Preparations for Defense
The following extract is from "The Seventh United States
Army Report of Operations", Vol. I and II, pages 494 - 502, Battery
Press, 1988. The following section deals with the action of Task
Force Herren and other Units during the opening moves of Nordwind.The Army Shifts to
the Defensive
On the night of 20-21
December Seventh Army seemed to be bracing itself for a thrust into
the Saar-Palatinate. XV Corps was now free to move north above the
Ensemble de Bitche. VI Corps was ready to continue its prodding of
the Siegfried Line and perhaps to exploit the 45th Division salient
on its left flank. The Seventh Army drive north into Germany was
called off before its culmination. Acting upon orders of Higher
Headquarters Seventh Army directed all its divisions to discontinue
the attack and to prepare a new line of defense. The 100th Division
withdrew to the positions from which it had jumped off on its
assault against Fort Schiesseek. The 180th Infantry of the 45th
Division withdrew south of the Lauter River. The other divisions dug
in where they were. General von Rundstedt's counter-offensive in
Belgium and Luxembourg was to make the last ten days of December an
anticlimax for Seventh Army. During those ten days there was little
activity other than the shifting of positions along the army front,
for both American and enemy forces were readjusting their lines.
The German counter-offensive, which had jumped
off with 17 divisions on 16 December had in five days driven 35
miles on a 60 mile front. On 19 December Third Army's XII Corps had
taken over the III Corps front so that III Corps could move north to
attack the southern flank of Von Rundstedt's Ardennes salient. To
relieve Third Army for the maximum effort against the German threat
Seventh Army extended its left boundary to St. Avold and prepared
defenses on a front which stretched 84 miles westward from the
Rhine. The shift took four days and was completed by 26 December.
In accomplishing its part of the shift to the
west between 20 and 26 December XV Corps was able to make the
adjustment more readily since the 87th Infantry Division of XII
Corps, in accordance with oral agreement between the Commanding
Generals of the Third and Seventh Armies, was to be attached to XV
Corps on 21 December and remain until all reliefs had been effected.
The 35th and 80th Divisions of XII Corps made immediate preparations
for movement north. After full readjustment had been completed, the
87th Infantry Division was moved to assembly at Dieuze and from
there to Rheims, passing from control of XV Corps and Seventh Army
at 0001 hours on 28 December.
During this period of the extension of the
Seventh Army line, brought about by the Ardennes counter-offensive,
elements of the 63rd, 42nd, and 70th Divisions, which had debarked
at Marseille and which consisted of the infantry regiments and a
provisional staff headed by the assistant commander of each
division, were arriving in the army area. None of these units had
completed its full training program in the United States, but it was
the intention of higher headquarters that they train intensively
under Seventh Army supervision until such time as they could be
employed in their combat roles. In conjunction with this training,
they could become indoctrinated by employment on line of
communications duties or in an inactive role such as flank
protection along the Rhine.
The small provisional headquarters of each of
these divisional groups was somewhat reinforced by signal and other
service personnel to enable each to operate on a limited scale. Each
group was designated a task force, named after the assistant
divisional commander concerned. Elements of the 42nd Infantry
Division became Task Force Linden; elements of the 63rd
Infantry Division became Task Force Harris; and elements of the 70th
Infantry Division became Task Force Herren.
At the end of December Seventh Army had reorganized its corps
components and held the new front. XV Corps had relieved XII Corps
and defended a line from St. Avold to Bitche. It consisted of the
106th Cavalry Group on the left flank, the 103rd Division, which had
been transferred from VI Corps, the 44th Division and the 100th
Division on the right flank. On 30 December the newly-arrived Task
Force Harris was withdrawn from its initial positions along the
Rhine and transferred, less one regiment, to XV Corps. Two
regiments, the 253rd and 255th Infantry, were attached to the 44th
and 100th Divisions for additional strength on the line. The 254th
Regiment was at the same time attached to the 3rd Division on the
rim of the Colmar Pocket.
VI Corps defended the line between Bitche and the Rhine in
slightly less advanced positions than those it had achieved in its
northern drive. On the corps left flank in the lower Vosges was a
task force which consisted of Combat Command R of the 14th Armored
Division less one tank battalion, Company B of the 645th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, Company B of the 3rd Chemical Mortar Battalion,
and the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. This force was
designated Task Force Hudelson. To the east were the 45th and 79th
Divisions. The Rhine flank, extending some 40 miles southward from
Lauterbourg, was guarded by Task Force Herren and Task Force Linden,
Infantry elements of the 70th and 42nd Infantry Divisions
respectively.
