Cavalry Group. To the
right of the cavalry and south of Saarbruecken was the 70th Infantry
Division. The infantry units of the division, the 274th, 275th, and
276th Regiments, which had been designated as Task Force Herren, had
initially entered the Seventh Army line on the Rhine flank late in
December, had been transferred by VI Corps to the Philippsbourg arm
of the Bitche salient, where they had been relieved by the 103rd
Division in mid January, at which time they had come under the
command of the XV Corps and
had
entered the line on the Sarre front. With the arrival of Major
General Allison J. Barnett (left) and his staff on
3 February, the task force was dissolved into the 70th Infantry
Division; and the remaining component parts of the division closed
in to their respective assembly areas within the next few days.
Adjoining the units of the 70th Division was the 63rd Infantry
Division in the Sarreguemines area. The 253rd and 255th Infantry
Regiments of the division had first occupied these positions while
the third regiment of the division, the 254th Infantry, was being
employed in the Colmar operations attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division. These regiments which had made up Task Force Harris had
been first employed by the Seventh Army on the Rhine Hank north of
Strasbourg. On the last day of December two regiments had been
transferred to XV Corps to strengthen the lines of the 44th and
100th Divisions on the corps right flank. The third regiment had
been
attached
to the 3rd Infantry Division on the Colmar front. On 1 February Task
Force Harris was dissolved with its units reverting to the control
of the 63rd Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Louis E.
Hibbs. (left) On 6 February the division, which had
received its artillery and supporting troops, assumed command of its
portion of the line. The 44th Division held the sector in the Gros
Rederching area, east of the 63rd Division; and on its right was the
100th Division, covering the east flank of the corps in the area
west and southwest of Bitche.
A counter-reconnaissance screen
was constantly maintained in the corps sector, east and west of the
Sarre River and south of the Maginot Line, by armored elements of
the corps. In the latter half of January and early February this
protection was furnished by units of the 10th Armored Division
following their arrival from the Third Army. As a part of the
general reshuffling of forces on the western front to meet German
offensive thrusts the 10th Armored Division,
commanded
by Major General W. H. Morris, Jr., (left) had been
assigned to Seventh Army to take the place of the 2nd French Armored
Division, which was to be passed to the control of the First French
Army for Colmar Pocket operations. On 10 February the 12th Armored
Division, its work in the Colmar area completed, relieved the 10th
Armored in the XV Corps sector and continued the mission of
counter-reconnaissance. The 10th Armored Division moved out to Metz
for return to Third Army control.
In the defensive lull that followed the failure of the German New
Year's offensive all these units on the XV Corps front pursued a
comparatively uneventful, triple-phased program of improvement of
defenses, training, and periodic raids. Into the corps area on 23
January and out again on 28 January the 35th Infantry Division, less
one regimental combat team, had been shifted by SHAEF orders; this
division had come from Third Army's XX Corps and had remained with
Seventh Army for six days only. Unaffected by these movements of
troops on high level decision, front line units of XV Corps
strengthened their positions by the installation of tactical and
protective wire, mines, and overhead cover for foxholes and
emplacements. In January, when the thermometer sometimes dropped as
low as 1 degree Fahrenheit, the frozen ground made digging of
emplacements particularly difficult; and the 44th Division found it
necessary to use explosives to break the ground. In that same
divisional sector it was found advisable to use concertina wire
almost exclusively for wiring-in the front line positions because of
the difficulty of driving pickets into the frozen ground. The
battles of the early part of the month, and the incidence of trench
foot due to severe weather, had reduced some rifle companies to a
strength of 50 to 60 men on the line, making it necessary in some
instances to send overhead personnel into the lines as riflemen. In
the 114th Infantry of the 44th Division it was necessary to commit
the antitank company to hold a portion of the line.
There was an influx of reinforcements at this time, and all units
conducted intensive programs of training and battle indoctrination
for these new men. Even veteran troops in rear areas found it
expedient to do range firing and re-zero their weapons. The 70th
Division handled their 2,000 reinforcements in typical fashion.
Since most of these men had had but a minimum of infantry experience
when they arrived, it was urgent that they receive more training
than they would ordinarily gain by merely being assigned to the line
and working there with experienced men. A rigorous four-day
schedule, therefore, was instituted, which included basic weapons,
map reading and use of compass, minor tactics, and field work. To
insure teamwork in battle, operating procedures for squads and
platoons in combat situations were emphasized.
In accordance with the policy of retaining the initiative during
this calm the constant patrolling that was carried on by all units
was frequently featured by well-planned raids, sometimes of company
strength. These raids were most often sharp, nocturnal thrusts into
the enemy-held towns across the line. In the 70th Division raids
that were made on Oeting, Lixing, Grosbliederstroff , and
Brandenbusch Woods the mission was constant and concise to capture
prisoners and kill as many of the enemy as possible.
Immediately to the right of XV Corps in the Low Vosges Mountains
south of (below: MG Harry J. Collins) Bitche the
same conditions of defending, raiding, and intensive training
prevailed. This sector was the west flank of VI Corps; but while the
energies of most VI Corps units were being expended in the task of
reducing the German bridgehead north of Strasbourg, its groups in
the Bitche area had the identical mission held by XV Corps defensive
line. Until 16 February the 45th Infantry Division maintained this
portion of the VI Corps front. On that day the 45th
Division
was relieved by the 42nd Infantry Division, whose infantry
regiments, the 222nd, 232nd and 242nd had initially joined Seventh
Army as Task or Force Linden for Rhine flank defense. After having
absorbed the initial blows of the German Gambsheim bridgehead and
after having fought against enemy thrusts in the
Hatten-Rittershoffen sector under the command of the 79th Division,
these units had been withdrawn from the line by the Seventh Army. An
army directive issued on 6 February ordered a comprehensive training
program for the 42nd Division, which was to remain in army reserve,
according to plan, until about 16 February. At that time the 42nd
Infantry Division, under the command of Major General Harry J.
Collins and reunited with its non-infantry components, entered the
VI Corps line as the 45th Division reverted to army reserve. The
42nd Division continued the defense of the Bitche sector into March.
The period of static defense, the time of holding to positions,
emerging from them occasionally to strike violently and fleetingly
in a sudden raid, and then returning to the original line, lasted
little more than a month. Mid-February came, and the XV Corps was
ready to attack once more.
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