7th ARMY's OPERATIONS DURING NORDWIND:
HITLER'S LAST OFFENSIVE
"Strength lies not in defense but in attack!" 
Mein Kampf... Adolph Hitler

The campaign star on the European Theater ribbon for the bitter winter combat during December 1944 and January 1945 is titled "Ardennes-Alsace". Over the past 50 years the "Battle of' the Bulge" in the Ardennes region in northern France and Belgium has received as much publicity as Gettysburg. Unfortunately Nordwind, Hitler's last offensive in Alsace which, in spite of 40,000 German and American casualties, is practically unknown. The Army Chief of Military History's World War II 50th Anniversary Commemorative Pamphlet for the battle of Ardennes-Alsace wryly noted in its "Further Reading", which listed extensive sources on the Ardennes fighting, that "fighting in the Alsace region has been sparsely covered" and highlights the book "When Odds Were Even" by Keith Bonn for further information on Nordwind.

To set the stage for coverage of Operation Nordwind, an overview of the status of 6th Army Group in relation to the rest of General Eisenhower's forces in Europe is necessary. After the 7th Army launched its airborne and amphibious invasion of southern France from the Mediterranean on 15 August it rapidly attacked north to link up on 11 September 1944 with the southern flank or 12th Army Group which was attacking east from Normandy to the German border. This link up in September just 27 days after the invasion of southern France, resulted in a solid front of' three Army Groups across western Europe extending from Switzerland to the English Channel. The Army Groups were disposed with Montgomery's 21st in the north, Bradley's 12th in the center and Dever's 6th in the south. With these three Army Groups driving to the German border the twin constraints of prolonged military campaigns logistics and combat loss replacements soon became a serious problem.

General Eisenhower's broad front strategy assigned the key role for defeating the German Army to Bradley's 12th and Montgomery's 21st Army Groups. Eisenhower viewed Devers 6th Army Group's role as guardian of the south flank of the main thrust into Germany by the two northern Army Groups. While 6th Army Group's supply line from Marseilles was adequate, its secondary role resulted in it receiving the lowest priority for both logistics resupply and personnel replacements.

As previously noted a major problem which plagued US combat operations during WW II was the shortage of personnel, particularly combat loss infantry replacements. By the fall of 1944 the need for infantry replacements in Europe was critical. As noted by General Eisenhower "only a small percentage of soldiers in a combat theater operates in front of' the light artillery ... yet this small portion sustains 90% of the casualties". He said - "The fighting descended to the dirtiest type of infantry slugging. Operations on the part of infantry became mainly endurance, stamina and courage. In these conditions infantry losses were high, particularly in infantry platoons. The infantry which habitually absorbs the bulk of the losses, was now taking all of them ... Also because of the coldest winter in four decades exposure cases of frost bite, trench foot and respiratory diseases were far more numerous among infantry soldiers." As a result of this drastic shortage of infantrymen, further exacerbated by a shortage of replacements from the US, steps were taken in France to retrain Air Force and Communication Zone service personnel as infantry replacements.

During November the 6th Army Group continued its attack to the northeast with the 7th and First French Armies. In a series of rapid punches they broke through the German fortified positions designed to defend the Vosges mountain range seizing the key passes and debauching onto the Alsace plains. Since the VI Corps was being slowed down by stubborn German delaying actions 7th Army ordered XV Corps to send an armored force cutting across the rear of the enemy- holding up the VI Corps to seize Strasbourg. The XV Corps's French 2nd Armored Division attacked towards Strasbourg and entered the city on 23 November. The defense of Strasbourg would later not only become a political issue between Eisenhower and deGaulle but would also effect the subsequent defensive tactical disposition of 6th Army Group.

Eisenhower, concerned over Patton's progress, changed Dever's orders from seizing a bridgehead across the Rhine to attacking north to assist attack on the Saar Basin. To carry out this mission 6th Army Group issued new orders for the 7th Army to attack north. The First French Army along the Rhine was given orders to reduce the German 19th Army's bridgehead at Colmar.

OPERATION NORDWIND

In November and December the army's normal combat losses were increased by frost bite, trench foot and respiratory diseases caused by the bitter cold weather and snow. Due to 12th Army Group's priority for replacements 7th Army had to turn to their own resources to obtain infantry replacements to keep their combat eroded divisions in action. The 7th Army made arrangements to organize their own "Conversion Training Program." General Patch noted in his Diary that "since Army Ground Forces would not support his program that he planned to utilize an experienced training cadre from his own infantry divisions in the 7th Army." He also noted, due to critical shortages in infantrymen, that his 2nd Replacement Depot would also give infantry training to Field Artillery and Anti-Aircraft artillerymen as well as rear area service troops.

