The following extract is from the US
Seventh Army Report of Operations, Battery Press, 1988, pp 665 -
669.
Plans for a Limited Offensive
This attack was not to be on a grand scale. It
was specifically designated as a limited objective attack, and its
purpose was "to rectify and shorten present front lines." Shortening
the line would make for economy of force. Fewer men would be
required to man its defenses. In addition, the objectives to be
gained represented terrain more favorable for the launching of a
future great offensive. There were two prominent "sags" in the corps
line: at Gros Rederching in the 44th Division sector and in the area
of the 63rd Division at Welferding. These were what must be
"rectified", and at the same time it would be necessary for the 70th
Division on the left to keep abreast by moving its entire front
forward.
(see map 5)
Following a series of diversionary raids to be
carried out by units of the 100th Division on the night of D minus
1, it was planned that the 44th Division would attack on D-Day in
conjunction with the right elements of the 63rd Division to
eliminate the Gros Rederching "sag". On D plus 2 the left elements
of the 63rd Division would attack in conjunction with the 70th
Division on their left, wipe out the Welferding "sag", and advance
the entire western half of the corps front. It was originally
planned that the 101st Cavalry Group would attack on D plus 3 in
conjunction with the left elements of the 70th Division, but this
last drive in the series of limited objective attacks was later
postponed. The entire operation was to be carried out in secrecy in
order to confuse the enemy as much as possible. It was felt that
knowledge by the enemy that these attacks were being planned for the
XV Corps sector only and were only limited in objective would impede
the success of the operation and dispel any nervousness on his part
over a possible major, coordinated Seventh Army advance.
"To rectify and shorten present front lines"'
was to mean a slugging offensive, for some a quick raid, and for
others a complicated crosswater movement. Each small and sharply
limited action was a drive to seize high ground a few miles farther
on, to give the Seventh Army a taut line behind which it could build
up offensive strength. D-Day was set for 15 February, and H-Hour at
0646 hours.
The initial attack was a problem in planning
for the 44th, 63rd, and 100th Divisions. The objective assigned to
the 44th Division was a
THE ROLLING
COUNTRY AROUND RIMLING
"...The objective assigned to the 44th Division
was ... between Rirnling and Epping- Urbach..."
general east-west line from a
point between Rimling and Epping-Urbach west to the northern fringes
of the eastern third of the Bliesbrucken Woods. On the left flank
the 255th Infantry of the 63rd Division was to attack the middle third of the Bliesbrucken
Woods in conjunction with the 44th Division. The western third of
the woods, separated from the larger mass by a clearing of about 500
yards in width, was already within the lines of the 63rd Division.
On the right of the 44th Division the 100th Division was to move its
left flank elements slightly forward to conform to the general
advance.
The plan of attack formulated by the
44th Division called for the employment of all three infantry
regiments, to be supported by the 749th Tank Battalion. A number of
considerations were responsible for such a plan. First, the nature
of the terrain made a natural division of the objective into three
parts. Secondly, the necessity for withholding a large division
reserve was reduced to a minimum since the objective of the attack
was limited and detailed knowledge of enemy dispositions gave
reasonable assurance that no large enemy force would intervene prior
to the seizure of the objective. A suitable division reserve was
provided for, therefore, by the requirement that each regiment
maintain one battalion in reserve to be committed only on division
order. A third reason for the decision to strike with all three
regiments on the line was the desire to inflict the maximum damage
possible on the enemy. Since the distance to be covered was short,
no more than two miles, it was considered advisable to strike with
maximum power and speed so as to penetrate the enemy line rapidly
and take his positions from the flank and rear. The desirability of
maintaining centralized control over the division tanks was
influenced by two factors: the poor condition of the ground made it
questionable whether tanks would be able to function effectively in
all parts of the division zone, and better results were anticipated
if the tanks were to be employed in mass for shock action to exploit
a penetration anywhere along the front.
The 324th Infantry on the right and the
71st Infantry in the center were to attack at 0545 hours. This was
an hour before daylight. The open terrain and the high rolling hills
gave the enemy excellent observation. On the left the 114th Infantry
and the 255th Infantry Regiment of the 63rd Division were to jump
off half an hour later. Contact in their zone was closer, and a good
deal of their sector was heavily ,wooded. At 0645 hour, as soon as
visibility would permit coordinated
action
with the infantry, the 749th Tank Battalion was to attack, passing
through the infantry regiments to seize regimental objectives and
dominate them until they could be consolidated by the infantry
units.
MACHINE GUN
EMPLACEMENT IN BLIESBRUCKEN WOODS
"...Contact in their zone
was closer, and a good deal of their sector was heavily
wooded..."
Although eight battalions of field
artillery were under division command for this operation in addition
to the supporting fires of corps artillery, it was decided to attack
without an artillery preparation, Because the enemy positions were
well dug-in with overhead cover, it was thought that artillery would
have little effect. Moreover, it was felt that the surprise gained
by attacking without artillery would outweigh the possible
destructive effect of a preparatory barrage.
On the right flank of the 44th Division the
324th Infantry had for its objective the Buchenbusch Woods between
Rimling and Epping - Urbach and the high ground beyond. The enemy in
that area was the 37th Panzer Grenadier Division, at least two of
whose companies had been identified as manning a main line of
resistance that ran generally on an east-west line through the
woods, which were about 1,300 yards wide. Active patrolling of the
past weeks had made the men of the 324th Regiment well acquainted
with the terrain and the principal strong points in the enemy's
defense. It had been discovered that while the south edge of the
woods was heavily mined and wired with many emplacements and machine
gun positions, the open slopes east and west of the woods were
either unguarded at night or held by only a weak outpost that could
be avoided or quickly subdued.
