The following extract is from "The Seventh United
States Army Report of Operations", Vol. I and II, pages 559-579,
Battery Press, 1988. The following section deals with the action of
Task Force Herren and other Units during the opening moves of
Nordwind.The German army struck in the closing hours of the old
year with fanatical force. The 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division
spearheaded one attack group, its initial objective being the town
of Rohrbach in the eastern Sarre Valley. (See
Map 1) It was supported by two other divisions, the 19th
Infantry Division and the 36th Volks
Grenadier Division on its right. The 559th, 361st, and 256th
VolksGrenadier Divisions comprised another attack group and struck
southward from the Bitche area in the Low Vosges Mountains.
Looking south from Bitche
"...The enemy struck southward from the Bitche area to the Low
Vosges Mountains..."
Before recounting the German attack in detail, it is perhaps
appropriate to recapitulate briefly the situation on Seventh Army's
front and to sum up what has been learned subsequently, from
captured documents and other sources, of actual German battle plans.
It has already been stated that on 29 December Seventh Army G-2
estimated that the Germans would launch a series of limited
objective attacks for the purpose of keeping Seventh Army under
sufficient pressure to prevent it from sending troops north against
the Ardennes salient, or, as the next probability, that they would
attack south from the Bitche- Sarreguemines area with from five to
eight divisions to seize the Saverne and Ingwiller passes, to fan
out to destroy the Seventh Army in the Rhine Valley, and to
recapture Alsace. Such a drive, it had been foreseen, might well be
coordinated with a drive northward from the Colmar bridgehead and
the establishment of a Rhine bridgehead in the Gambsheim area. The
Seventh Army preparations for defense had been intensified
accordingly. During the early part of the last ten days of December
VI Corps had begun to prepare an alternate main line of resistance
along the Maginot Line. Both VI Corps and XV Corps had been
preparing counterattacks against possible enemy penetrations as well
as consolidating lines of defense.
During the last two days of the month these preparations were
completed. A radio message from Sixth Army Group received on 30
December warned
that a hostile attack against your flank
west of Bitche may force you to give ground from your main
position. To meet such a possibility, it is necessary that your
west flank be protected by a reserve battle position. With this in
mind, reconnaissance and organization of a reserve battle position
will be instituted without delay along high ground on the general
line: Hill east of Landroff - Benestroff - Sarre-Union - Ingwiller.
One half of each division and attached troops currently earmarked
as SHAEF reserve, located in your area, may be employed at any
given period of time to assist in organization of ground provided
that troops so employed can be reassembled and prepared for
movement on six hours' notice.
These directives were carried out by New Year's Eve. XV Corps
prepared its secondary main line of resistance with its western part
in the Maginot Line. The SHAEF earmarked units, the 36th Division
and the 12th Armored Division, plus the 2nd French Armored Division
upon its ar- rival in the Seventh Army area were ordered to be ready
to counter- attack against enemy penetrations.
Both corps planned to defend on their forward lines until ordered
to withdraw and then to fight delaying actions to the secondary
line. The 14th Armored Division in VI Corps reserve was ordered to
move to the vicinity of Phalsbourg and to prepare to counterattack
to the northwest in the XV Corps sector, or to the southeast toward
Selestat. On the Seventh Army's left flank Third Army was "limiting
the enemy offensive and ... preparing to counterattack." On the
right the French First Army contained the Colmar Pocket and prepared
defensive positions in depth.
On New Year's Eve General Patch visited the XV Corps com- mand
post at Fenetrange and there warned both the XV Corps and the VI
Corps Commanding Generals that an enemy attack was to be ex- pected
during the early hours of New Year's Day. Official holiday
celebrations were cancelled. Preparations had already been made to
move the Seventh Army command post from Saverne to Luneville, a more
central position for the direction of both XV and VI Corps defense.
This move was completed on 2 January, after the Germans had launched
their initial assault. (See Map
2)
The
German Plan
German documents subsequently captured revealed that the German
High Command West apparently had concluded from Allied withdrawal of
bridgeheads in the Sarre area that forces on this front south from
the Ardennes to the Rhine had been weakened. On 21 December German
Army Group G was directed to exploit this situation, specifically
through local attacks and preparations for a surprise attack to
regain the Saverne Gap. Signal operations instructions issued on 25
December designated the new operation by the code word Nordwind.