Meanwhile the nine infantry regiments of the 42nd, 63rd and 70th Infantry Divisions, which had received accelerated orders for deployment from AGF in October, started arriving at Marseilles and were assigned to 7th Army. They were organized as Task Forces under their Assistant Division Commanders- Task Force Linden (42nd.) and Task Force Harris (63rd.) and Task Force Herren (70th.). The small provisional headquarters of each Task Force was reinforced by signal and service personnel to enable them to operate only on a limited scale in the rear areas.

The "7th Army's Report of Operations" noted that they had been informed of' the canceled maneuvers and lack of combined training of these Task Forces. Restrictions on their employment were highlighted in the Report - "None of these units had completed its full training in the United States but it was the intention of higher headquarters that they train intensively under 7th Army Headquarters supervision until such time that they could be indoctrinated by employment on (rear area) lines of' communication duties."

On 16 December the Germans launched a massive surprise attack in the Ardennes with 200,000 troops which virtually destroyed the 106th Infantry Division and created a large salient which threatened to split the 12th Army Group. This massive attack surprised the Allies who had become complacent since the Normandy landings feeling that they were "on a roll".

By 18 December General Eisenhower held a meeting of his senior commanders to draw up plans for a counter attack. Patton was given responsibility for the counter attack against the southern shoulder of the penetration by Eisenhower and Bradley. He rapidly shifted the thrust of the 3rd Army from attacking to the east to attacking to the north into the vulnerable southern shoulder of the German salient. To release Patton's troops for this attack the boundary between 6th Army Group and 12th Army Group was shifted 25 miles to north west, near St. Avold, with the 7th Army taking over the sector formerly held by the 3rd Army. In addition 6th Army Group was directed to stop all offensive operations and go over to the defensive.

This order for the 6th Army Group to go over to the defensive resulted in shifting of divisions across the entire sector as it repositioned its forces. This change was further exacerbated as Devers was also called upon to earmark two divisions, the 36th Infantry and the 12th Armored Divisions for SHAEF reserve. With the 7th Army now holding a front of 126 miles with only six infantry divisions and one armored division in reserve they were stretched dangerously thin. Their extended front resulted in each division defending 20 miles, each regiment 6 miles and each battalion 2 miles.

At this time desperate for troops the mission of the newly arrived Task Forces from the 42nd (Linden), the 63rd (Harris) and the 70th (Herren) was reevaluated. The first blow came when the directed training was scrapped and the concept of using the Task Forces only on rear area duties was discarded. Faced with the offensive in the Ardennes and new Ultra Intelligence of the threat of an imminent attack in Alsace against the over extended 6th Army Group the "rear area limitation on their use" was canceled. Next their responsibility was stretched with a classic mission creep technique to include use in manning "defensive positions". This concept was soon modified to include manning front line "defensive positions" on the west bank of the Rhine. The next blow came from SHAEF Headquarters when each Task Force was levied 600+ infantry men to be sent as replacements to reinforce infantry divisions fighting in the Bulge!

The next step was to bring the Task Force Commanders to the 7th Army headquarters at Saverne to be briefed on their new mission: Assignment to VI Corps and to defensive sectors on the west bank of' the Rhine. The move northward started on the 22nd and was completed on the 26th of December. Defensive positions to be assumed along the Rhine were co-ordinated between Task Forces Linden, Herren and Harris. On its arrival in Europe, the XXI Corp was originally to assume command of' the three Task Forces and protect the 7th Army east flank along the Rhine. However due to the German attack in the Bulge and Ultra Intelligence on Nordwind, the XXI Corps was assigned instead to command the SHAEF reserve consisting of the 36th Infantry Division and 12th Armored Division.

Meanwhile, SHAEF Headquarters was increasingly alarmed at the Ultra intelligence reports which indicated that the Germans were preparing for a surprise attack against the 6th Army Group in Alsace. Worried over the continuing problems with reducing the Ardennes Bulge General Eisenhower issued orders on 26 December for General Devers to pull 6th Army Group back to a defense line on the Vosges mountains, giving up Strasbourg and the Alsace plain along the Rhine. When deGaule heard of giving up Strasbourg it initiated a political controversy with Eisenhower which became termed the "Strasbourg Incident". This problem which was to persist over the next few days not only exacerbated the relationship between Eisenhower and Devers but had a direct influence on the 6th Army Group's deployment to meet the upcoming German attack in Alsace!

On 27 Dec., to strengthen their defensive position, Seventh Army extended their boundary south along the Rhine to include the three Task Forces - Herren, Harris and Linden. One regiment of Task Force Harris was attached to the 3rd Infantry Division which was assigned to the First French Army surrounding the German's Colmar bridge head on the west bank of the Rhine south of Strasbourg. The assignment order cautioned for "use in a defensive role only - except in an emergency." This attachment of one of TF Harris's infantry regiments, "a partially trained line or communication unit -scheduled for further training" to an infantry division was the first direct violation of the spirit of' their original assignment orders to Europe. However, with a German attack expected against their undermanned front, the philosophy or "what's best for the most" seemed appropriate!

