This account first appeared in the October 1985 issue
of the Trailblazer, pp 6-8. It was written by then Association
historian, Charlie Pence. It was originally in 7 parts and appeared
in the Jan 86, Spring 86, Fall 86, Winter 87, Spring 87 and Summer
87 issues of the Trailblazer.
Author's Note: This account of the 70th Infantry
Division campaign of February and March 1945 is based largely on the
"US Seventh Army Report of Operations," Volumes Two and Three and to
a lesser extent, on Division G-2 and G-3 summaries and journals.
Recollections of personal experiences during this campaign reported
by Trailblazer veterans have been included. Some errors of fact have
been discovered in the Seventh Army report and corrected - there may
be others.
Period maps in 1:50,000 scale can be found
here.
Donald C Pence
B/275
The 70th, Reunited and Rarin' to
Go
By early February 1945, the 275th and 276th had arrived on
the Sarre front, where they had been assigned to the XVth Corps, on
the left flank in the Seventh Army's defensive dispositions. The
Seventh Army's front ran through northern Lorraine so close to the
border that German national territory was visible from many places
in the Aiiierican lines, which faced generally north. Meanwhile,
their brother regiment, the 274th Infantry, remained in the Low
Vosges Mountains in the vicinity of Bitche, where on January 29 it
had been attached to the 100th Division and assigned as reserve
elements in the "Century" Division's defensive deployments.
The three regiments could look back on the month of
January and the last days of' 1944 as the period of' their first
combat; they had performed effectively in the Seventh Army's
successful defense against the German First Army's Nordwind
offensive. Attached to the 45th Division and committed separately
and at different times and places during this offensive, the three
regiments had gradually reassembled and were back under the command
of Brig. Gen. Thomas W Herren 70th Asssistant Division Commander and
commander of the task force bearing his name. Most notably, the 2nd
Battalion, 274th was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for its
outstanding work in the recapture of Wingen and its defense during
the German offensive.
Task Force Herren had emerged from this trial badly
understrength, battered and bloodied but it was a confident outfit
as it assembled near the valley of' the Saar River. January had seen
the three regiments take over 1100 men killed or wounded, to rank
with the veteran 45th and 79th divisions as having received the
heaviest casualties in the Seventh Army's most costly month during
World War II. Men of the task force would remember their many
comrades who had become casualties during their initial trial in
combat. Too, they would remember an enemy who exhibited a persistent
toughness and determination and on occasion exploited the Americans'
inexperience by his employment of' battle tested deceptions.
Certainly they would remember the harshness of' the setting, -the
relentless cold, the snow and ice, the rocky and precipitous
terrain-which redoubled the hardships of' their lives in combat.
With the arrival of Maj. Gen. Allison J. Barnett and his
station February 3, Task Force Herren was dissolved and it's
elements were merged back into the 70th Division. The components
which had arrived from the States only a short time before, closed
into their respective assembly areas. The 274th Regiment joined the
reconstituted division on February 9 from the 100th Division.
On the defensive front, on the right of the 70th Division,
was the 63rd Division, in the Sarreguemines area. On the left, the
106th Cavalry Group had covered the XV Corps West flank; however, on
February 11 the 101st Cav alry Group took over those defensive
positions southwest of Saarbrucken.
During the first weeks of Februarv, the Seventh Army
received an influx of replacement troops, and it's units conducted
intensive programs of training, and battle indoctrination. The 70th
handled its 2,000 replacements in typical fashion. Since most of the
new arrivals had had a minimum of infantry experience, they received
a rigorous 4-day program covering basic weapons, map reading, use of
the compass, battlefield procedures and field work. To promote
teamwork, squad and platoon combat practices were emphasized.
To retain initiative during this static period, constant
patrolling was carried on, varying in purpose and size -small
reconnaissance patrols, larger combat patrols and raids in company
strength. In the raids conducted by 70th units on such objectives as
the villages of Oetingen, Lixing, and Grosbliederstroff and
Brandenbusch woods, the standard mission was to capture prisoners
and kill as many of the enemy as possible. After several weeks of
preparation, the XVth Corps was ready for offensive action.
The Raids of February 6
Four different actions went on simultaneously with varying
degrees of success. All of the gains made that day were conceded
back to the enemy. The same ground was fought for and rewon within
two weeks.
Pfc Wilfred Gould, Co. I, 275th recalls:
"I was in the
2nd Platoon and when we hit Lixing, the Germans - supposed to be
only a few who wanted to surrender - were shooting at us from every
angle. About 12 of us got only as far as an alley between two
houses. Lt. David Turner was shot in the neck just as we got there.
Lt. Cannon, in charge, was later relieved for the operation's
failure. I was able to knock out a machine gun with a bazooka round,
but was then wounded when a sniper bullet exploded a grenade carried
by "Swifty," my loader, wounding him fatally. In all, 13 men were
wounded and 23 remained missing at midnight after the withdrawal."
A Co. I informal record
notes: (That night) "about 2100 T/Sgt. Skeen and S/Sgt. Nelson
staggered into the CP on the verge of collapse. From their reports
it was gathered that the Company had run into trouble. Lt. Cannon
got in about two hours later ahead of other survivors straggling
in." Later the Co. I daily record noted that MIAs and wounded
continued to straggle back from Lixing for a couple of days and that
ultimately 11 men and one officer carried for a time as MIA were
presumed captured and dropped from the company roster.
First Lt. Lawrence Southard, Co. G, 275th, remembers:
"G Company was assigned the job of hitting Grosbliederstrof.
Approaching the towni, my command party took coer in a building next
to a mill-race and waterwheel. I told O'Conner and Wilkerson to have
a look on the other side. Reaching the top of the rise above the
mill-race, both men shouted 'Machine gun!' and jumped back down just
as it opend fire. Dirt was spattering us from the bullets pounding
into the ground above our heads. There ws one grenade left in our
group, and it ws thrown just before we pulled back to the creek.
"Everyone made it except Sgt. Louis Hoger, my commo
sergeant. When we got back to the creek, we heard him cal for help.
I went back and found him stuck under a footbridge over the
mill-race; the radio on his back had become fouled in the bridge
underpinning. Lying near him, I was able to coach him into working
himself free. Presently we both made it back to the creek.
"Pvt. Donald G. Grisen was killed that day, Sgts. Hill
and Hoger had crossed an open area adjacent to a storage shed. Then
Grisen, another man and I started across when an enemy machine gun
opened fire. All three of us hit the ground. Grisen as hit with a
hail of bullets and lay there unmoving. I crawled back to the shed.
The other man moved a leg, and Sgt. Hill called to him asking him
whether he was hurt. When the man answered he didn't think so, Hill
shouted back, 'Well get your ass over here!' And he did."
S/Sgt. Charles Lobs, Co. K, 275th, recounts that they were
sent out about 0300 to take high ground, Brandenbusch, above
Grosbliederstroff. "Whatta 15 hours!
"Near the crest the Germans had a schuh-mine field
bounded by a hayrake and what we called a 'pissmobile.' Our scout
didn't realize this and lost a foot right away. Eppstein, our medic,
was called and was just finishing his work on the scout when he
accidentally fell on four more schuhmines and was killed instantly."
The 11-days between the raids and the opening of the drive
to the heights overlooking Saarbruecken was devoted to continued
training, patrolling, organizing of the just reconstituted division,
and preparations for the offensive. In between the men struggled for
warmth and rest against continuing cold and wet and, once in a great
while, found some diversion from their Spartan regimen.
First Lt. Walter Bogart, Sv. Co., 276th, thinks back:
"Aside from carrying out their myiad support duties to keep the
regiments clothed, watered, fed, shooting, communicating and on
wheels, the men and officers of the service Companies had their
exposures to danger when their duties brought them close to the
front. Even the near rear area had its risks-there were land mines,
booby-traps, long-range artillery and air attacks to keep life
behind the front under tension."
Bogart and Sgt. Larry Hadley were in a jeep one night at
the rear of a company truck convoy hauling ammo. Behind the "light
line," Hadley had the jeep's headlights on. There was a sudden flash
of what Bogart first took to be lightning or power-transformer
explosion, then realized it was an enemy aircraft, "Bedcheck
Charley, " on a strafing run against the column.
Coming to the same conclusion, Hadley hit the light
switch, but the two men agreed that it seemed like an eternity
before the headlights blinked out. "Charley' circled the area
several times, then left. Luckily there were no casualties and no
vehicle damage.
Ray Mienheartt, Co. E, 276th, recollects:
"Prior to
moving out, the company was assembling outside a huge barn which had
sheltered us the night before. In the barn, a sergeant was putting
on his overcoat when he heard the firing mechanism snap on a grenade
which had fallen loose from his coat lapel. Grabbing up the grenade,
the sergeant scrambled to the barn door and, with a yell, hastily
threw it.
"The live grenade landed amid a group of 15 or so and
exploded before anyone could hit the ground. Amazingly only one man
was hit-T/Sgt. Jack Ramsey caught a fragment at the base of his
skull. Evacuated, he recovered in a few days and returned to his
company for combat service which would win him a battlefield
commission, a Silver Star, a Bronze Star with clusters, and two
Purple Hearts. Some 40 years later Ramsey died of complications
attributed to the slight wound by the grenade fragment."
First Lt. Ted Heck, 3rd Bn S-2, 275th, recalls:
"Higher headquarters soon required that patrols be accompanied by
one or more members of the I&R regimental platoon-to observe and
critique patrolling techniques. On a night raid into Kerbach by two
platoons from a 3rd Bn rifle company, two I&R men went along. Aside
from having a firefight in Kerbach with no casualties, the only
noteworthy incident was the tripping-off of two enemy 'Bouncing
Betty' antipersonnel mines which sprayed both I&R observers with
rock fragments making them our only 'casualties.' The S-2
conclusion-the mines had been sabotaged, or shortages had caused the
German war industry to substitute rocks for metal fragments in
loading the cannisters of the mines."
The offensive planned for the middle of February was
defined as an attack with a limited objective, "to rectify and
shorten present lines." There were two prominent sags in the line,
one at Gros Rederching in the 44th Division sector, the other at
Welferding in 63rd's sector. These two divisions were to straighten
out their fronts by attacking. Meanwhile, the 70th Division to the
west was directed to keep abreast of these attacks by moving its
entire front forward. The operations plan called for the
Trailblazers to attack on D plus 2, two days after the 44th Division
opened the offensive. D-Day was set for February 15; H-Hour, for
0645.
Attack! The 70th at the
Siegfried Line
ON THEIR POSITIONS the regiments of the 70th confronted a series
of unevenly wooded hills dominating wide, uncovered draws. A network
of roads following the valleys connected the many towns and villages
along them with the industrial and mining centers of Forbach,
Stiring Wendel, and Saarbruecken - the southern gateway to Germany's
Saar industrial basin and a bastion in the Siegfried Line. A
Division G-2 report described the enemy's defenses: "Multiple belts
of entrenchments extend along the southern and southeastern slopes
of the ridge system from Kleinwaldchen (woods) to Pfaffenwald
(forests). Belts of anti-tank ditches and obstacles also extend in
this zone. Secondary lines of entrenchments extend from Kerbach to
Lixing, and along the Saar River through Kleinblittersdorf (opposite
Grosbliederstroff) to Saarbruecken. An anti-tank ditch extends east
from Alsting to the Saar. The Siegfried Line of permanent pillboxes
extends along the southern outskirts of Saarbruecken, then follows
the Saar River to the northwest."