The objective of the operation was to gain the
Saverne Gap in the Phalsbourg-Saverne sector in order to annihilate
Seventh Army forces in northern Alsace and to secure a juncture with
the German Nineteenth Army. For this purpose two attack groups were
to be readied. The first group was to attack from east of the Blies
River toward the south in order to breach the Maginot Line at
Rohrbach and there to make a junction with the right flank of the
second group for a thrust against Phalsbourg. The second group was
to attack from east of Bitche toward the south in several spearheads
and then to link up with the first group, after which, depending on
the situation, both were to attack either east or west or south
toward the Phalsbourg-Saverne line.
On 26 December German High Command West informed Army Group G of
the Fuehrer's request that the efforts of the right attack group be
undertaken in such a way that with cover for its right flank against
the Sarre River and with cover for its left flank against Saverne it
could quickly reach the highway leading to the Phalsbourg-Saverne
axis. Therefore it was necessary to move the right flank of the XIII
SS Army Corps westward to Bliesbruck on the Blies River. From there
the attack of Group I could be launched south by way of Woelfling,
thence southeast to Rohrbach and the road net south of Rohrbach. The
25th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 21st Panzer Division were
designated as reserves. They were to be so situated in the northern
area that after the breakthrough they could be shoved rapidly south
1.)ast Group 1, then theoretically at Rohrbach.
As early as 22 December it was proposed to support the opera-
tions of Army Group G by employing special forces east of the Rhine
which had been brought together under Army Group Oberrhein. The
commander of this army group was instructed to support Operation
Nordwind by shocktroop tactics and to assist in the establishment of
bridgeheads north and south of Strasbourg. By 26 December it was
decided that the attack over the upper Rhine was not to begin until
48 hours after the initial assault. At the same time a diversionary
attack to the north on the Third Army front was called off. On the
next day more detailed plans revealed that the Oberrhein command was
to be committed only when the armored spearheads of the assault
forces (see Map 3)
driving south from Bitche had arrived at
the eastern exits of the Vosges in the Ingviller-Saverne area. After
having established its bridgehead across the Rhine north of
Strasbourg the Oberrhein Army Group was to aid in the destruction of
Seventh Army troops isolated in Alsace by attempting a juncture with
Groups I and 11 which would be turning east from the Vosges
Mountains to the Haguenau-Brumath area. The Fuehrer ordered the
initial attack for operation Nordwind to start at 2300 hours on 31
December 1944.
The Initial
Blows
On 31 December Seventh Army occupied an 84 mile front from the
Rhine to a point a few miles west of Saarbrueeken and a flank along
the Rhine north and south of Strasbourg. VI Corps held positions on
the right from the Rhine River to Bitche with the 79th and 45th
Infantry Divisions in the line and the 14th Armored Division less
one combat command in reserve. On the VI Corps left flank, holding a
front of about ten miles in the Low Vosges, was Task Force Hudelson.
On the left flank of Task Force Hudelson XV Corps maintained a line
west to within a few miles of Saarbrueeken employing the 100th,
44th, and 103rd Infantry Divisions with the 106th Cavalry Group on
the left flank. The greater part of the Rhine flank, extending for
about 40 miles, was a responsibility of Task Force Herren and Task
Force Linden. These task forces were composed of infantry elements
of the 70th and 42nd Infantry Divisions respectively, whose
supporting troops had not yet arrived in the army area.
The 44th Infantry Division of the American VI Corps deployed
between Sarreguemines and Rimling bore the full impetus of the
enemy's right flank drive. In the space of a few hours the entire
divisional front was engaged. On the left flank between
Sarreguernines and Polpers- viller the 114th Infantry Regiment with
the aid of concentrated artillery fire smothered a determined enemy
effort to exploit his Blies River bridgehead at the bend north of
the Sarreguemines airport. In the center the enemy attempted three
crossings southeast of Habkirchen without success, as the 324th
Infantry Regiment held inviolate the line of the Blies River.
The enemy unleashed the full fury of
his attack against the 71st Infantry Regiment which held a line
extending from Bliesbruck eastward to Rimling. A five company
assault north of Rimling curled
about the right flank of the 2nd
RIMLING AREA
". . . The enemy unleashed the full fury of
his attack against the 71st Infantry Regiment which held a line
extending from Bliesbruck eastward to Rimling . . ."