Devers directed Patch to draw up three delaying positions for the 7th Army as follows: First: on the American held sector of the Maginot Line; Second: Bitche-Moder River to Rhine; Third: The line Bitche - Ingweiler to the Moder River. Forth and final, roll back under heavy pressure all the way to the east slopes or the Vosges Mountains giving up Strasbourg.

With the failure of the Ardennes offensive to achieve a break through, Hitler began to look to Alsace, which had been weakened by the pull out of the 3rd Army for the Bulge. On the 22nd of December, Army Group G was authorized by Hitler to begin planning and rebuilding the forces allocated for the attack. Three days later, Hitler, Von Runstead and Blascowitz reviewed the plans and approved the attack, code named Nordwind, for New Year's Eve! Under command of the German First Army they would launch a major thrust. The main attack with four refitted infantry divisions would attack east of Bitche through the mountains with the objective of seizing the road Wingen-Wimmeneau-Ingweiler which would allow them to utilize their Panzer Divisions to debouch from the mountains to link up with an attack from Himmler's "High Command OberRhine" from a bridge head across the Rhine north of Strasbourg coordinated with the 19th Army's attack from the Colmar bridge head. If these two drives linked up as planned 7th Army would not only be split but the VI Corps to the north would be trapped.

German Army Group G issued orders on 24 December to launch operation Nordwind on 1 January. Captured German orders from Army Group listed "K" day, beginning of forewarning- as 26 December and "O" day beginning of' attack on 1 January 1945. Extracts from this order follow:

a. Main attack with the majority of the attack forces from the area east of Bitche. First objective: reaching the line Sarreninsberg-Wimmenau-Rothback. b. Secondary attack - cast of the Blics in a southernly direction toward Rohrbach. c. Assembly area of the 25th PZ Gren Div such that after the development of the situation it can be pushed out behind either of' the two attack groups.

Objective of operation is to cut off the greatest portion of enemy strength in lower Alsace from its rearward communications and simultaneously to attack and destroy the enemy situated west of the Vosges between present front and the area west of Phalzburg and as a final goal establish communication with the north front of' the Nineteenth Army.

In this the participation of the Army Group Ober Rhine will simultaneously with the beginning of the attack of Army Group "G" to develop with strong assault troops the bridge head on the Rhine north of' Strasbourg to the widest front possible.

The 361st Volks Grenadier Division of the XXXIX Corps to break through the Division front in the Baerenthal area and push south through Reipertswiller to the Moder River at Wimmenau. The 256th VG Division was to push south to the exits of the Vosges to block enemy counterattacks. The concept was to attack by infiltration, then attack strong points held by the enemy blocking roads through the mountains to prepare for the advance of panzers and heavy artillery for the second phase of the attack, east onto the Alsace plains."

After this Order was issued Hitler held a briefing for his commanders prior to Nordwind similar to the "pep rally" prior to the Ardennes offensive. He recalled Frederick the Great's defeats which convinced his supporters that they should surrender. However, Hitler said he made one last attack, which proved successful and saved the dat. He emphasized the were now in a similar scenario. Hitler said "I hope we can push the right flank forward rapidly so as to open the approaches and push rapid into the Rhine." His said his objective was to destroy 7th Army forcing a diversion of troops from Ardennes and weakening the Alliance.

The Ultra Intelligence available at this time indicated that the German attack against the 7th Army would come on 1 January, '45. Their objective would be to seize the Saverne Gap in the Vosges Mountains and trap the VI Corps in north eastern France. It was estimated that two German divisions would attack down the Saar Valley to seize the Saverne Gap. Three Volks Grenadier Divisions would push down the spine of the low Vosges to seize the Wimmaneau-Ingweiler road. This seizure would be reinforced with armor for an attack east to link up with an attack west from across the Rhine. Army Group Ober Rhine, a special group directly under Hitler's headquarters was organized to seize a bridge head on the west back of the Rhine followed by an attack west to link up with the Vosges attack, thus cutting off and isolating VI Corps.

At the end of December, 7th Army covered a front of 84 miles from the Rhine west to the 12th Army Group boundary just east of Saarbrucken. The XV Corps in the west held their front with 3 divisions. From west to east, the 103rd, 44th and 100th. The 44th and 100th Division were each reinforced by one regiment from Task Force Harris. The west flank covered by the 106th Cavalry Group, Task Force Hudelson linked the two Corps . The 2nd French Armored Division was in reserve.

The VI Corps in the east deployed two infantry divisions on line, the 79th in the east and the 45th in the west. Task Force Hudelson provided a screen across the mountains from the boundary with XV Corps to the west flank of the 45th Division. It consisted of the 14th Armored Division, 62 Armored Infantry, B of the 645th Tank Battalion and the 117th and 94 Cavalry Squadrons. The 14th Armored Division in Corps reserve was echeloned to defend the passes in the Vosges mountains.