Immediately before the beginning of the XVth Corps offensive,
Div. G-2 identified the major enemy infantry components as the 347th
Infantry Division with three battalions in the line and the 19th
Volks Grenadier Division with two battalions in the line. The enemy
also had an estimated 800 reserves in the Forbach - Stiring Wendel
area.
In the overall scheme the Division's mission was to take the
heights along the Saar River south and southwest of Saarbruecken.
The plan called for seizure of the high ground extending due west
from Schoeneck and the larger, mostly wooded, range of hills running
southeast from Stiring Wendel to Buebingen. The 70th attack was to
be made with all three regiments on line, the 276th on the left, the
274th in the center, and the 275th on the right.
One minute after midnight, February 17, the 276th, with the 3rd
Battalion on the left and the 1st on the right, moved out through a
heavy fog toward its initial objective: the hills between Oeting and
Forbach. The main enemy positions ran west from the southern edge of
Forbach and southeast from there through Oeting to the height
Kelsberg. The 3rd Battalion advanced quickly through enemy small
arms fire to take the height Fahrberg while the 1st Battalion took
Kelsberg. Key defenses at Oeting remained in enemy hands.
The two battalions launched attacks simultaneously on Oeting from
east and west but were driven back by intensive fire from
self-propelled 88mm guns. Heavily mined roads forestalled the use of
armor to support the attack, and the 1st and 3rd battalions withdrew
to their two hills to dig in.
IN THE DIVISION CENTER the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 274th
had crossed the line of departure at 4:30 a.m. on February 17. Their
assignments were the clearing of Stiring Wendel and occupation, with
the 275th, of the heights south of the Saar. But there was an
intervening series of hills and towns to be taken beforehand. The
first objective was Kerbach and then the high ground to the
northwest. Kerbach was entered, but the advance stalled there when
enemy tanks counterattacked from Etzling and Behren. Artillery
support was summoned and the response beat back the enemy armor. By
4:20 p.m. Kerbach and Behren were cleared.
After moving through K Company in Behren during the predawn
hours on the 17th, I Company, 274th was moving in two columns along
a trail across an open field when it became pinned down by
machine-gun fire. From the adjacent woods came a voice shouting in
broken English: "Americans, Americans vee vill giff you 10 minutes
to put down your arms and surrender; othervise you vill all die."
The ultimatum was repeated, but not a second time, after an I
Co. rifleman fired a clip into the woods. Still the company was
stalled where it was behind the leading platoon, which was taking
casualties from enemy shellfire, as it remained without initiative.
Then 2nd Lt. Harold D. Wilson came up from the rear, began urging
those around him to get going, and led the way into the woods. The
advance, once started again, continued on to the objective, with
Wilson occasionally calling out, "Let's keep going! Let's keep
going!" even after being wounded by Panzerfaust fragments in the
face and leg. Wilson was killed a couple of weeks later.
Following the Behren-Forbach road, L Company, 274th moved forward
on I Company's left, initially encountering no opposition, although
there was firing all around it. Then it was taken under machine-gun
fire. Hitting the dirt, the men waited, but not for long. S/Sgt.
Harold F. May crept and crawled forward until he got within range.
Then he started tossing hand grenades, accounting for two Jerry
machine guns. Then the Company got moving again. He was awarded the
Silver Star.
First Lt. Fred Cassidy, Co. G, 274th, recalls that its advance
on the 17th left G Company out front of the assault companies on its
flanks. It had taken and held the key Wingertsknopf height, north of
the Behren-Kerbach road. Accordingly the Company's positions were
deployed to defend the height in all directions, and defensive
artillery fires covering the approach from Etzling were prearranged.
Attached H Co. mortar and machine-gun sections were positioned to
cover to the front while the G Co. weapons platoon protected the
rear.
The expected German attack, with tanks and infantry, came at
dusk and was allowed to approach half way up the slope before the
artillery TOT was called in and fire of all weapons on the ground
was opened by the firing of flare signals. The attackers were moved
down as they came on, taking heavy casualties. The next morning G
Company was still on Wingertsknopf when F Company and the 3rd
Battalion came upon its flanks. (Note: in "Snow, Ridges and
Pillboxes" the 274th combat history, Wingertsknopf was given the
name "Cassidy's Hill" in honor of the G Co. commander.)
The 275th on the right flank had been ordered to support the
274th's attack by flanking fire and to advance on its own initial
objectives, the towns of Lixing and Grosbliederstroff. With 1st,
3rd, and 2nd battalions abreast from left to right, the 275th had
moved into the attack at 1:25 a. m. The 1st Battalion cleared the
high ground in front of Lixing, overcoming several enemy
strong points while doing so. The 3rd Battalion advance in the center
was steady despite opposition by heavy machinegun fire. On the right
flank the 2nd Battalion kept pace, advancing to Brandenbusch woods,
from where it was to assault Grosbliederstroff to the east. During
the night the road approaching this objective from the west was
swept of mines.
Pfc Clarence Bentley's Co. H machine-gun squad was assigned to
support G Company in its predawn attack on Wingertsknopf. After the
objective had been secured, the fog in which the assault had been
carried out thinned sufficiently for the enemy to spot the American
force on the high ground. For the next several days, the company
endured a succession of counterattacks.
During these attacks Clarence distinguished himself by taking
a water-cooled machine gun off its tripod mount, cradling it in his
left arm, and using the gun so effectively as to make it a decisive
factor in the repulse of the most dangerous assault. He was awarded
the Silver Star for this action.
Early the next morning, February 18, the assault battalions of
the 274th Infantry advanced to the northwest and crossed the
Etzling-Behren road. After driving off several small enemy groups in
firefights, the battalions threaded their way uphill into the thick
forest blanketing Kreutzberg ridge, just south of Stiring Wendel.
Around noon a German counterattack from Etzling was forced back by
artillery and self-propelled gunfire.
"Near Etzling, the mines were thick and our supporting tanks
couldn't move up to support our pinned-down infantry. It was a job
for the engineers, and teams of the 270th Engineer Battalion moved
in under enemy fire. Pfc. Deno A. Gaffi yelled to our waiting
tankers. 'There's your path!' as he lifted the last mine."
An ENEMY PRESSURE, however, was maintained throughout the
afternoon as a force of about 12 tanks, making repeated sorties
along the road south of Etzling, posed a constant threat to the
274th's 2nd Battalion on the right flank of the regiment. Meanwhile
well directed German artillery fire was a continuing problem.
As the 2nd Battalion resumed its attack into Kerbach begun the
day before, Pfc. Hy Schorr, Co. H, 274th, was at his HMG position in
a house from where he was firing into the center of town. During a
lull, he was watching an E. Co. mortar section sergeant nearby when
the noncom fell to the ground. "Suddenly white smoke seemed to shoot
from his body and he began pulling at his belt. In seconds the
grenade exploded. S/Sgt. William E. Lehman was awarded the DSC
posthumously for deliberately falling on a live grenade to protect
the lives of his mortarmen," Hy recounts.
Late in the afternoon the 274th's attack was halted while assault
units reestablished contact with each other. Now the 2nd Battalion's
concern about the threat posed by the enemy force holding Etzling
was eased when the 275th's 3rd Battalion took that village.
Early that morning the 275th Infantry on the Division right flank
had resumed its attack. First Battalion elements entered Lixing and
worked their way through the town house by house until it was
cleared. Some troops advanced from Lixing toward Etzling, cautiously
picking their way through Schuhmine fields.
T.Sgt. A. W. Rorabaugh, Co. C., 275th remembers: "When the big
push started, we swept around to the right of Lixing, avoiding the
numerous schuhmines which had been exposed by the recent thaw of the
snow. We had moved up into the Hartwald and started clearing it when
the machine gun opened fire, killing S/Sgt. Fran Hetzel, Pfc. Louis
Paschal, and Pvt. Alfred Casey.
"Leonard and I crawled around to the right while Alfred Mejia
went left, and we caught the enemy gun in a cross-fire from our
BAR's. After we had poured a lot of fire into their position, the
Krauts signaled that they wanted to give up. When they came out, one
of our men wanted to shoot them, but someone-not I - stopped him,
and they were passed to the rear. "
In what was probably the same action, John Kayat-known as "our
Indian" by his Co. C companions-is remembered to have advanced
through the Hartwald while firing a light machine gun "wide open"
from the hip.
IN THE REGIMENT'S CENTER the 3rd Battalion moved north of Lixing
to approach Etzling from the east, shortly after noon. After sending
patrols forward to check the approaches to the village, the
Battalion attacked and took Etzling. In this action, lasting just an
hour, 64 prisoners were taken.
First Lt. Ted Heck, 3rd Bn S-2, 275th, explains: "The taking
of Etzling by K Company was much facilitated by a TOT artillery
barrage which took much of the fight out of the enemy garrison.
Clearing of houses was well under way when I came up from the rear
to find out about the situation. Soon I was approached and informed
by a French resident that the cellar oj' his house nearby remained
occupied by 10 German soldiers. I was not much convinced that the
Frenchman's unwelcome guests would be as docile as he described
them; still I drew my pistol and stormed into the cellar. But as he
predicted, the Germans meekly dropped their burp guns and rifles and
filed out of the house."
The 275th's 3rd Battalion then moved out of Etzling and hastily
dug in on the lower slopes of the height Pfaffenberg. Farther east
the 2nd Battalion had pushed into Grosbliederstroff. By mid-morning
the German defenders had been forced back to the northern end of the
town. The Battalion's attack was continued, troubled by artillery
and mortar fire from the other side of the Saar River. Finally the
last German strongpoint in the town fell in a sharp firefight.
On the divisional left flank, the 276th still confronted the key
defenses around Oeting. During the night it had cleared the mines
from the road into that village. Then the Regiment resumed its
attack on February 18. By early afternoon Oeting had been taken and
a small enemy infantry-tank counterattack was repelled. Afterwards
the Regiment turned its front to the northwest toward Forbach.
In its path rose three hills covered by the thick woods of
Kleinwaeldchen. The westernmost of the three hills rose sharply from
the forest to afford a panoramic view of Forbach to the north and
visibility to the south as far as Oeting. On its summit stood a
redstone castle, the Schlossberg. The commanding observation given
to the side that held it made the capture of the Schlossberg the
obvious prerequisite to the taking of Forbach.
By nightfall on the 18th two of the three hills in the
Kleinwaeldchen had been overrun. The next morning Co. I advanced
cautiously toward the Schlossberg. Surprisingly, no opposing enemy
fire was encountered and, when the attackers scaled the outer walls,
they found the castle deserted. Almost immediately heavy artillery
and mortar fire began falling in the area. Between barrages the
troops dug in around the buildings.