Battalion forcing a withdrawal of about 1,000 yards. The
3rd Battalion of the 71st Infantry moved out to help restore the
overrun positions. However, three companies of the enemy had driven
through the I st Battalion on the regimental left flank and had
penetrated the Bliesbrucken woods 2,000 yards to the rear of the
lines. The 3rd Battalion was diverted to meet this penetration and
plunged into a pitched battle in the forest. Although assisted by a
reserve battalion of the 324th Infantry, troops of the 71st Regiment
failed to dislodge the enemy from his positions in the woods; but
they contained his penetration and reformed the line along the
southern edge of the forest.
Elements of the 2nd Battalion aided by a platoon of tanks
restored "their original positions" by 0600 hours on 1 January only
to be dislodged again at 0730 hours. A see-saw battle raged
throughout the
GROS REDERCHING
"... At the eastern edge of the forest, the
line slanted southeast for over two miles to cover the northeastern
approaches to Gros Rederching..."
day. At nightfall the right flank of the battalion rested on
Maronviller form, which was attacked and set afire in the middle of
the night. This action necessitated an additional withdrawal to a
north-south line one mile, west of Rimling. Here the 2nd Battalion
covered the readjustment of the remainder of the regiment
before being placed in reserve. After dislodging or destroying
isolated enemy groups behind the lines, reorganized troops
established a line which ran west-east just below the Bois de Blies
Brucken. At the eastern edge of the forest the line slanted
southeast for over two miles to cover the northeastern approaches to
Gros Rederching. The 3rd Battalion of the 253rd Infantry, which had
been one unit of the recently disbanded Task Force Harris, was
attached to the 71st Infantry and sent into the line on the right;
the lst Battalion of the 71st Regiment was in the center and
the 3rd Battalion on the left.
During the night of 1-2 January XV Corps had ordered the 12th
Armored Division to establish and maintain a counter-reconnais-
sance screen west of the Sarre River and south of the Maginot Line
to neutralize any infiltration of enemy armor. East of the Sarre
River Combat Command A of the 14th Armored Division was given a
similar mission which the 2nd French Armored Division was to be
prepared to take over on 2 January. This relief was completed, and
French armor
MAGINOT LINE SOUTH OF GROS REDERCHING
'... XV Corps ordered the 12th Arrnored
Division to establish and maintain a counter- -reconnaissance screen
west of the Sarre River and south of the Maginot Line..."
blocked the western end of the Vosges
passages from Meisenthal south to Phalsbourg. The unit also prepared
to counterattack either in the direction of Drulingen-Sarre-Union,
or along the line Drulingen-Rahling. Armor was poised for an
equalizing blow should it be required.
On 3 January the line of the 71st Regiment was again assailed by
enemy tanks and infantry. The 2nd Battalion of the 114th Regiment,
now also attached to the 71st Infantry, helped the 3rd Battalion of
the 253rd Infantry to stabilize the situation after the latter unit
had been pushed back a few miles. Although the 71st Infantrv had
been able to weld its elements into a line capable of withstanding
severe enemy attack, strong enemy groups appeared behind that line.
Elements of the lst and 2nd Battalions of the 255th Infantry, the
second regiment of Task Force Harris to be attached to XV Corps,
supported by Combat Command L of the 2nd French Armored Division,
were required to stop the gap and to recapture Aachen which is three
miles southwest of Gros Rederching. The appearance of powerful
armored reserves at this point of penetration and the severe losses
that the enemy had suffered during these attacks may have been
factors in the German decision at High Command level to curtail the
Sarre offensive.
Remnants of the enemy in the vicinitv of Aachen were eliminated
on 4 January as the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Infantry made its way
south toward the town, while the 2nd Battalion of the 255th Infantry
cleared Aachen itself. The enemy in this sector became active again
when elements of Combat Command L were driven from Gros Rederching
by American tanks manned by Germans. After repelling an effort by
the 2nd Battalion of the 71st Infantry to retake Gros Rederching the
enemy withdrew. The Sarre pincer of Operation Nordwind had failed in
its mission.
Drive Southeast of
Bitche
Caught between the Sarre drive of German attack Group I and the
drive near Bitche of German attack Group II was the 100th Infantry
Division, holding the line on New Year's Eve between Rimling and
Bitche. The initial German onslaught had swirled about both flanks
of the division. A successful prosecution of the enemy plan would
have cut the division off. As the situation developed, the 397th
Infantry on the left flank was obliged to fight hard to hold Rimling
against the assault of Group 1. The division's right flank was
exposed when the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron of Task Force
Hudelson was forced back to the line Lemberg-Mouterhouse by the
attack of Group 11. The 399th Infantry Regiment then had to retire
from the high ground south of
KNOCKED OUT GERMAN TANK IN RIMLING AREA
"...the 397th Infantry on the left flank was obliged
to fight hard to hold Rimling against the assault of Group I..."