With an attack expected the "facade of defensive positions for the Task Forces began to fade." In final preparation for the projected German attack on 1 January, final orders were given by 7th Army to the two remaining Task Forces in VI Corps. They were attached to the two front line Infantry Divisions of the VI Corps "for occupation of the Vosges positions." TF Herren to the 45th Division and TF Linden to the 79th Division.

The following accounts which give a daily overview of the general situation for early January are keyed to the "6th Army Group, US Army in W.W.II - Special Studies, Chronology. Ch. Mil. History 1946" and 45th Division G-3 Reports. The description of Task force Herren and the 274, 275 and 276 Infantry Regiments are based on archival files, books and manuscripts and oral history accounts of the participants. (Note: Sleep depravation and fatigue resulted in frequent use of Benzedrine to keep commanders called back for orders to headquarters alert. When researching Archives a note of caution. During heavy fighting and rapid movements of troops under enemy pressure the facts are often garbled and "Fog of Battle" sets in.)

1 January 1945

6th Army Group: Germans launch offensive designated Operation Nordwind. In XV Corps : two pronged enemy thrust forces 106th Cav. Gp., 44th Div. and 100th Div. to give ground 100th Div. caught between 2 attacks withdraws right flank exposed by withdrawal of TF Huddleson. Elements of TF Harris help check enemy. RCT 141, 36 Div., moves up to plug gap between XV and VI Corps. VI Corps: Enemy drives salient into flank of Corps south of Bitche. TF Huddleson's thin line pushed back. 45th Div contains enemy .... Reinforcements from TF Herren and 79th Div are rushed to 45th Div whose boundary is moved West. 79th Div's right flank extended to Rhine....

Terrain Analysis : The low Vosges mountains formed a barrier ten miles wide between the XV Corps on the left and the troops of the VI Corps on the right. The 45th Division, with Task Force Huddleson was responsible for the defense of the mountains south of Bitche. The main roads running east west through the mountains in this area ran from Bitche to Niederbronn and from Wingen Sur Moder to Ingwiller. South of these was the east west road running through the Saverne Gap. A key north south road through the mountains ran from Bitche to Bareanthal then south on a secondary road through the key road junction at Reipertswiler south to the strategic Wingen-Wimmenau-Ingweiler road.

This battle for the low Vosges mountains held by the 45th Division on the West flank of VI Corps became a battle for these icy roads and passes through the snow covered forested mountains. Control of these roads was essential for the 7th Army in order to be able to coordinate their Corps to the east and west of the mountains. Seen from the German perspective the rugged character of the terrain, if it could be seized by a sudden assault, would could give a temporarily secure flank so that if they could seize these roads they could split the 7th Army. The successful seizure of these roads would then offer an opportunity to launch an attack to the southeast which would link up with attacks from the Colmar Pocket to the west cutting off VII Corps which could then be isolated and destroyed.

The battle for the Low Vosges which followed was dictated by the terrain: it became a brutal infantry battle in the snow covered mountains and icy roads. The enemy attack against the left flank of the VI Corps held by the 45th Division and Task Force Huddleson become a struggle for these key roads and passes. The initial attack of Nordwind south of Bitche destroyed Task Force Huddleson's screen between the west flank of the 45th Division and the 100th Division on the east flank of the XV Corps leaving a gap through which the enemy poured. The west flank of the 45th Division was extended to cover this sector and reinforcements were attached to the Division by VI Corps to block the penetration.

A key problem for VI Corps was to redeploy troops to link up with the east flank of the XV Corps where the 141st Infantry of the 36 Division had been moved up to secure the threatened east flank of the 100th Division. However, the most immediate danger was the hole torn in the defenses by the overwhelming of Task Force Huddleson on their left flank. A decision was made to turn the responsibility for this breakthrough to the 45th Division. This required the rapid shifting of infantry regiments from the 79th Division and Task Force Herren to the 45th Division to allow them to contain the penetration.

The major fighting took place in key areas as the 45th Division struggled to limit the penetration. FIRST: stabilizing the shoulders of the penetration. And SECOND: containing the depth of the attack by defending the Corps reserve position on the Wingen-Wimmenau-Ingwiller road. Their problem was similar to that faced initially by 12th Army Group in the Battle of the Bulge, however with out additional resources such as Montgomery's XXIst Army Group and the 3rd Army to assist.

The first mission which faced the 45th Division on 1 January was to limit the enemy penetration. The 313th Regiment (-3rdBn) of the 79th Division was attached and moved to the key road intersection at Reipertsweiler at 2230 to block the enemy thrust to the South which threatened the strategic Wingen-Wimmeneau-Ingweiler road.