At 7:20 p.m. an enemy battery of 88mm guns began shelling the
castle with great accuracy. Under this covering fire, German patrols
crept up to the outer perimeter of the company's defenses and cut
its telephone wire. At 8:40 p.m. the enemy artillery barrage was
briefly intensified. Then as it was lifted, German infantrymen began
rushing the castle from three sides, screaming wildly. Despite Co.
I's active resistance with rifle fire, the enemy advance reached to
within yards of the castle.
When he judged that the attacking Krauts were sufficiently close,
the Co. I commander Capt. Herbert J. Andrews had his men called from
their firing positions to shelter inside the castle walls and
requested defensive artillery and mortar fire. Thirty-five dead
Germans were found on the hill around the castle the next morning.
The shelling that came in response-81mm mortar fire of Co. M. and
105mm howitzer fire of the 884th Field Artillery-drove the enemy
back. The vital Schlossberg position remained in American hands.
Supported by the 274th's 3rd Battalion, the 276th assault in
Forbach began late the same afternoon, February 19. The road from
Saarbruecken to Forbach, the Metz Highway, was to be interdicted by
attack aircraft. The 276th's 1st Battalion and elements of the 3rd B
n. 274th were the first units to penetrate into the city in
its southeast section. The enemy opened up with machine-gun and
artillery fire on the advancing skirmishers after they had
penetrated through the first two blocks. When the advance was thus
slowed, 3rd Bn, 276th less Co. 1, descended from the Kleinwaeldchen
and joined in the house-to-house fighting. The attack continued
until shortly after nightfall.
In its "Report of Operations" for February 19, the Seventh
Army G-3 staff evidently found nothing noteworthy in 274th
activities. However, there was a dramatic event involving the
regimental commander that day. Reconnoitering the heavily wooded,
rough terrain on Kreutzberg Ridge, Col. Sam Conley and his party
including Maj. Buford Boyd, 2nd Bn. CO, came fact to face with a
trench full of enemy infantry. Conley and his party seemed trapped
when the enemy opened fire. But then the colonel made a run for it
to get help and got out amid a hail of enemy automatic weapons. Lt.
Fred Cassidy was with one of his Co. G rifle platoons when it
received a radio message of the command group's predicament. Running
forward to investigate, Cassidy ran into Conley going the opposite
way. After a brief discussion, Cassidy fetched the same platoon,
found a supporting tank, climbed on its back, and directed his ad
hoc task force through tangled woods, over barbed wire and to the
rescue. After a brief, hot fight 50 Kraut prisoners were taken.
DAYBREAK on February 20 was attended by drizzling rain and fog,
restricting tank movement to roads and making displacement of
artillery difficult. The 70th Reconnaissance Troop in its patrolling
concentrated on the eastern flank, where the advance of the adjacent
63rd Division had lagged behind that of the 275th Infantry across
the Sarre River. The 275th's 1st and 2nd battalions advanced rapidly
against light resistance, capturing the villages of Zinzing,
Hesseling, and Alsting.
T/Sgt. Rorabaugh: "After Alsting was cleared on the 20th, we
immediately pushed on into the woods beyond and ran into stiff
resistance. We cleared out some pillboxes and took some prisoners.
Among them was a medic wearing a white over-vest with its big red
cross. He did a great job administering first aid to wounded men
from both sides. I remember a German officer had been shot between
the eyes while looking through his binoculars. We used the fit
prisoners as litter bearers."
Sgt. Lee Miller, Co. D, 275th: "We had a fine gun position
south of Zinzing. On the first night of preparing it we had to lie
in snow as we filled sandbags; then before dawn we put the bags in
the hole we'd excavated and camouflaged everything with snow before
withdrawing. After a couple of nights working like this we had a
bunker with a 4"-by-4" timber roof covered by several layers of
frozen dirt. The day before the jump-off the weather thawed, and the
bags sagged under the weight of the roof, making our position
unusable. We had to rebuild the whole thing."
After a small counterattack east of Zinzing was dispersed, the
two 275th battalions fanned out into the wooded areas to the north
and east. However, on their left the 3rd Battalion's attempts to
drive the enemy off the height Pfaffenberg were initially
unsuccessful.
Co. I, 275th "Record of Events": "In the afternoon the Company
attacked the high ground north of Etzling and took it with fixed
bayonets. Casualties were not so light due to our own artillery and
enemy mortars, artillery, and snipers. After digging in at a
position looking down the throats of enemy in Spicheren, the Company
threw back a counterattack. Our artillery continues to give the
Heinies hell. S/Sgt. Fulcher was killed and 12 wounded were
evacuated. Three men were wounded but not evacuated. " (Note: There
is a striking difference in the two preceding accounts of the same
action-a not unusual discrepancy in wartime records.)
Lt. Ted Heck: "A few days before, I had taken a flight over
the front lines in a Divarry liaison plane-part of a program to
familiarize S-2 personnel with the terrain and front-line troop
dispositions. On the day of the attack on Pfaffenberg, I suggested
to my battalion commander that I again fly over the action and radio
down information on enemy troop deployments affecting the
Battalion's assault. Given the okay, I and my pilot were drawing
fire a thousand feet above the action when the assault began. Our
pinpointing of enemy strongpoints was given credit in the success of
the attack and for the lightness of casualties taken. "
Lt. Lawrence DuBose, Co. L, 275th: "The Company's advance took
it across several trenches and a tank-trap ditch. There was some 88
shelling but no one was hit. Unfortunately we became involved in a
firefight in the wet and fog with our K company; Sgt Bridges was
seriously wounded and several others received flesh wounds. Except
for getting wet, nothing was accomplished, and we withdrew to
Etzling in the afternoon. (Note: DuBose's recollection of the
clash between two friendly companies is more consistent with G-3
account of the 3rd Bn assault on Pfaffenberg.)
In Forbach the slow, systematic reduction of the city continued.
Assaulting troops of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 276th Infantry,
advanced along the streets toward the railroad on the northwestern
edge of town forcing the enemy back house by house and block by
block. When the enemy was forced to abandon any defensive position,
his artillery and mortars pounded the area just given up heavily
with mortars and artillery.
At this time the German 347th Infantry Division forces defending
Forbach were receiving local Volkssturm replacements and an
additional 300 infantrymen from the 719th Infantry Division, which
was defending a nearby sector against the American Third Army.
"70th Division Story": "The Simon Mine and Factory at Forbach
was surrounded by a deep anti-tank ditch and a 7 -foot wall
surmounted with iron spikes laced with barbed wire. In a charge to
penetrate the compound by a 3rd Battalion rifle platoon, only one
man reached the wall. Crawling through a hole, he was advancing
beyond the wall when he was hit. S/Sgt. Joseph Kohn, a medic with
the platoon, saw the man fall. Kohn advanced through enemy fire
across the open ground and through the wall to reach the man and
carry him to safety. Kohn was awarded the Silver Star and received a
battlefield commission."
Silver Star citation for Pfc. Willie J. Daigle, Co. E, 276th:
"As the scout for the squad spearheading an attack on strong enemy
positions, Sergeant (then Pfc.) Daigle skillfully maneuvered under
enemy fire and cut through three rows of barbed wire entanglements
to open gaps through which the assault teams gained entrance to
Forbach. Later he deliberately exposed himself to engage an enemy
sniper in a firefight to enable medics in crossing a street exposed
to the sniper's fire and in evacuating several casualties from
there."
Meanwhile, 274th units operating just east of Forbach worked
their way to within a short distance of the Forbach-Sarrbruecken
road (Metz Highway) and other 274th troops swept northeast to high
ground between Spicheren and Stiring Wendel. Spicheren Heights north
of Spicheren was to become an area of particularly bitter German
resistance.
Spicheren, Forbach: "Take them!"
is the 70th Order
THE 70TH DIVISION Operations Instruction No. 7 directing the
actions to be taken by its three regiments on Feb. 21 stated in
part: "274th Inf-Continue attack early morning of 21 Feb 1945.
Capture SPICHEREN. Seize remainder of initial regimental objective.
Be prepared to resume attack NW. I Co and 1/2 M Co 275 Inf revert
control 275 Inf after capture SPICHEREN. 275 Inf-Continue to push
attack and seize final objective. 276 Inf-Resume attack at daylight
and drive enemy from FORBACH. Be prepared to resume attack NW. " At
6:30 that morning the Division G-3 reported to G-3, XV Corps the
70th's current rifle company positions (see map). Unreported were
the positions of Co. K, 274th, Co. I 275th (detached), and Co. G,
276th (detached).
The weather cleared that morning. Pressure applied by the 274th
Infantry from positions north and northwest of Spicheren presently
drove the enemy garrison from the village.
Co. I, 275th, "Record of Events." I Company continues to hold
positions overlooking Spicheren while intermittent sniper fire is
exchanged and our mortars and artillery pound the enemy
unmercifully. About 1400, 1st Lt. Donahue takes a 6-man patrol into
Spicheren and takes the town over, capturing about 25 prisoners.
Then 274th troops move in, but we damn well know who took Spicheren.
" (Note: Co. I, 275th was attached to the 274th at this time;
regardless of what company's men took Spicheren, it was officially
the 274th's booty!)
On a cold morning 1st Lt. John J. Passanisi and Pvt. Paul F.
Walker were on a mission in Spicheren to remove wounded. Walking
down the main street, they were narrowly missed by an incoming 88
shell which impacted only 10 feet away but failed to detonate.
However, Walker's escape was only temporary, and he was killed on
March 15 while going to aid a wounded Co. A, 274th rifleman near
Forbach.
Further east the 1st Battalion of the 275th advanced northward
along the Saar and occupied the wooded high ground overlooking the
eastern part of Saarbruecken. However, two strong enemy
counterattacks forced forward elements back over a half mile to the
middle of the woods (Stiftswald). The enemy drive was finally halted
by the combined firing of infantry, artillery, tanks and tank
destroyers.
Pvt. W. W. Johnson had been assigned as a replacement to Co.
A, 275th only a couple of days before he accompanied his rifle
platoon in the two-battalion advance beyond Zinzing. The platoon had
been pinned down in a firefight in the initial advance, and after
nightfall the platoon sergeant discovered that "Johnny," the
bazooka-man, for whom Johnson was ammo bearer, had left his bazooka
far behind where the platoon had been pinned down. After chewing out
Johnny, the sergeant instructed Johnson to leave the now useless
bazooka rounds behind as the platoon continued its advance in the
darkness through thick woods toward its objective-an enemy bunker.
The next morning, Feb. 21, an assault team from the platoon
advanced on the objective, Johnson being left behind in a foxhole to
cover one flank of the attacking group. The attack quickly ran into
heavy resistance, and Johnson then engaged an enemy tank-infantry
force threatening to encircle the assault team.
Wounded several times in what turned out to be a full-scale
enemy counterattack, Johnson was captured and treated by an enemy
medic. He was liberated when the 1st Battalion advanced again after
blunting the German thrust. While being evacuated to the rear,
Johnson recognized two of his litter bearers as Ray Ireland and Sam
Ganns, with whom he had taken basic training a few short months
before and whom he had last seen in the replacement depot just
before being assigned to the 275th. Ireland, Ganns, and Johnny are
the only names Johnson remembers from his brief experience with his
infantry regiment.