Bitche which compelled the
divisional right flank to bend southward to guard against the enemy
threat from the east.
Since this movement greatly extended the flank, the 3rd Battalion
of the 255th Infantry was put in to bolster the line. At the end of
1 January the 141st Infantry Regiment of the 36th Division relieved
the 399th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 255th Regiment from
respon- sibility for the southern end of the flank and took
positions on the line Sarreinsberg-Goetzenbruck-Lemberg. The 100th
Division had been forced to form what was in effect a "second front"
south to Sarreinsberg at a right angle with the original divisional
front which extended from Rimling to the vicinity of Bitche.
The enemy maintained a constant pressure expressed by countless
probing attacks along the "new" front until 5 January. However, the
stubborn fighting qualities of the defenders plus the early dispatch
WHITE PHOSPHORUS SHELLS LAND ON ENEMY POSITIONS IN EGUELSHARDT
"...Task Force Hudelson was holding a line extending
from a point just south of Bitche east through Eguelshardt..."
of reinforcing elements stabilized the
situation. For the remainder of the period the enemy showed little
inclination to continue the attack, but reacted fiercely to
attempted aggression by our troops against the upper shoulder of the
Bitche salient.
On the left flank of VI Corps holding a front of about ten miles
in the Low Vosges was a group of miscellaneous units known in the
aggregate as Task Force Hudelson. Most important of these units were
Combat Command R of the 14th Armored Division less one tank
battalion, Company B of the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company
B of the 3rd Chemical Mortar Battalion, and the 117th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron. Task Force Hudelson was holding a line
extending from a point just south of Bitche east through Eguelshardt
and Neunhoffen with the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron on the
left, the
GERMAN POSITIONS IN THE WOODS NEAR EGUELSHARDT
"...Although the terrain was
rugged, Task Force Hudelson's lines were paper thin..."
94th Cavalry Squadron in the center, and
62nd Armored Infantry Battalion on the right.
As the new year began the enemy 256th and 361st Volks Grenadier
Divisions moved southeast in a two pronged drive from Bitche without
rnortar or artillery preparation. The western column constituted the
main enemy effort, though constant heavy pressure was maintained in
the east and strong enemy infiltrations occurred there. Although the
terrain was rugged, Task Force Hudelson's lines were "paper thin."
In the center the 94th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was attacked
shortly after midnight, but the enemv withheld his strength until
0530 hours. Troops of the reconnaissance squadron then attempted to
establish a position along the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal road. However,
they found the Mouterhouse-Baerenthal road already cut by the enemy.
The American lines had been overwhelmed; the enemy was everywhere;
there remained only the expedient of forming small groups to effect
an escape by flight.
To the east the forward groups of the 62nd Armored
Infantry Battalion withdrew to the Bannstein-Philippsbourg highway
to avoid envelopment. The enemy pushed against the lines, and German
armor was observed to be approaching Bannstein from the northwest.
Half-tracks of the 19th Armored Infantry Battalion, joined by
vehicles of the 117th and 94th Cavalry units, moved southeast toward
Philippsbourg. Meanwhile, other elements of the 62nd Battalion,
their front lines riddled by the enemy, retired to Bannstein where
they maintained a perimeter defense until 1130 hours the following
morning, 2 January. They then withdrew by infiltration southeast to
Baerenthal. By this time the enemy had gained partial control of the
Philippsbourg-Bannstein highway and were threatening both
Philippsbourg and Baerenthal.
On the left flank of the Hudelson Task Force the
bulk of the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had been hit hard
and virtually surrounded at Mouterhouse. The situation here became
obscure to task force and corps commanders, as communications with
reconnaissance troops were maintained only with the greatest
difficulty. The enemy had overrun their forward positions north of
Mouterhouse in the early stages of the offensive. Withdrawal from a
second defensive line under heavy enemy pressure was accomplished
during 1 January. The squadron command post, which had been in
Mouterhouse, was reestablished in Wingen; and by the end of the day
the 117th Cavalry had drawn back to final defensive positions which
were maintained. On the morning of 2 January the 179th Infantry was
brought up and disposed along the line already held.