The 45th Division next concentrated its efforts on reorganizing its defensive position on its eastern flank in order to concentrate units to move to establish blocking positions on the western shoulder of the penetration. The attached 36th Engineer (C) Regiment- relieved the 179th Infantry that evening with the mission of holding the sector between the 79th Division on the east and the 157th Infantry on the west. The 179th moved into reserve with the two newly attached units from the 79th Division - the lst Bn. 314th and the 1st Bn. 315th Regiments.

It had also been reinforced prior to the attack by the commitment of the 275th Infantry attached from TF Herren. The mission of the attached 275th Infantry was to move to Phillipsbourg on the east flank of the 157th Infantry and to link up on 1 January with the 62nd Armored battalion of Task force Hudelson which they were to relieve on 1 January. The Division boundary was moved west to include the projected 275th Infantry position. A liaison officer of the 3rd Battalion of the 275th went to the Command Post of the 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion in Philippsbourg which they were to relieve. While there the Germans launched their attack. This attack changed all plans. Originally the 3rd Battalion was to have relieved the 62nd, the 2nd Battalion was to report to TF Hudelson at Bareanthal and the 1st Battalion was to have remained in reserve. This enemy attack caught the 275th Infantry Headquarters in the middle of a relief and out of communications with both the 45th Division and their Battalions. Being attacked in the middle of a relief would be difficult for an experienced unit with full communications. For the 275th with no organic communications or artillery it was a disaster and further illustrated the weakness of the Task Forces when assigned a full scale combat mission!

By that afternoon TF Hudelson reported to Division that the attack was forcing it to move its CP back to Reipertwiller and the 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion reported that its CP was pulling out of Phillipsbourg. Later that afternoon the Division artillery officer called asking for the location or the 275th Infantry battalions so he could assign liaison officers to co-ordinate artillery support. All communications from the 45th Division were out with the 275th and its Battalions so G-3 dispatched a liaison officer with orders to 275th to tell them to send patrols out to contact the 62nd Armored Battalion. Faced with this attack and the responsibility for stopping it the "Fog of Battle" set in. As described in a book "Ordeal in the Vosges", the accounts by participants, even the official accounts in journals in the archives are "unedited and contain many errors!"

With troops moving to secure the east shoulder of the penetration the next crisis faced by the Division was to stem the enemy thrust south toward the vital Wingen-Wimmeneau-Ingweiler road. The 313th Infantry (-) attached from the 79th Division was en-route to seize Reipertswiller to block the enemy's drive south on the roads leading to Wimmeneau.

2 January '45
6th Army Group

In XV Corps area, pressure forces 44th Div's right flank to fall back ... and causes 100th Div's right flank to fall back further. In VI Corps the Germans maintain pressure against reinforced 45 Div, particularly on its west flank, former zone of TF Hudelson ....TF Herren's 276th Inf takes up switch position in Wingen, Wimmeneau areas. 79th Division takes over S. portion Rhine line held by TF Linden.

45th Infantry Division

As a result of enemy penetrations the left boundary is moved west again to take over the east shoulder of the German penetration. The division withdraws its right flank to Maginot Line defenses under enemy pressure. From right to left the disposition is: 36th Engineer Regt. responsible for maintaining contact with 79th Division on right; next the 180th Regiment and the 157th Regiment on the left.

179th Infantry was committed to stabilize the West Shoulder of the penetration. The first two battalions left for Wingen at 0400. They moved immediately to the north west and launched attacks against enemy troops moving south. Strong resistance was encountered and local counter attacks were repulsed.

275th Infantry (TF Herren) - 1st Bn and 2nd Bn attack against moderate to light resistance and took many prisoners. 2nd Battalion in blocking positions in Southern edge of Baerenthal.

313 Infantry in vicinity of Reipertswiller, on the nose of the penetration, cleared town, placed road blocks on all roads. Repulsed estimated enemy counterattack. 314th Infantry (79th Div) lst Bn. remained in Division Reserve until end of day when attached 313 Infantry at Reipertswiller.

315 Infantry (79th Div) 1st Bn remained in Division Reserve prepared to counter attack any enemy thrusts on order. (G-3 Report)

Accounts from the 275th presented a different story at the grass roots than the view from Division Headquarters. The 3rd battalion was ambushed north east of Philippsbourg and their K Company never received orders to move forward. In the afternoon the Battalion pulled back to Philippsbourg. In the words of the S-3, "the 3rd Battalion got pretty well cut up last night!" Radio contact was out for most of the day with the forward companies of both the lst and 3rd Battalions.

276 Infantry was attached to 45th Division. Moved to occupy Corps switch position along Moder River. 1st Bn.Wingen, 2nd Bn. Wimmenau to Ingwiller with COPL with 37mm AT gun across the Moder River and 3rd Bn in reserve south of Wingen. By the time the penetration was scaled off the 45th Infantry Division had command of eight regiments.