FROM SILVER STAR CITATION, Pvt. William B. Trotter--Co. B, 275th:
"On 21 February at 1600 hours in the vicinity of Saarbruecken, a
counterattacking enemy force threatened to overrun his company's
position. Pvt. Trotter rushed forward alone in the face of intense
machine gun and small arms fire to halt the German drive. Firing
short bursts from his automatic rifle, Trotter advanced to within 15
yards of the enemy group, killing four and capturing eight Germans.
"
On the left of the 1st Battalion, the 275th 3rd Battalion also
advanced up the slope toward the final objective. It too found the
going difficult.
Co. K, 275th "Kings Men": "Again on the 21st, the company moved
out in the attack along the ridge to the right flank. Overcoming
fierce enemy resistence, we were able to take the high ground beyond
the town (Spicheren?). The strain of four days continuous attack was
bringing men to the verge of exhaustion. T/4 Buncic received a wound
but refused to go back to the aid station for treatment. Then he was
killed by shellfire in the Pfaffenwald; the time was 1500. Pfc.s
Labie, Hein, Mitchell, Delarcipiet, Moore, Deamicis, Pettit, Meinike,
Mureeler, and Ammons and Sgt. Wood were wounded and evacuated that
day."
T/Sgt. Richard Becker, Co. L. 275th, recalls: "Leading the
battalion's attack, L Company took 39 casualties, including the
company commander and two other officers, when it was hit by three
counterattacking assault guns supported by infantry. A captured
German NCO who spoke good English was deceived into believing he
could be sent to prison camp in Texas if his captors were pleased
with him. Accordingly, he revealed that the company position would
be hit that evening by a 300-man force.
The Bn S-3, Capt. Garnet Oliver, arrived to take over the
company and immediately moved what was left of the unit-about 50
men-to new positions. Then Oliver, taking the place of the missing
artillery FO, plotted defensive fires to include the company's
position just abandoned and zeroed it in. Sure enough, the enemy
attack came just after dark, just as predicted. It was stopped cold
and the attacking force was badly mauled by a thunderous
time-on-target barrage."
The 3rd Bn. commander, Maj. John M. Duffie, was captured with two
accompanying NCO's on February 21. While reconnoitering out in front
of the battalion, the small party was surprised by the sudden enemy
counterattack. After the war Duffie recalled that his German captors
were anxious to find out what had happened to Task Force Herren,
which had suddenly disappeared from the American order of battle.
(It was now the 70th, again.)
Lt. Lawrence DuBose, Co. L, 275th, recounts: "We started our
advance well before dawn on a pitch-black night in which you had to
keep close enough to touch the man ahead in order to maintain
contact. At dawn we captured several Germans who surrendered
readily. Then we ran into an SP 88 and after a 'staredown' during
which it fired one shot at us, it withdrew.
Moving through some woods, I took a rifle bullet in the stomach,
and a medic gave me some morphine tablets to chew on-but no water.
Sgt. Rankin picked up my maps and ammo saying I wouldn't need them
anymore. Then the company was withdrawn, and I was left with my
runner, Vernon Medford, and a German prisoner. After a time, two men
from the company on our left came up, and these two, plus Medford
and the prisoner, got me back to the aid station on an improvised
litter. They were joined by one of my men, Murray, who insisted on
seeing that I got back to the aid station. "
FROM THE OTHER SIDE of the battle, a German 347th Infantry
Division monograph reported: "The American attack succeeded in
penetrating our positions north of Spicheren and in occupying Hill
341 (Gifertwald). Immediate counterattacks by elements of the 36th
Infantry succeeded in recovering only the north and northeast slopes
of Hill 341. Similarly, the 6th SS Mountain Division's
Reconnaissance Battalion, attached to the 347th Division,
counterattacked toward the high ground one kilometer north of
Spicheren, but could reach and hold only the northern slope.
However, the following night (February 22) this battalion was
withdrawn and reverted to its own division."
The brief appearance here by an element of an earlier Vosges
Mountains adversary of Task Force Herren, the 6th SS Mountain, seems
not to have been detected by our intelligence-it is not found in the
70th G-2 lists of enemy units in contact.
The situation at nightfall on the 21st: The 276th had advanced
its positions to control the southeast third of Forbach; the 274th
had established two roadblocks on the ForbachSaarbruecken road (Metz
Highway) northeast of Forbach; and the 275th had regrouped its
forces on the lower slopes of its final objective. The count of
POW's taken that day was 249, 100 of them having been taken in
Forbach. During the night enemy shelling, mainly 88mm and 105mm
caliber, was continuous.
Sgt. Ray Mienheartt, Co. E, 276th was in a foxhole on the side
of the hill under the tower in Forbach. From this position he could
see well into the city, looking past the cave serving as the Co. E
command post. In the early morning he heard the sound of hobnailed
boots coming down at the foot of the hill and soon caught sight of a
man in the moonlight. Too far away to challenge, Mienheartt took aim
with his carbine but held his fire, hoping that someone closer would
take the booted man prisoner. Then he realized that the man in his
sights had turned and was withdrawing. Reluctantly, Mienheartt
started to squeeze the trigger when he heard the welcome "Halt!"
Later he learned that the man he had come so close to shooting was a
Russian who had escaped from a slave-labor camp intent on warning
the Americans of the camp location.
Walter C. Cox, Co. E, 274th, remembers that on the drive into
Stiring Wendel his company and Co. C under Ist Lt. George Blanchard,
formed a perimeter defense near the Metz Highway to consolidate the
ground gained after a long day of exhausting fighting. A short time
later Cox was awakened at the combined CP for the two companies by a
messenger who informed him that everyone was asleep. Everyone was
quickly awakened and thanks were given that the Krauts hadn't found
out the situation in the perimeter before the messenger did.
"Snow, Ridges and Pillboxes": On the 21st, I Company was pushed
forward from reserve to establish an outpost on the edge of Stiring
Wendel and took several casualties, all wounded, to mortar fire
during the approach march. Taken under automatic weapons fire by the
enemy, the company continued its advance by fire and movement and
the objective was taken. Firing positions were found from which to
meet any enemy counteraction.
Presently a German soldier was spotted approaching and was nearly
fired on before being recognized as a medic. In his approach he
checked several Kraut bodies, continuing on after each check
apparently convinced him that the man was dead. Having checked the
last body before coming to Co. I-held buildings, the medic gave
himself up.
On Feb. 22, the enemy defense of Forbach remained active. Much of
the defense was conducted from strong points, many of them automatic
weapons emplacements in fortified basements. The German defenders
fought tenaciously and surrendered only when their position became
surrounded. At 11:30 that morning the 276th's S-3 was on the
telephone speaking to a Division G-3 staff officer about the
regiment's progress: "E Co. is moving into Blocks `K' and `M.' L Co.
is half way through Block `10' and running into heavy MG, small arms
and bazooka fire. K Co. is in Block `I l' and is running into
automatic and rifle fire. K Co. and L Co. are maneuvering with
tanks. A Co. is at Phase Line 'I.' C Co. and F Co.-no change, (they
are) moving across Phase Line 'I' under heavy artillery fire and
direct fire from tanks. I Co. is in battalion reserve and is
maintaining contact between E and L companies. We are hitting the
counterattack assembly area with artillery."
N THE AFTERNOON, attack aircraft of the XII Tactical Air Command
supported the 276th Infantry's advance by bombing and strafing the
enemy-held part of town. At the end of the day, the regiment paused
to consolidate its gains and reorganize. In its advance the 276th
had reached the railroad embankment which cuts through the northern
end of the town.
"70th Division Story": Sgt. William P. Henry, Co. F, 276th was
posthumously awarded the Silver and Bronze Star medals. The Silver
Star was awarded for his clearing of houses beyond the Forbach
underpass. Several days before he had gone alone into some houses
and killed two Germans while capturing two others. Later, he worked
his way through an enemy-held section of Forbach to reestablish
contact with his squad, also engaged in house-clearing.
In the Division center the 274th took an important enemy
defensive complex with pillboxes and bunkers between Spicheren and
Stiring Wendel. At 10:52 a.m. the 274th's S-3 Sergeant, Shultz,
reported to G-3 on the attack's progress: "1st Bn. moving forward
slowly. (We have) no positions yet. 2nd Bn is moving up on the
initial objective where the finger of the (Spicheren-Stiring Wendel)
road goes up about three-quarters of the way. They received some
bursts of enemy artillery there this morning. Pretty bad. A few
casualties. I can't give you a position of 1st Bn. because our line
is out to them." Schultz then provided the coordinates of 1st Bn.'s
last known location about 500 yards northwest of Spicheren. From
there the Regiment confronted Spicheren Heights.
Co. C, 275th "Bulletin," (April '45): The German counterattack
hit C Company positions, and an advancing tank threatened to break
through. From his foxhole, Pvt. Sampson J. Stephens moved toward it
with a bazooka and, from a range of 15 yards, disabled it with his
first round. Stephens continued to fight in this same aggressive
fashion until he was killed on Feb. 25. He received the Division's
first Distinguished Service Cross, posthumously.
Recollection of 2nd Lt. Harry Durkee, Co. C, 275th: "C Company
continues that attack begun several days before at Alsting. Dusk
begins to fall and Jerry tanks come through the forest. There's my
bazooka man, but where is his ammunition? The precious bag was left
behind in the confusion of the previous night! Jerry foot soldiers
are right behind the tanks. Some hand-to-hand fighting ensues but
most of our men are taken prisoner quickly in the unequal situation.
Our few survivors remain where they have hidden while the enemy
infantry and tanks with POW's riding pull back. Then we dig in, an
understrength platoon-all that remains of C Company."
Recollection of Pfc. Hy Schorr, Co. H, 274th: "My MG section
was set up on a sharp rise in a woods on Spicheren Heights. That
night I was awakened by Pfc. Harold L. Ward whispering that he had
detected movement to our front. He threw a grenade while I scanned
to see what was happening. Spotting several figures, I fired and hit
one. Then our MG's opened fire raking from left to right and we
heard screams and groans. By early dawn we could see the ground to
the front littered with wounded and dead Germans, one with a machine
gun just a few yards away. Right after Ward left my hole to fetch
more ammo, two shots cracked and he fell. I dragged him back to the
foxhole and dressed his wounds, but he was too badly wounded to
survive."
Still on February 22, The 275th, on the Division right, cleared
the eastern two-thirds of its final objective and began preparing
strong defensive positions there. That night a German attack with
tanks was thrown back by doughboys using bazookas and rifle
grenades.
A Day of War: February 23, 1945
THE DIVISION directive for operations beginning February 23 (Ops
Ins No. 9): "274th Inf-Hold SPICHEREN GAP at all costs, assist the
275th Inf in the capture of GIFERTWALD woods, be prepared to attack
STIRING WENDEL on order; 275th InfDrive enemy from GIFTERWALD,
organize and defend final objective. . . ." The order also directed
the 276th to continue clearing Forbach. (Note: The Gifertwald
blankets something more than half of Spicheren Heights from its
eastern end.)