Farther east the task force employed the larger
part of its reserves to relieve pressure on the right flank.
The 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion had established positions which
held Philippsbourg safe until the 275th Infantry of the 70th
Division could be moved up to the. line to assume control. After the
enemy attack near Bannstein which ultimately breached positions in
this area, the 19th Armored Infantry Battalion and a medium tank
company of the 25th Tank Battalion had set up, under task force
orders, a perimeter defense around Baerenthal. The Task Force
command post pulled back at dusk southwest to Reiperts- willer. The
enemy continued to pour through; in mid-afternoon a force of perhaps
500 troops was observed two miles west of Baerenthal. Before the end
of the day countermeasures were taken. A battalion of the 313th
Infantry Regiment of the 79th Division had moved in north of
Reipertswiller to check advances in that zone; and a battalion of
the 275th Infan- try Regiment, which had been attached to the 45th
Division, was placed in position southeast of Baerenthal to block
that axis.
Still farther to the east the initial enemy thrust of Group II
was met by troops of the 45th Division who joined Task Force
Hudelson in a defense anchor at Neunhoffen. This attack was
contained just west of Neunhoffen by the 157th Infantry Regiment of
the 45th Division. Further attempts at infiltration in force between
Philippsbourg and Obersteinbach were repulsed with heavy enemy
casualties. These actions aided in delimiting what was to be known
as the enemy's "Bitche Salient."
During the first few days of the new year the 45th Division was
strenuously engaged in regrouping its organic forces and the
numerous units which had been recently attached preparatory to
taking command of the Low Vosges sector and neutralizing the enemy
thrust. To minimize the effects of a possible complete collapse of
the Low Vosges front Combat Command B of the 14th Armored Division
established a counter-reconnaissance screen studded with roadblocks
in the wooded mountain passes along the line
Neuwiller-Ingwiller-Rothbach-Zinswiller-Niederbronn which extended
along the eastern edge of the Low Vosges Massif.
On 2 January the 179th Infantry Regiment moved by motor to the
corps left flank and established itself on a line two miles north of
Wingen. On this flank the enemy succeeded in establishing a
road-block on the Meisenthal-Wimmenau road which separated two
battalions of the 179th Regiment. A few miles to the east the enemy
pushed a two-company attack from the north along the two parallel
roads leading into
Reipertswiller. The attack was
stopped by elements of the 313th Regiment. Late in the day a
battalion of the 314th Infantry Regiment arrived to bolster the
Wildenguth-Reipertswiller line.
On the eastern shoulder
of the salient of 2 January the 275th Infantry Regiment held the
Baerenthal-Zinswiller and the Bannstein-Niederbronn passes. On the
road southeast of Baerenthal two attacks by an estimated 200 to 300
enemy supported by armor were repelled. In the pass to the north the
enemy manifested little aggressiveness, thereby enabling troops of
the 275th Regiment to establish positions on the road northwest of
Philippsbourg. Sarreinsberg on the west, Relpertswiller in the
center, and Baerenthal-Philippsbourg on the east shoulder of the
salient became the focal points of action as 2 January came to a
close. Identification of elements of the 6th SS Mountain Division
indicated that the enemy was investing considerable strength in his
Low Vosges assault. The prompt appearance of Seventh Army reserves,
however, was depriving the situation of its fluidity. The outlines
of the salient had been formed and were hardening.
On 3 January the enemy made a determined
effort to enlarge his Bitche salient. The counterattack of the 179th
Regiment on the left flank was met head on. Heavy inconclusive
fighting, in which elements of the 21st Panzer Division were
identified, ensued. In the nose of the salient elements of the 361st
Volks Grenadier Division attacked Reiperts- willer from the north,
northwest, and due west. A small group of the enemy managed to
infiltrate south of the town, but in general these attacks were
contained. On the eastern shoulder the 476th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment overran forward positions of the 275th Regiment to reach
Philippsbourg.
The enemy's incessant hammering against the
walls of the salient drew the 180th and 276th Infantry Regiments to
this sector. The 179th Regiment retained its positions on the left
flank near Sarreinsberg. South of this point the 276th Infantry
Regiment arrived to set up a security line and to clear Wingen of
the estimated 200 troops who had infiltrated during the night of 3-4
January. The 276th Regiment fought its way to the outskirts of
Wingen by 2130 hours on 4 January.