Task Force Herren (274-/276 Inf) 274th Inf moved to new position to the west of Wingen to protect road and west flank of 276 Inf. Orders received, when en route to new position, for 1st Bn 274th to move to vicinity of Philippsbourg where it would be attached to the 275th Infantry which was under heavy enemy pressure.

3 January 45 6th Army Group: - is assigned the defense of Strasbourg. XV Corps withstands further pressure. In VI Corps area enemy expands Bitche Salient entering Wingen and Phillipbourg. 45th Div. withstands pressure against Reipertswiller, Center and right flank element of Corps complete withdrawal to Maginot positions.

45th Division: Enemy objectives in northeastern sector of penetration appear to be the mountain passes running northwest and southeast through Wimmenau and Philipsbourg. Attacks in Phillipsbourg and Reipertswiller areas appear to be designed to obtain key road centers from which to mount further attacks. Initial enemy success on the east shoulder was contained by the end of the day and we still held the southern part of Phillipsbourg.

On the nose of the enemy penetration after heavy fighting in Reipertswiller an enemy tank infantry attack repulsed. One company forced back 600 yards. On the West Shoulder of enemy penetration the 179th Regiment (+ 19th Armored Battalion) in the Sarrienburg region met heavy resistance from a well organized enemy.

The 180th infantry completed switch to West Shoulder. Attacked north to clear gap between 179th and 313th Infantries. Ran into troops from German 951st Regiment moving south to support attack on Wimmeneau.

The 275th Inf + 1st Battalion 274th Infantry (TF Herren) on the East Shoulder of penetration consolidated its positions south of Philippsbourg. The 3rd Battalion moved back under heavy pressure company K joined the 1st Battalion, company L linked up with the 2nd Battalion. The newly attached 1st Battalion 274th attacked Philippsbourg and seized half of the town. 45 Div)

The view from the 275th presented a much grimmer picture. The German 156th V.G. Division launched a strong infantry - tank attack on Philippsbourg. The 1st Battalion was driven back along with the 3rd Battalion in some disarray. The Regimental Headquarters was uninformed of this situation until late that night. As noted in subsequent reports there had been some disorder when the troops fell back. The scattered troops were soon rallied and linked up with units of other battalions.

The 276th Infantry received an attack on the Combat Outpost Line of the 2nd Battalion which was located across the Moder River from the battalion's main line of resistance. Its combat patrols had contact with enemy patrols which were heavily shelled. During the day the regimental area received a few artillery rounds and G-2 reports that our contact is with the German 953rd Regiment of the 359th Division . (Later POW reports identify elements of 361st Division).

Task Force Herren with 274 Inf. (-Bn attached to 275th Infantry) ordered to the Corps reserve position on the Wingen-Ingweiler road. The 274 (-) moved to positions to the east of Wingen. TF Headquarters to position south of corps reserve line.

4 January '45- 6th Amy Group: In VI Corps area 45th Div. continues fight to reduce Bitche salient, 180th Infantry moves to outskirts of Wingen, attacks NE across Wingen-Wimmenau road to ease pressure on Reipertswiller; ...clears about « of Phillipsbourg. Linden's line along Rhine is extended to include zone held by TF Herren.

45th Infantry Division: Now reinforced with Regiments from 79th Division and Task Force Herren (strength 26 Infantry battalions, 10 Artillery battalions). Division attacks to maintain Maginot positions in east. Strong enemy pressure continues against West Shoulder of penetration cast of Sarreninsberg and against Reipertswiller. Heavy enemy pressure against East Shoulder of penetration vicinity of Philippsbourg.

Town of Wingen located on Corps switch position attacked and seized by troops of newly arrived 6th SS Mountain Division. According to PW accounts the 1st and 3rd Bn 12th SS Mtn Regt. moved through gap between the 179th Inf. on the shoulder of the penetration and the 313 Inf at Reipertswiller. 180th Infantry moving north into position between 179th Infantry and 313th Infantry hit 2nd Bn 951st Regiment which was moving to support attack on Wimmineau. Continued German fighting on Western Shoulder. 180th Infantry finally opens road to Reipertsweiler.

The 275th Infantry (+1st Bn, 274th) consolidated its positions south of Philippsbourg and conducted strong counter infiltration combat patrols in area. The 3rd Battalion moved back under heavy pressure, company K joined with lst Bn and L company linked up with the 2nd Battalion. I company still out of contact. 1st Bn 274th launched attack on Philipsbourg. At end of day had seized half of town.

Task Force Herren (-275 Infantry & 2nd Battalion 274th Infantry): 276th Infantry hit by strong enemy attack. Company B ambushed by German troops which seized Wingen.