During the first hours of the 23rd, the Division G-3 office was,
as usual, making telephone contacts with front-line units to keep up
to date on the operations picture. The night had been fairly quiet.
A report from the 274th noted that there had been the usual enemy
vehicular traffic; word of it had been sent to the 882nd
artillerymen, who fired on the road and called for additional
shelling by another artillery battalion. The 276th reported that a
friendly engineer party working on an anti-tank ditch had been fired
on by a 276th rifle company. The riflemen had been in a remote area
to maintain contact with the 101st Cavalry Group, on the Division
left flank. The engineer party had entered the area and gone to work
without notifying the rifle unit of their presence.
Then the G-3 received word from the 275th that a POW captured
that night had said an enemy attack would hit in the regiment's
sector in the morning. The warning would have been too late for Lee
Miller whose Co.D HMG position was probably under attack while the
German prisoner was predicting one in the same area to take place
some hours later.
Lee Miller, Co.D, 275th, recollects: "The night of February
22-23 our position was in the woods, on the left side of a trail
being covered by a 57mm. anti-tank gun. T/Sgt. Anthony P. Van de
Wege was dug in a few feet away, and there were some riflemen to our
right front. Then came a lot of shooting and hollering and a BAR-man
came running back. He said the rest of his outfit had been wiped out
by a tank and he was the only survivor. He was worried about being
shot for desertion. A Kraut tank approached, firing its big gun, and
our 57 bounced several rounds off before stopping the tank about 75
feet with a broken track. We heard a lot of talking in German-they
seemed to be working on the track. " Ordered not to fire and give
his gun position away, Miller was wounded after prolonged suspense
when firing again broke out. An enemy soldier, seemingly scouting
around, crawled right up to Miller's gun position and was shot by
Van de Wege. Miller remembers that 2nd Lt. Robert McDaniel was
killed at the anti-tank gun during its lengthy engagement with the
enemy tank.
At 8:45 a. m. back at the Division operations center, G-3 was
called by Capt. Severance, 275th S-3, who reported on the progress
of his regiment's attack resumed that morning. "The situation on the
right is the same stuff (enemy tanks) they beat off last night; they
came back 15 minutes ago. We don't know what's happening right now."
Major Brewer, the G-3 officer, asked: "Is that C Company they're
hitting?" Severance: "They are hitting C Company again. The report
doesn't say how many infantrymen. There are two tanks."
The next two personal accounts relate to a continuing action that
started with one fight during the night of February 22 and then
another the next day.
Pfc. Kern Dibble, Co. C, 275th remembers: "Attacking the hill
above Saarbruecken after dark, the Company advanced up a path in
single file, when shouting in German was heard. I yelled for
everyone to get off the path and we hit the ground just as an enemy
gun opened fire at close range. I called for ammo for my LMG;
getting no response, I crawled around feeling ahead of me and found
my ammo bearer, Bill Ho, dead. He was a recent replacement."
2nd Lt. Harry Durkee, Co. C, 275th, adds to the account:
"The enemy seemed to be pulling back, and C Company was ordered
to press forward to reestablish contact. The Jerries apparently
allowed us to march through their line then opened fire once we were
behind them. The night fighting was much confusion and we took still
more casualties. Into daylight we kept going. I recall being
hesitant about our route; then I saw Major Malloy, our new battalion
CO, and he pushed me on. Bless his courage and confidence! I was in
need of that at the time, especially amid the falling artillery. I
forgave his impoliteness due to the circumstances."
It had been still dark, at 6:45 a.m., when the G-3's office
received the first report of action. Pvt. Murphy, of the 276th S-3
staff, said that Co. F (on the right flank of the solid regimental
front) had jumped off to resume the attack in Forbach 40 minutes
before. At 7:50, Capt. Severance, 275th S-3, reported that his 3rd
Battalion had jumped off in its attack at "0740." Asked by the G-3
officer the direction taken by the attacking battalion, Severance
responded tartly: "It is the one way to go and that is north and
northwest." Then at 8:15, the 274th's Lt. Stolz reported: "1st
Battalion, 274th established contact with the 3rd Battalion, 275th
at 0803. They have the Jerries sacked up in a pocket in that
vicinity, strength and coordinates unknown."
On the 70th Division's right, across the Saar River, the 63rd
Division was planning to resume its northward attack as part of the
Corps offensive the next day and was making preparations. Its G-3
called the 70th G-3 office to say that he had reports of much enemy
activity in Buebingen, a town in the path of the 63rd's intended
attack. He wanted to call for an air strike against the town. Since
the proposed target town was adjacent to the 70th sector, he asked
about objections to the strike. After checking with the 275th, Major
Brewer called the 63rd back and indicated there were no objections,
asking only to be advised of the air strike's timing.
THE DAY BEFORE, a gap of some 600 yards had developed between the
274th and 275th in Gifertwald. As the 274th's A and F companies had
advanced in an oblique movement northeastward, they crossed into the
275th's sector. Meanwhile the 275th's 3rd Battalion's westward
advance to meet with the 274th had been blocked by an enemy-defended
antitank ditch and terrain obstacles, and this left the western part
of the 275th's objective still in enemy hands. A large pocket of
enemy troops had been discovered in the gap, and a pinching-together
of the two regiments' forces had almost, but not entirely, closed
the gap, the 274th troops taking about 100 prisoners in the process.
From "Snow, Ridges and Pillboxes": The 1st Bn. attack on
Spicheren Heights went off on schedule, and Lt. Davis' Fox Company
(attached) surprised an enemy battalion as it was deploying for a
counterblow and captured or killed nearly the entire outfit. Then
the going got rough. Sgt. Ramon Fajardo said: ''We pushed forward in
the face of heavy machine-gun and artillery fire. Pfc. Donald Eberle
was hit by shell fragments but refused to go to the rear. He kept
advancing, firing his bazooka at enemy emplacements. He hadn't gone
far when another round came in. It was a direct hit, and he was
blown to bits. At about the same time, P/c. Don Huskey was killed by
machine-gun fire. Then Sgts. Jim Wright and Charles Dempsey were
wounded by shrapnel. Casualties were heavy, but we drove steadily
onward."
The progress of this attack on the Gifertwald had been closely
watched by Gen. Herren as he kept pace with the 274th's advance and
periodically contacted his operations center giving it instructions
to be passed to the 275th on the other side of the gap.
On the morning of the 23rd, Col. Conley was already concerned
about the possibility of having to leave his 274th assault (A and F)
companies holding Spicheren Heights when he undertook his next
orders-to take Stiring Wendel. He had the impression that the 275th
expected the 274th would continue to hold what it had taken of the
Gifertwald until further notice, and he had obtained the same view
from Gen. Barnett. Conley called up the G-3 staff and expressed his
concerns.
However, the pocket of enemy resistance in the Gifertwald gap
still remained to be completely subdued; this continued to preoccupy
the 274th and 275th rifle companies that were dealing with the
problem. Nevertheless, the subject of the relief of 274th troops in
the Gifertwald kept recurring in G-3 telephone contacts with the
274th and 275th until the afternoon. Then the Germans made several
counterattacks in the Gifeerwald area, some tank-supported. Staff
officers of both regiments called G-3. One asked about obtaining
self-propelled tank destroyers, large enough to kill German Mark VI
"Tiger" tanks, which had been identified in the counterattacks. The
other asked about obtaining a company of tanks to fight the German
armor with. G-3 responded that the TD's couldn't be obtained for a
week but was able to arrange quickly for the requested tanks. Late
in the afternoon, the question of relief of 274th companies in the
Gifertwald was settled when Col. Townsend, the G-3, notified both
regiments as follows: "The Division Commander directs that those
elements of the 274th Infantry now in the 275th area will remain
there until relieved on the Division Commander's order." As for the
pocket of enemy in the Gifertwald, the last mention of this was at
5:10 p.m. when Gen. Rodes called in and asked G-3's Maj. Bremer: "
Well, has it been a bad day or a good one? Did they ever close the
gap?" Bremer: "Yes, sir. They did. But (enemy) armor keeps
infiltrating up there."
Over on the left there had been no report on the progress of the
276th attack since jumping off. Then, at noon, Sgt. Yandell of the
S-3 section reported that most of the Regiment was holding along
Phase Line 2 (the railroad tracks in Forbach) while it mopped up
pockets of resistance bypassed earlier. Meanwhile, Co. F on the
right flank had advanced northeast to reach the regimental boundary.
Resistance was described (incompletely, it seems) as sniping and
machine-gun fire.
Ray Mienheartt, Co. E, 276th remembers that Phil Goan, Sgt.
Casey Gondek, and he were moving along a wall across the street from
a large church in Forbach when another volley of Nebelwerfer
"screaming meemies" loudly sounded their approach. Mienheartt looked
up and spotted what looked like a GI steel helmet coming in over the
church and yelled a warning a split second before the projectile
bounced off the top of the wall right above Gondek and exploded.
Gondek was buried under masonry from the wall, and his two shaken
companions hastily cleared huge chunks of rock to free him and load
him in a medical jeep which arrived. A viewing afterward of the
debris he and Goan had moved to uncover Gondek caused Mienheartt to
marvel at the superhuman task they had performed. The sergeant was
back on the job in a few days.
Forbach Falls 1945
ON MARCH 1, the three regiments were disposed with the 276th 3rd
and 1st battalions approaching the railroad embankment in the
northwest corner of Forbach, Co. G in regimental reserve and Cos. E
and F still attached to the 274th. In the center, the 274th had its
3rd and 2nd battalions on the south edge of Stiring-Wendel; 1st
Battalion was on the right, and Co. E and Cos. E and F/276th were in
reserve. The 275th had its 3rd battalion and Co. A/274 on the left
in the Gifertwald, 1st battalion on the right front in the
Pfaffenwald, and 2nd battalion covering the Division's right flank
along the Saar River.
Immediate tasks were: 276th-complete the clearing of Forbach;
274th-take StiringWendel; 275th-defend its portion of the Division
objective.
Lawrence Southard, Co. G, 275th recollects: "Gen. Herren paid
a surprise visit to G Cos. forward positions early one morning,
walking up toward the crest of the high ground a few yards below
which the foxholes of Lt. Paul McCoy's platoon were located. Near
one of the foxholes, he stood looking down on the Siegfried Line.
The occupant looked around and, seeing him, blurted out, 'Get down,
you SOB, don't you know there are snipers out there!' Hitting the
ground, the general crawled to the foxhole, thanked the soldier, and
then disappeared, crawling back to the rear."
The enemy deployed a mixture of 347th VGD and 559th VGD elements
against each of the regiments and held in reserve an odd collection
of units, including the Assault Bn of First Army HQ. Battle Group of
Zweibruecken Volksturm, 67th Mtn Rcn Bn, and 17th SS PGD Assault Gun
Bn. Among the units identified by the 70th Div G-2 as being possibly
available for commitment was the 6th SS Mtn Div, out of contact
after last being identified in the nearby Bitche area.