The 180th Infantry Regiment was pulled out of the Maginot Line in
the east and moved into the Reipertswiller sector to clear the area
west and southwest of the town of those enemy elements which had
infiltrated through the lines. A line one mile southwest of
Reipertswiller was established despite heavy resistance offered by
the enemy. Shortly after this attack, and perhaps because of
it, pressure decreased in this area; the 313th Infantry was able to
reestablish contact with elements cut off in Wildenguth.
On the eastern shoulder of the salient the 275th Infantry
reestablished on 4 January the positions and communications which
had been disorganized by the previous day's fighting. Philippsbourg
was made secure, but an effort to extend the line northwest was
stopped at the edge of the town. At the southwest end of the
275th's diagonal line fighting in the vicinity of Baerenthal was
heavy but inconclusive.
The Bitche Salient
Formed
On 5 January the 179th Infantry continued to exert steady
pressure on the German forces in the Meisenthal-Sarreinsberg area,
maintaining roadblocks and throwing back minor enemy attempts at
infiltration. On the following day the 179th Regiment cleared the
road to a point one mile southeast of Meisenthal in an attack
synchronized with efforts by the 180th Infantry and the 313th
Infantry. On 5 January the 180th Infantry had attacked north on a
one mile front encountering especially heavy resistance on its right
flank which neared Wildenguth. The heaviest fighting of all raged at
the tip of the salient near Reipertswiller. The slight advances
which had been made by the 313th Regiment on 5 January northwest of
the town were off set by continued infiltration on the right flank
east of Reipertswiller. On the next day the 180th Infantry assumed
additional responsibility in the Wildenguth area, thereby releasing
elements of the 313th Regiment to deal with the per- foration of the
right flank. While the right flank problem was being liquidated,
elements of all three regiments continued the straight, forward,
slugging assault north of Reipertswiller.
To the southeast the 276th Infantry had been handicapped in its
attempt to clear Wingen, because the presence of American prisoners
in the town precluded the use of artillery. On
6 January the tenacious defense offered by the enemy was overcome;
the town was cleared. This action marked the elimination of the
enemy's deepest penetration in the Low Vosges.
Farther east the 2nd Battalion of the 276th Infantry assisted the
coordinated attack of the 179th, 180th, and 313th Regiments by
stopping up breaks in the line southeast of Reipertswiller. On 6
January this battalion cleared the town of Lichtenberg of the
hostile forces which had infiltrated the previous day. On the
following day, in conjunction with elements of the 313th and 274th
Regiments the 2nd Battalion of the 276th Infantry continued its
attack to the high, wooded ground north-east of Lichtenberg,
trapped, and eliminated the remnants of an enemy battalion. All
advances were painfully slow on 7 January, and the line was pushed
forward only a mile north of the Wildenguth-Reipertswiller road. At
last, however, it was apparent that enemy troops were on the
defensive and that the force of their attack had spent itself.
On the eastern shoulder of the salient the 275th Infantry with
lst Battalion of the 274th Infantry attached continued to hold a
line extending from southwest to northeast in the Dambach area. The
enemy had advanced toward Philippsbourg on 5 January but turned back
when attacked by planes. On the following day three enemy assaults
on Philippsbourg were hurled back; the first was broken by artillery
fire; the second disorganized and repulsed by a counterattack; the
third was contained after several hours of fierce fighting. These
attacks involved an estimated two or three companies. On 7 January
hostile activity was negligible.
Before the enemy had launched his January offensive VI Corps had
been warned of the impending attack and directed to make ready both
defensive positions and countermeasures. This preparedness permitted
an acceleration in the process of regrouping to contain the Bitche
salient. The VI Corps units, trading blow for blow with the enemy,
sapped the strength of the German drive. According to the
impressions gained by the German Chief of Staff, who was with his
troops on 6 and 7 January, the rugged terrain had imposed an extreme
physical strain
upon the men who were compelled to
fight without rest and live in the open. There was a visible
abatement in combat strength.
On the other hand, after overcoming the initial shock VI
Corps was able to increase the resistance it offered. By skillfully
maneuvering shock troops through breaks in the line the American
corps threatened German supply routes. One enemy commentary revealed
that the situation in the Bitche salient as now constituted required
new German forces if further exploitation was to be considered.
However, the same terrain which hampered the development of a German
breakthrough now served to protect the outlines of the salient which
remained a real threat to Seventh Army troops in Alsace.