On the Following day, 5 January, the 276th Infantry launched attack by the 3rd Bn. and COs A and B of the 1st Battalion by tanks. As noted by the participants, it took heavy casualties and was a disaster. By now the German success at Wingen became the focal point of the German drive. The 45th Division's CG and staff's frustrations at the 276th Infantry's failure to regain Wingen before it could be reinforced through the gap in the front line is reflected in the Staff Journals.

The 2nd Bn. 274th attack supported by 2 Bns. of the 276th Infantry was launched on 6 January. It broke into the town but the lead company took heavy losses. Its company commander and executive officer were casualties and it suffered 19 KIA and 40 WIA out of 120 men. The Germans had also suffered very heavy casualties. The German veterans said that the 3rd Bn.12th SS Regiment had 450 when they attacked Wingen on the 4th. By the time they withdrew they only had 2 officers and 110 men left. On January 7th the renewed attack secured Wingen and over 250 prisoners were freed from the church where they had been held, most of them from the 179th. Regiment.

Meanwhile to the north east of Wingen the gap between the east flank of the 313th Infantry and the pass at Rothback held by the 3rd. Bn. 274th Inf. remained a German infiltration route. The 2nd. Bn. 276th was attached to the 313th. Infantry to assist in blocking this hole. On 6 January it joined a coordinated attack of the 179th., 189th and 313th. Infantries. As noted in the 7th Army Report of Operations during this attack the 2nd. Bn. 276th. Infantry seized the castle at Lichtenberg, a village east of Reipertswiller which they held against a fierce German counter attack. On the 7th. January "in conjunction with elements of the 313th. Infantry the 2nd. Bn., 276th. as it continued its attack to the high ground north east of Lichtenberg, trapped and eliminated elements of the 2nd Bn. 852 VG Regt." Its mission complete 2/276 moved south east to rejoin the 276th Regiment.

On 8 January Task Force Herren was given the responsibility for the East Shoulder of the Penetration. The 276th Infantry under Task Force control was ordered to attack north west across r cross compartments into the shoulder of the German penetration at 0700 on the 9th. It cleared enemy from the initial steep ridge and troops dug in for the night. On 10 January the attack continued against increasing resistance and dug in reverse slope positions and increasing mortar and artillery fire. Slow progress was made against numerous dug in enemy machine gun positions. That night the 2nd Bn. made a surprise night attack on Hill 415, the dominant terrain feature in the area, and by midnight seized its objective. In the morning it ambushed an enemy column on a road on the front of Hill 415. The Germans soon counter attacked isolating F and G companies. E company hit by heavy artillery shelling unable to link up with F and G companies.

The 276th. Infantry attack resumed on 11 January to link up with the surrounded companies of the 2nd Bn. however the lst. Bn. encountered strong enemy resistance and heavy artillery and mortar fire which prevented its linking up with the isolated companies of the 2nd. Bn. On January 12th. when the Regiment continued its attack, Company L of the 3rd. Bn. finally broke through to link up with the cut off elements of the 2nd. Bn.

The fierce fighting and brutal weather took a serious toll eroding the strength of both US and German infantry units. The CG of the 361st VG Division recommended that "with 4/5th of its infantry strength casualties that they be replaced." At this time with the initial German thrust in the Vosges mountains stopped their troops, dug in, and went over to a stubborn defense.

A decision was made by 7th Army at this time to bring fresh troops into the area and readjust their forces in preparation for a renewed German attack. TF Herren, which had taken heavy casualties in the bitter fighting, was to be replaced by the 103rd. Division from the left flank of XV Corps. Task Force Herren, minus the 274th Regiment, which remained in the Vosges was to trade sectors with the 103rd Division on the left flank of XV Corps. A complex series of shifts followed as units were shifted to meet this threat of a renewed German attack on the east flank of the VI Corps along the Rhine.

Blocked by the bitter defense of the reinforced 45th Division in the Vosges mountains the Germans next mounted a strong attack by the XXXIX Panzer Corps in the east which threatened to link up with the Gambesheim bridgehead. After fierce fighting across its entire front the 7th Army withdrew to a defensive line extending from Reipertsweiler-Rothback-Bischwieler. The last gasp of Norwind was an offensive on 21 January which was virtually stopped in its tracks.

On 3 February the newly arrived 70th. Division headquarters officially took command of the 275th and 276th Infantries from Task Force Herren which was holding a position on the west flank of 7th Army. Task Force Herren was inactivated, its mission in the Vosges completed. The next question is how did the Task Force Herren operate?