The journal of Division G-2 records: "Four Yugoslav civilians who
left Stiring-Wendel on March 1 were detained and interrogated by the
IPW team. They reported seeing only seven German soldiers there and
that civilian residents were complaining about U.S. artillery
shooting up their town already abandoned by nearly all German
forces." In view of the hard fighting that the 274th later
encountered in Stiring-Wendel, it seems that this report could have
resulted from an intentional deception.
The first two days of March were spent reorganizing, regrouping
and patrolling. On the 2nd, in the only action noted for that day in
the 70th Division Narrative History, E/276 dispersed enemy combat
patrols which had attacked it near Kreutzberg Ridge in what turned
out to be a farewell ceremony marking the end of its attachment to
the 274th. Shortly, Co. E returned to its own regiment. Otherwise,
enemy action was confined to sporadic mortar and artillery fire.
For the resumption of the attack on March 3, the Divarty field
order indicated where enemy resistance was expected to be toughest.
The 882nd, 883rd, and 884th were to provide direct support of their
normal combat-team partner regiment; the 725th FA Bn was to
reinforce the 882nd's fire support of the 274th's attack into
Stiring-Wendel.
Recollections of Andy Davenport, C/882 FA: "Lt. Howard Peck
was forward observer of a team including 'Red' Turner, radio
operator, and Davenport as scout corporal. The morning of the attack
into Stiring-Wendel, the team set up its OP in the woods overlooking
the town. A telephone wire was run up the hill and the radio and the
telephone remote control were placed in a two-man foxhole. Before
274th's attack, a Kraut counterattack started, and Peck
requested fire on the enemy. However, due to the steep terrain, the
incoming shells with their proximity fuses began going off right
over Turner's and Davenport's foxhole. When we got our guns to
ceasefire, we could hear Kraut skirmishers coming, firing short
bursts to draw fire. We got out of there fast."
In the 276th's attack, the assault companies were I, K, A, C and
an attached company of the French Lorraine Division. Their advance
quickly covered all untaken ground before the railroad embankment
and continued, on the left, along the roads from Forbach to the
west, northwest and north. However, the underpass of the road to Im
Bruch was a problem. Mines in the underpass and heavy enemy fire
blocked Co. K and Co. A behind it, several supporting tanks being
lost to the mines there. On the right, Co. C and the French company
crossed the tracks but were halted by enemy resistance from the Nord
Caserne. At dusk the 3rd Battalion advance to the west approached
Marienau.
The G-2 journal says: "According to their major in charge, the
French infantry attached to the 276th were under orders to send
POW's to the French POW facility in Metz and not turn them over to
70th. He at last agreed to Division's questioning their POW's while
under French guard but they were not to be evacuated in U.S.
channels. One of their POW's was thought to have information on gun
positions at the Simon Mine."
This complication with the French Ally was not isolated. Capt.
Fred Cassidy recalls 274th orders not to use attached French troops
in any combat action. In Stiring-Wendel they were used to handle the
Allied POW's that flocked into that town.
AGAINST STIRING-WENDEL, the 274th advanced from Kreutzberg Ridge
and Sangenwald, with 3rd, 2nd, and Ist battalions abreast. Less
resistance was encountered in wooded approaches than through open
areas or along roads and trails, stubbornly covered by enemy MG
fire; during the day, mortar and artillery fire ranged from moderate
to heavy. By late afternoon, 2nd Bn was fighting inside
Stiring-Wendel, the other two battalions having taken Sophie to the
south and reached the Metz Highway to the east of that town. From
its sector, 275th fire supported the advance of the 274th.
Hy Schorr H/274, recollects: Advancing through the woods, his
HMG squad came under heavy shellfire. The gunner, Pfc William E.
Beldon, was evacuated. Then squad leader Sgt. Harold W. Kline was
hit in the thigh, and though protesting, was evacuated. That left Al
Vargo and Schorr the only survivors of the squad.
Col. George Barten, 2nd Bn, 275, reported that the OP of 2nd Bn,
275 on the Division right flank, overlooked the Saar River and
German positions across it, since the Battalion's advance had
outstripped that of the 63rd Division by a half mile. The 63rd
assistant division commander visited this OP to plan his division's
attack and later to observe it. Barten was skeptical when he heard
of the 63rd plan to spearhead its attack with tanks. Later he and
63rd's general watched the attack. "We looked right up the flank of
the assaulting force. I observed flashes around our tanks and
thought they were firing. I was wrong. Within minutes the five lead
tanks were hit by German fire, and the attack halted." Like the
70th's, the 63rd's assault of well-defended ridges rimming the
German border was costly - it took two days of hard fighting for the
63rd to clear this objective.
On the 4th, the 276th jumped off at 9 a.m., the enemy resisting
strongly, particularly at the underpass. The 2nd Battalion, brought
up from reserve, advanced into Forbach Forest. Finally, blasting
from Corps Artillery's big guns enabled Cos. K and A to advance
beyond the underpass and approach the Nord Caserne. On the left
Marienau was taken.
Supporting tanks finally got through the underpass and began
blasting the German defenders from house after house. They were well
protected by rifle fire from enemy attempts to fire Panzerfaust
projectiles from windows. The slugging lasted all day, with the
Germans grudgingly retreating to the northwest end of town. Just
before dusk the 276th assault battalions pulled back to the
embankment while an artillery barrage softened the enemy-held
section, then advanced behind a rolling barrage to clear it.
THE 274TH ATTACKED at 6:30 a.m., the 1st Battalion entering the
east end of Stiring-Wendel and 3rd Bn, the west side. The 2nd Bn
reached the middle of town against resistance centering on
elevating rotating pillboxes protected by mine fields and supported
by continuous mortar and artillery fire. A low cloud ceiling
hampered the attackers' use of air support.
On March 5 the clearing of Forbach was completed when 276th 1st
Bn took Nord Caserne against light resistance. Reaching Im Bruch,
3rd Bn turned left and cleared the woods to the southwest. 2nd Bn's
advance in Forbach Forest was stopped at the well defended embankment
of a railroad spur line from the Simon Mine.
In Stiring-Wendel, 2nd Bn, 274 mopped up enemy strong points. In
the early morning a mass of Allied POW's fleeing from their prison
hospital was taken under fire by an enemy MG as they approached
Stiring-Wendel along the Metz Highway - several were wounded. The
2nd Battalion spent the rest of the day feeding and providing for
the evacuation of these men, mostly Russians, but also Czechs,
Frenchmen, Poles and Yugoslavs. 3rd Battalion cleared Neue Glashutte
on the Metz Highway, west of Stiring-Wendel.
S/Sgt. Malcolm Ruthven, C1274, wounded in the face as he directed
his men in the mopping-up, just pitched a grenade into the cellar
where the shot came from. That ended resistance there. After
receiving medical treatment, Ruthven, peered with one eye from under
the bulky bandage and commented to a companion: "Even with one eve,
you still look uglier than me."
The 274th's Sgt. Martin Sviger, who spoke Yugoslav and French,
was the busiest man in Stiring-Wendel. The newly liberated POW's
were anxious to hear about news of the war. A Russian officer, just
given a hasty briefing by Sviger, jumped on a packing case and
relayed the news of victory after victory on both Western and
Eastern fronts, each one greeted by loud cheers from his countrymen.
Early March 6, enemy infiltrating patrols got behind F/276 and
cut if off, but prompt counteraction by Cos. E and G effected its
relief. Enemy armor appeared and the fighting raged on until 12:30
p.m., when the 2nd Battalion's front opposed to the railroad
embankment was finally restored. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion moved
up and extended the 2nd Battalion's front to the west. The 1st
Battalion advanced further west in Forbach Forest against light
resistance. After repelling enemy counterattacks in the late
afternoon, the Regiment withdrew several hundred yards and dug in.
Capt. Roger L. Conarty halted his Co. L, 276th advance and
crawled forward to scout the railroad embankment. When he returned
to his company he radioed to Battalion his judgment that the
embankment could not be taken. Soon the Regimental Commander called
on the radio and, receiving the same report from Conarty, ordered
him to advance his company or face court martial. Conarty
respectfully refused, and the advance was postponed. The next
morning the assistant division commander and regimental commander
visited the Co. L position. After they reconnoitered and conferred,
they ordered Conarty to keep his company where it was.
At 6:30 a.m. 3rd Bn, 274 with tank support attacked the Simon
Mine and factory west of Stiring-Wendel and penetrated the
minefield. It withdrew after testing the defenses and finding them
formidable and in need of softening by bombardment.
LATE THAT NIGHT Division arranged for the bombing and shelling of
enemy defenses opposing the 276th Regiment and 274th's 3rd Bn after
these elements had been withdrawn. This was to be followed closely
by the new advance of these units. However, the persisting low
ceiling on March 7 prevented the aerial bombardment while the
artillery concentrations fired were judged to be insufficient
preparation for the infantry assault, which was postponed.
According to the G-3 journal: "Divarty fired a TOT concentration
on enemy strong points. In the late afternoon a concentration was
fired on the Simon Mine complex. During the day 73 missions were
fired - a total of 901 rounds. "
A conference among corps, division, and concerned regimental
commanders concluded that the infantry units which had been pulled
back should hold their positions until intensive reconnaissance had
been made of the enemy defenses. Orders were: Dig in. So the 70th
Div reverted to the defensive by Corps order.
For several days there was a lull in the action. In a
re-disposition, 276th 3rd Bn, 274th 2nd Bn and 275th Cos. I and A
were withdrawn from the line and sent to locations in the rear (sec
map). The 883rd FA experimented with flamethrower fluid as a filler
for 105mm shells with unsatisfactory results. Division Artillery
fired many successful missions.
A Mark VI Tiger tank was destroyed by six rounds of 725th's
howitzers. The 270th Engineers were busy clearing mine fields,
constructing defenses, rebuilding roads, and searching buildings for
unexploded bombs. An intensive search was made after a time bomb was
discovered in the Nord Caserne, where troops of the 276th were
located.
Counterattack! But the 70th
Repulses a Desperate Enemy
Having been forced back from this key defense line on
February 23, the enemy reacted with a series of violent
counterattacks over the next several days. The German 347th Division
had home the brunt of the recent fighting, and its 36th Infantry on
Spicheren Heights was in particularly bad shape even though it had
received replacements diverted from the Division's other two
regiments, which had been less heavily engaged. During the period,
elements of the 2nd Mountain, 559th Volks Grenadier and 19th Volks
Grenadier Divisions were fed into the battle to add their weight to
the counterblows.
Trailblazer casualties, light during the first several
days of the Saar offensive, but increasing sharply beginning on
February 21, remained high. The impassive language of the Division
Report of Operations for Feb. 24 was accurate enough in its
reflection of units, events, times and locations. There was no room
in such reports for the human drama attending these happenings:
"(1) 274th Inf: Co. F, 276th Inf atchd. Enemy
counterattack from NW at 0830 consisting of infantry only. Enemy in
small groups continued to harass troops in GIFERTWALD WOODS. Mop-up
of woods continued during the day. At 1400 enemy counterattack from
vie STIRING-WENDEL; no armor used. Contact regained with Co. E and
enemy driven from woods. Co. F, 276th Inf. in regimental reserve.