An analysis of the operation of the three infantry regiments of Task Force Herren reaffirms reports that on the down side some units initially had serious problems which reflected their lack of maneuvers and combined training. Equally as important initially was the turbulence caused by the lack of organic communications and artillery support. However, what would one expect of an inexperienced football team which, without even having learned or practiced the plays, was sent into a game against a veteran team, including the 6th SS Mountain Division. After all, learning and practicing "tactics/plays" is what combined training and maneuvers are all about! The key is that aggressive action was taken to replace those commanders who proved to be unable to lead troops effectively in combat and replace them with proven leaders! The silver lining in the cloud was that senior commanders, junior officers, NCO's and aggressive soldiers instinctively took over the needed leadership to carry out the missions assigned their units.

In final analysis Task Force Herren did well. In spite of heavy losses its units defended Philippsbourg and stabilized the east shoulder of the Nordwind penetration. They also stopped the attack on the corps reserve line at Wingen by the veteran 6th SS Mountain Division and so bloodied the units of the 361st Volks Grenadier Division that they had to be withdrawn because of heavy losses.

Looking back on the Task Forces Herren's operation what can we conclude? It is relatively easy to view the operations during Operation Nordwind in the snow covered Vosges mountain and come up with the conclusion in the book "When Odds Were Even", that training is important! As he said "those units (Task Forces from the 42nd, 63rd and 70th Divisions) which did not complete the mobilization training and suffered hemorrhages of trained men and subsequent infusion of ill-trained replacements shortly before commitment to combat suffered much high casualties"

For the military professional this comment on the need for training is a truism like heavy lead or wet water. Phrased succinctly in soldier terms "Sweat in training saves blood in combat!" Having participated in mobilization training in the 6th Motorized and 91st Infantry Divisions before being cadred to the 70th Division there was no question in my mind that hard field training was the sine qua non of a successful combat infantry unit. It is an unfortunate act that Task Force Herren's lack of training did lead to more casualties than it would have taken if the MTP combined training and maneuvers had been completed.

Task Force Herren paid a price in blood for the lack of sweat in training! In reading the archives accounts, published books, company histories, unpublished manuscripts and listening to "oral history type accounts" on Nordwind; one item stands out loud and clear. That was in spite of the lack of' combined training and maneuvers what finally turned the Task Force Herren into a combat unit was the common sense and courage of key leaders and soldiers at the lowest level!

Seen from the "other side of the hill" the observations of a German Colonel who had fought against the French, British and Russians were significant. He commented about the American troops he fought against during Nordwind---"they were extraordinarily flexible, they adapted immediately to a changed situation and fought with great doggedness. They were able to evaluate their experience and through unconventional conduct (transfer) it into results."

In the final analysis Task Force Herren carried out its assigned combat missions though not without heavy costs. They had the third highest casualty rate in the 7th Army, only surpassed by the veteran 79th and 45th Divisions. As summarized in the book "When Odds Were Even" units of the "70th Division (Task Force Herren) which had not completed their combined training or maneuvers and operating without their parent organization's support echelons, fulfilled their missions and played an important part in halting their adversary's advance. They threw back the best soldiers the Germans could offer - few more telling comparisons could be made"

ANALYSIS of 7th ARMY'S USE
of the THREE TASK FORCES

It is interesting to note how a crisis mentality in 6th Army Group and its subordinate headquarters resulted in these Task Forces being thrown into the line to stem the offensive. The orders to the three Task Forces to occupy defense positions on the Rhine was the first step in "mission creep" which violated not only the instructions which emphasized the need for further training, but also those which restricted their use "to rear area". This step, authorizing them "to be used in defensive positions along the Rhine", still attempted to maintain the fig leaf on their defensive use. The next step, orders assigning them to infantry divisions in the XV and VI Corps continued the sophistry of limitations to "defensive use only" of the Task Forces. However, the assignment of the 275th Infantry to relieve a unit of Task Force Hudelson in direct contact with the enemy and the use of battalions and 276 Infantry and its attached 2nd Bn. of the 274th in the attack on Wingen was a clear violation of the restrictions placed on the utilization of the Task Forces- made necessary by the breakthrough of Nordwind's offensive!

The question arises, was using these Task Forces in combat in violation of orders justified? Viewed academically, in a comfortable post war milieu, the answer could be no. From the view point of the winter of 1944 when the 7th Army was under a heavy German attack, without the attachment of these three Task Forces to 7th Army the Germans could well have succeeded in their attack to break out of the Vosges and link up with their subsequent attack from the Gamheshiem bridge head and the Colmar pocket. This would have cut off the VI Corps in northeastern France and split the 7th Army. With this background the answer is an emphatic yes - with a "Thank god" that common sense prevailed and the original orders were ignored!

In his book, "Crusade in Europe", General Eisenhower stated, "that the need for troops (infantry battalions) was so great and his long lines so thinly manned that newly arrived troops were assigned to a special sector and were supported by artillery from Corp and Army formations." He further explained that "this was completely unsatisfactory and complete violation of the purpose the new regiments were rushed into the theater ahead of their equipment. Never the less the requirements of the front allowed us to do nothing less."

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