"(2) 275th Inf: Enemy artillery fell in 3rd Bn area at
1030. 1st Bn received small counter-attack consisting of infantry
and four tanks. All attacks repulsed. Positions on Division
objective being consolidated and secured.
"(3) 276th Inf (less Co. F): Regiment holding positions
along railroad tracks in FORBACH. Continued mopping up and
patrolling streets. Cos. E and F relieved by elements of 1st and 3rd
Bns. 2nd Bn (-Co. G and Co. F) assembled in COCHEREN. Harassing
enemy artillery continued throughout the day."
The 274th's Col. Conley did not take lightly the
counterattack in his area. He asked G-3 about getting back his
troops tied up in the Gifertwaid in the 275th sector, pointing out
that he didn't have a "damn thing to guard that hill." He noted that
the enemy was behind his Co. E and judged that the Kreutzberg Ridge
below Stiring-Wendel could be lost unless he received additional
forces.
That the enemy was taking fearful casualties in its
continuing counterattacks was indicated in a POW interrogation
report obtained the next day and forwarded by the 274th S-2 to
Division. The POW stated that the total strength of the 1st
Battalion, 1126 VG Regiment, 559th VG Division had been reduced to
50-60 men and that it had 50 KIA's during the counter-attack of Feb.
24. According to a German unit history, the 559th had been committed
to recapture the "Spicheren fortifications." The unit history noted
further that, contrary to the recommendation of the CG, 347th
Division (cited above), the first regiment of the 559th VG to have
arrived in the area was committed immediately without waiting for
the arrival of the entire division, the result being a piecemeal
attack.
"Snow, Ridges and Pillboxes." "Sometime during the
hours of darkness, the Krauts succeeded in moving up the draws
undetected, and by daybreak they were ready to charge our foremost
positions. Capt. Sisson's Easy Company (274th) bore the brunt of the
attack. 'The Krauts were on top of us before we knew what happened,'
recalls Sgt. Barrett. 'They went through the gaps in the woods, past
the front line defenses, and headed for the mortar positions on top
of the hill. Fighting raged at close quarters.' "
Sgt. Edward Kachursky, 274th Co. B., was hit four
times in the German counterattack that overran his position on
Kreutzberg Ridge. Motioned by his captors to come with them,
Kachursky struggled to his feet, then fell, too weak to stand. A
very young German medic gave him first aid, and Kachursky gave the
boy his watch and some rations when the others left them alone. Then
armed Germans reappeared, Kachursky judged, to finish off any
wounded Americans. The young medic covered Kachursky with a blanket
hiding his GI identity. Kachursky was liberated when the same ground
was retaken by an American counter-attack, during which the young
German medic was killed, his head blown off.
Co. B, 274th was digging in after a tough day's
fighting when the enemy suddenly counter- attacked. Dropping their
shovels and picking up their M-l's, Sgt. ElmoChappell and two of his
buddies found the weapons, fouled with mud, wouldn't fire
semi-automatically. Motioning his buddies to cover where they could
load each round manually, Chappell took up an exposed position and
fired each rifle as it was loaded and passed to him. He accounted
for eight Germans, and the enemy attack was turned back.
The German attack that hit the 1st Bn, 275th, was not so
easily repelled as the quoted Division report of operations seemed
to indicate. It hit at 8:45 a.m. between Cos. A and C, and a request
was made for tank support. Two of the four enemy tanks broke
through, one through Co. C, which had been forced back 250 yards. It
was not until 12:41 p.m. that the tanks were cleared from the Co.C
area, and from the Co. A area not until later. Then both units moved
up to their earlier positions. Several friendly tanks which had
bogged down and had been abandoned in the Pfaffenwald were found to
have been stripped by the enemy, gas and oil drained. General
Barnett ordered the 270th Engineers to recover the tanks, but it was
found that the engineers' winches weren't strong enough for the job.
The 275th's Col. McAleer was concerned about keeping tank support
for his infantrymen spread "as thin as they are." He had heard that
a pull-back of his supporting tanks was intended and he objected. He
told G-3: "We got hit by a counterattack this morning and it was
about over by the time we could get the tanks up there. As long as
our tanks keep behind the Battalion OP they will be all right and
they will be right up there if the counter- attack starts (again).
Lt. Harry Durkee, Co. C, 275th, recollecting: "On the
23rd, the remnants of Co. C were pinned down by sniper fire from
close range. The snipers' concealment defied our efforts to spot
them, and several men were hit when they raised their heads to
search. After nightfall, I conferred with Sgt. George Kwant and
decided that the remaining 11 of us would all move out of our holes
at daybreak and hunt them down. At dawn, when I climbed out my
foxhole to alert Kwant, a sniper's bullet . . . hit me squarely in
the forehead." Durkee was taken to the rear, and 1st Sgt. John Mercy
took over command of Co. C.
Col. George Barten remembers: "After capturing Zinzing,
the Battalion's advance took it up over the wooded ridges
overlooking the Siegfried Line. Dr. Kurt Lekisch, the battalion
surgeon, took care of wounded men right up in front-line positions
to maximize their chances of survival. From up front he evacuated
men with plasma being administered from bottles rigged up on the
jeep carrier while en route to the Zinzing battalion aid station.
(Col. Barten is remembered to have denied Lekisch's earlier request
to accompany Co. G in its February 6 raid on Grosbliederstroff.
Evidently the doctor persisted in his efforts to be where men were
being wounded, and his battalion commander saw the merit of giving
quick treatment despite the increased risk of losing his fine
surgeon.)
In view of enemy pressure on the 274th, the G-3 called the
276th's Col. Morgan and relayed Gen. Barnett's order that the 276th
send its Co. A reinforced with HMG and 81mm sections by truck to the
274th 1st Bn CP at Etzling. In addition, the order provided for the
276th's alerting a second rifle company as a contingency should
additional help be needed.
Paul Newman, Co. D, 2 76th, recalls: "One of the jobs
of a mortar crew member is to maintain telephone contact with the
OP. One day near Forbach our line kept getting knocked out. Four of
us were detailed for the third repair job. At the edge of Forbach we
were caught in an artillery barrage that ruined our new spool of
wire and left the jeep with four flats. After attempting
unsuccessfully to get to the OP on foot, we returned to the platoon
CP and reported our failure. On reporting to the lieutenant, I was
braced for a dressing-down when he pinned the Combat Infantry Badge
on me-what a happy surprise!"
This account of the 70th Division's Saar campaign has thus
far focused almost entirely on what the Division's infantry was
doing, for indeed the pay-off for a division's effort is usually
measured in terms of the ground taken or lost up front. However,
what is accomplished up front is surely the consequence of teamwork
within and among all divisional components, of the direction and
support from the rear and of cooperation with units on either flank.
What the infantry did on Feb. 24 is summarized above. Examples of
what other components involved were doing that same day follow.
70th Rcn Troop checked and reported the capacity of Saar
bridges at Grosbliederstroff and 2 miles south as 40 tons and 13
tons.
353rd AAA Searchlight Bn was given authority to illuminate
an enemy blimp which had previously been detected after nightfall
just north of the Forbach area. This was to enable the shootdown of
the blimp with AA fire.
Two USAAC fighter-bomber sortees ran missions to identify,
mark and attack targets in the Schoeneck area near Forbach.
Support engineers were authorized to install fixed timber
bridges under existing Bailey bridges to enable removal of the
Baileys for use elsewhere.
749th Tank Bn obtained permission to bring in a tank
retrieval vehicle to recover three of its tanks that had been mired
down or disabled in the 275th sector.
Paul Gartenmann, 1st Bn Hqs Co., 275th, narrates:
"During the attack in the Stiftswald, one of the supporting tanks
got hit and threw a track; its crew abandoned it. That night a crew
from our motor pool went up and repaired the damaged track. A 1st Bn
man named Nelson was found who could drive a tank. In his honor the
tank was renamed 'Lord Nelson.' Can you imagine what it meant to me
to be able to radio a call for 'the Lord'-our very own tank- when we
got in a jam outside the Siegfried? The tankers came back a few days
later and wanted their vehicle back. Guess what we told them!"
CO, 275th arranged with G-3 to have 70th Rcn Troop extend
its patrols to secure the 275th supply route near the Sarre River.
There was discussion between G-3 and an officer of 99th Chemical
Mortar Battalion about the relief and replacement of a chemical
(4.2-inch) mortar platoon from the 99th attached to the 70th.
The enemy remained relatively quiet on Feb. 25. The men of
the 274th took advantage of the respite by digging their positions
deeper. Other than a few brief exchanges of small arms firing, the
274th sector was without hostile action. Also "Jig Company" was
organized. There were 150 replacements for the Regiment being held
in the rear by order of the Division Commander, not to be committed
except in case of emergency. The 274th's situation having become
critical, the 150 men were organized as Jig Company, equipped and
sent under command of S-4 Capt. Underwood to take over the securing
of Pfaffenberg hill and relieve the force on duty there.
"Snow, Ridges and Pillboxes": During Jig Company's
organization staging, one of the recruits was heard to ask as he was
handed an M-1, bandolier of ammunition and several hand grenades:
"Say, aren't we going to get any more infantry training?" The
response to the question went unrecorded.
In the 275th sector there was intermittent incoming
artillery fire all night and through the day. Shortly before dawn a
jeep driver en route to 1st Bn CP was killed and his jeep was blown
up by an enemy patrol. Co. I detected a 15-man enemy patrol and
killed five, dispersing the rest. In the only offensive action of
the day, the 1st and 2nd battalions made a late-afternoon attack,
pushing 200-300 yards into the NE corner of the Stiftswaid and
taking a key terrain feature previously affording the enemy a
position from which to harass frontal positions and through which
enemy armor had launched attacks.
On Feb. 26 the enemy launched another counterattack. This
was the final blow in the series to reestablish a position on the
high ground that had been wrested from him in the Trailblazers'
offensive when the 274th and 275th took their final objective. The
German attack started well before dawn, and the Kreutzberg Ridge,
where the 274th 2nd Battalion defended it, was the objective. The
Battalion's position was strong, but the enemy assault groups
penetrated it by working up wooded draws to get behind Cos. E and F.
Maj. Buford Boyd, the Battalion Commander, had anticipated
the possibility of such penetrations. He contacted Col. Conley,
furiously urging that the Battalion be allowed to withdraw to a
series of trenches, part of the Siegfried outer defenses. Conley
quickly concurred. The withdrawal was made, but not without some
difficulties and casualties. After a series of German attacks on the
new position was thrown back, the enemy withdrew and dug in on the
lower slopes of Kreutzberg Ridge.
At 2:50 p.m., while the German attacks continued, Col.
Townsend, the G-3, called his staff from the 274th CP and noted that
he had instructed the 274th CO to pull his troops back to ground of
his own choosing to stop further penetration.
He also noted that an enemy unit in the attack had been
identified as the 1125th Infantry. This was a second regiment of
559th VG Division, the first, the 1126th, having been committed two
days before. Col. Townsend learned from his staff officer, Maj.
Bremer, that he had passed Gen. Barnett's order to the 276th
Infantry to alert its Co. E and Co. H to be prepared to move by
truck to reinforce the 274th if ordered by the CG. It was clear that
the enemy counter-attack was causing deep concern. However, it
appears that it never became necessary to move in these
reinforcements, the 274th having managed on its own.
The last two days of February were uneventful. The enemy
had spent his strength, and the Trailblazer Division had a few days
to contemplate its next objectives-the final mopping-up of Forbach,
the taking of Stiring-Wendell, and then the main positions in the
Siegfried Line. In the 11 days of its offensive, it had penetrated
the primary defenses of the enemy in front of the Siegfried Line and
had established a foothold on German soil. More than 1800 prisoners
had been taken. The Division's casualties totaled 1662, of which 207
had been killed and 231 were missing-the price had not been cheap.
The Saar is Crossed; the City
Taken
On March 1, the three regiments were disposed with the
276th 3rd and 1st battalions approaching the railroad embankment in
the northwest corner of Forbach, Co. G in regimental reserve and
Cos. E and F still attached to the 274th. In the center, the 274th
had its 3rd and 2nd battalions on the south edge of Stiring-Wendel;
1st Battalion was on the right, and Co. E and Cos. E and F/276th
were in reserve. The 275th had its 3rd battalion and Co. A/274 on
the left in the Gifertwald, 1st battalion on the right front in the
Pfaffenwald, and 2nd battalion covering the Division's right flank
along the Saar River. Immediate tasks were: 276th-complete the
clearing of Forbach; 274th-take Stiring-Wendel; 275th-defend its
portion of the Division objective.
Lawrence Southard, Co. G, 275th recollects:
"Gen. Herren paid a surprise visit to G Cos. forward
positions early one morning, walking up toward the crest of the high
ground a few yards below which the foxholes of Lt. Paul McCoy's
platoon were located. Near one of the foxholes, he stood looking
down on the Siegfried Line. The occupant looked around and, seeing
him, blurted out, 'Get down, you SOB, don't you know there are
snipers out there!' Hitting the ground, the general crawled to the
foxhole, thanked the soldier, and then disappeared, crawling back to
the rear."
The enemy deployed a mixture of 347th VGD and 559th VGD
elements against each of the regiments and held in reserve an odd
collection of units, including the Assault Bn of First Army HQ.
Battle Group of Zweibruecken Volksturm, 67th Mtn Rcn Bn, and 17th SS
PGD Assault Gun Bn. Among the units identified by the 70th Div G-2
as being possibly available for commitment was the 6th SS Mtn Div,
out of contact after last being identified in the nearby Bitche
area.
The journal of Division G-2 records: "Four Yugoslav
civilians who left Stiring-Wendel on March 1 were detained and
interrogated by the IPW team. They reported seeing only seven German
soldiers there and that civilian residents were complaining about
U.S. artillery shooting up their town already abandoned by nearly
all German forces." In view of the hard fighting that the 274th
later encountered in Stiring-Wendel, it seems that this report could
have resulted from an intentional deception.
The first two days of March were spent reorganizing,
regrouping and patrolling. On the 2nd, in the only action noted for
that day in the 70th Division Narrative History, E/276 dispersed
enemy combat patrols which had attacked it near Kreutzberg Ridge in
what turned out to be a farewell ceremony marking the end of its
attachment to the 274th. Shortly, Co. E returned to its own
regiment. Otherwise, enemy action was confined to sporadic mortar
and artillery fire.
For the resumption of the attack on March 3, the Divarty
field order indicated where enemy resistance was expected to be
toughest. The 882nd, 883rd, and 884th were to provide direct support
of their normal combat-team partner regiment; the 725th FA Bn was to
reinforce the 882nd's fire support of the 274th's attack into
Stiring-Wendel.
Recollections of Andy Davenport, C/882 FA:
"Lt. Howard Peck was forward observer of a team
including 'Red' Turner, radio operator, and Davenport as scout
corporal. The morning of the attack into Stiring-Wendel, the team
set up its OP in the woods overlooking the town. A telephone wire
was run up the hill and the radio and the telephone remote control
were placed in a two-manjigxhole. Before 274th's attack, a Kraut
counterattack started, and Peck requested fire on the enemy.
However, due to the steep terrain, the incoming shells with their
proximity fuses began going off right over Turner's and Davenport's
foxhole. When we got our guns to ceasefire, we could hear Kraut
skirmishers coming, firing short bursts to draw fire. We got out of
there fast."
In the 276th's attack, the assault companies were I, K, A,
C and an attached company of the French Lorraine Division. Their
advance quickly covered all untaken ground before the railroad
embankment and continued, on the left, along the roads from Forbach
to the west, northwest and north. However, the underpass of the road
to Im Bruch was a problem. Mines in the underpass and heavy enemy
fire blocked Co. K and Co. A behind it, several supporting tanks
being lost to the mines there. On the right, Co. C and the French
company crossed the tracks but were halted by enemy resistance from
the Nord Caserne. At dusk the 3rd Battalion advance to the west
approached Marienau.
The G-2 journal says: "According to their major in charge,
the French infantry attached to the 276th were under orders to send
POW's to the French POW facility in Metz and not turn them over to
70th. He at last agreed to Division's questioning their POW's while
under French guard but they were not to be evacuated in U.S.
channels.One of their POW's was thought to have infor- mation on gun
positions at the Simon Mine." This complication with the French Ally
was not isolated. Capt. Fred Cassidy recalls 274th orders not to use
attached French troops in any combat action. In Stiring-Wendel they
were used to handle the Allied POW's that flocked into that town.
Against Stiring-Wendel, the 274th advanced from Kreutzberg
Ridge and Sangenwald, with 3rd, 2nd, and 1st battalions abreast.
Less resistance was encountered in wooded approaches than through
open areas or along roads and trails, stubbornly covered by enemy MG
fire; during the day, mortar and artillery fire ranged from moderate
to heavy. By late afternoon, 2nd Bn was fighting inside Stiring-Wendet,
the other two battalions having taken Sophie to the south and
reached the Metz Highway to the cast of that town. From its sector,
275th fire supported the advance of the 274th.
Hy Schorr H1274, recollects:
"Advancing through the
woods, his HMG squad came under heavy shellfire. The gunner, Pfc
William E.Beldon, was evaluated. Then squad leader Sgt. Harold W.
Kline was hit in the thigh, and though protesting, was evacuated.
That left Al Vargo and Schorr the only survivors of the squad."
Col. George Barten, 2nd Bn, 275, reported that the OP of
2nd Bn, 275 on the Division right flank, overlooked the Saar River
and German positions across it, since the Battalion's advance had
outstripped that of the 63rd Division by a half mile. The 63rd
assistant division commander visited this OP to plan his division's
attack and later to observe it. Barten was skeptical when he heard
of the 63rd plan to spearhead its attack with tanks. Later he and
63rd's general watched the attack. "We looked right up the flank
of the assaulting force. I observed flashes around our tanks and
thought they were firing. I was wrong. Within minutes the five lead
tanks were hit by German fire, and the attack halted." Like the
70th's, the 63rd's assault of well-defended ridges rimming the
German border was costly - it took two days of hard fighting for the
63rd to clear this objective.
On the 4th, the 276th jumped off at 9 a.m., the enemy
resisting strongly, particularly at the underpass. The 2nd
Battalion, brought up from reserve, advanced into Forbach Forest.
Finally, blasting from Corps Artillery's big guns enabled Cos. K and
A to advance beyond the underpass and approach the Nord Caserne. On
the left Marienau was taken.
Supporting tanks finally got through the underpass and
began blasting the German defenders from house after house. They
were well protected by rifle fire from enemy attempts to fire
Panzerfaust projectiles from windows. The slugging lasted all day,
with the Germans grudgingly retreating to the northwest end of town.
Just before dusk the 276th assault battalions pulled back to the
embankment while an artillery barrage softened the enemy-held
section, then advanced behind a rolling barrage to clear it.
The 274th attacked at 6:30 a.m., the 1st Battalion
entering the east end of Stiring-Wendel and 3rd Bn, the west side.
The 2nd Bn reached the middle of town against resistance centering
on elevating-rotating pillboxes protected by mine fields and
supported by continuous mortar and artillery fire. A low cloud
ceiling hampered the attackers' use of air support.
On March 5 the clearing of Forbach was completed when
276th 1st Bn took Nord Caserne against light resistance. Reaching Im
Bruch, 3rd Bn turned left and cleared the woods to the southwest.
2nd Bn's advance in Forbach Forest was stopped at the well-defended
embankment of a railroad spur line from the Simon Mine. In
Stiring-Wendel, 2nd Bn, 274 mopped up enemy strong points. In the
early morning a mass of Allied POW's fleeing from their prison
hospital was taken under fire by an enemy MG as they approached
Stiring-Wendel along the Metz Highway - several were wounded. The
2nd Battalion spent the rest of the day feeding and providing for
the evacuation of these men, mostly Russians, but also Czechs,
Frenchmen, Poles and Yugoslavs. 3rd Battalion cleared Neue Glashutte
on the Metz Highway, west of Stiring-Wendel.
S/Sgt. Malcolm Ruthven, C/274, wounded in the face as he
directed his men in the mopping-up, just pitched a grenade into the
cellar where the shot came from. That ended resistance there. After
receiving medical treatment, Ruthven, peered with one eye from under
the bulky bandage and commented to a companion: "Even with one eye,
you still look uglier than me."
The 274th's Sgt. Martin Sviger, who spoke Yugoslav and
French, was the busiest man in Stiring-Wendel. The newly liberated
POW's were anxious to hear about news of the war. A Russian officer,
just given a hasty briefing by Sviger, jumped on a packing case and
relayed the news of victory after victory on both Western and
Eastern fronts, each one greeted by loud cheers from his country
men.
Early March 6, enemy infiltrating patrols got behind F/276
and cut if off, but prompt counteraction by Cos. E and G effected
its relief. Enemy armor appeared and the fighting raged on until
12:30 p.m., when the 2nd Battalion's front opposed to the railroad
embankment was finally restored. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion moved
up and extended the 2nd Battalion's front to the west. The 1st
Battalion advanced further west in Forbach Forest against light
resistance. After repelling enemy counterattacks in the late
afternoon, the Regiment withdrew several hundred yards and dug in.
Capt. Roger L. Conarty halted his Co. L, 276th advance and
crawled forward to scout the railroad embankment. When he returned
to his company he radioed to Battalion his judgment that the
embankment could not be taken. Soon the Regimental Commander called
on the radio and, receiving the same report from Conarty, ordered
him to advance his company or face court martial. Conarty
respectfully refused, and the advance was postponed. The next
morning the assistant division commander and regimental commander
visited the Co. L position. After they reconnoitered and conferred,
they ordered Conarty to keep his company where it was.
At 6:30 a.m. 3rd Bn, 274 with tank support attacked the
Simon Mine and factory west of Stiring-Wendel and penetrated the
minefield. It withdrew after testing the defenses and finding them
formidable and in need of softening by bombardment.
Late that night Division arranged for the bombing and
shelling of enemy defenses opposing the 276th Regiment and 274th's
3rd Bn after these elements had been withdrawn. This was to be