Seventh Army readjustment on its extended line was complicated by
the necessity of employing new and inexperienced units at the same
time that army was required to make additional sacrifices to the
exigencies of the situation on the German Ardennes salient. The
newly-arrived 63rd, 42nd, and 70th Divisions were required to
furnish 219 basics from each regiment, these replacements to be
moved north to the Third Army for the counterattack on the Ardennes
front. The scarcity of infantry replacements necessitated a program
for converting Seventh Army Service troops into infantrymen. (See
Map)
On 15 December a Seventh Army staff memorandum had announced that
within a short time the XXI Corps, arriving from the United States,
would be employed to coordinate the activities of Task Force Linden,
Herren, and Harris in protecting a sector of the army right flank
along the Rhine.
 On
25 December an advance part of XXI Corps, commanded by Major General
Frank W. Milburn, (left) arrived at the Seventh Army Command Post at
Saverne- but in view of developments at the end of December the full
right flank protection of Seventh Army was left to VI Corps. On 29
December XXI Corps, consisting of the 36th Infantry Division and the
12th Armored Division. was earmarked as SHAEF reserve,
The mission of Seventh Army as out- lined on 19 December was to
be defensive, but the change in mission was to be concealed as much
as possible by some continuation of offensive action. For the last
ten days of December patrols were active along the front in an
effort to impress the fact upon the enemy that, as XV Corps put it,
"No Man's Land belongs to the Corps and not to the German forces
opposing it . . . ." These orders were issued when it was still
thought that the Seventh Army December offensive might soon be
continued. As December came to a close, it became apparent that the
German Ardennes attack was more serious than had been at first
supposed. Seventh Army was prompted to make a more intensive
preparation for a campaign that was to be purely defensive.
Enemy patrols, especially on the XV Corps front, became more
aggressive. Several small patrols on the VI Corps front crossed the
Rhine between Beinheim and Gambsheim. Increased German attempts at
espionage and sabotage resulted in the establishment of armored
road-blocks throughout the Sixth Army Group sector and the checking
of trip tickets and dogtags. The reshuffling and refitting and
strengthening of the German forces indicated a build-up for a large
attack.
Up until about 25 December it was thought that elements of the
11th Panzer Division, the 21st Panzer Division, and the 17th SS
Panzer Grenadier Division, which had been identified on the Seventh
Army front at various times during the month might have been with-
drawn and sent north to join the Ardennes counter-offensive. It
seemed possible that the First German Army, opposing Seventh Army,
might be deprived of all its mobile units. But by 29 December it was
known that the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division was refitting in the
Zweibrueeken area; and it was believed that two other mobile units,
the 17th and the 21st Panzer Divisions, had not moved north but were
also refitting preparatory to action on the Seventh Army front. Rail
movements, persistent prisoner of war reports, and photo
interpretation indicated a build-up of forces in the Saarbrueeken
area as well as in the Colmar bridgehead and east of the Rhine
Valley. Elements of nine divisions of the First German Army were in
contact with Seventh Army: the 245th, 256th, 257th, 361st
Volksgrenadier Divisions, the 19th, 36th, and 347th Infantry
Divisions; and fragmentary elements of the three mobile units which
were reforming in the rear. Their total strength of combat
effectives was equal to about 16 to 17 battalions of American
infantry. Enemy forces across the Rhine were believed equivalent in
strength to eight battalions.
On 24 December Seventh Army received a warning from Sixth Army
Group:
Excellent agent sources report enemy
units building up in the BLACK FOREST area for offensive. Other
indications for imminent enemy aggressive action exist. Imperative
that all defensive pre- cautions be immediately effective.
The altered tactical situation had already been presented to the
Army Commander by his G-2 with remarkable clarity and accuracy. In
the middle of December there appeared in the War Room a G-2 map
which depicted graphically the enemy's capabilities. In his
"Estimate of the Enemy Situation No. 6", dated 29 December 1944, the
Army G-2 reached the following conclusions:
Capabilities -
1. To attack south from Bitche-Sarreguemines
area with five to eight divisions with initial objective of
seizing Saverne and Ingwiller Passes.
2. To attack southwest from the Volklingen - Forbach -
Sarreguimines area with five to eight divisions and the mission of
capturing Metz and securing the crossings over the Moselle.
3. With forces currently in contact and in immediate reserve,
to launch a series of limited objective attacks.
4. Counterattack from Bienwald Forest and Hardt Mountains to
seize general line Woerth - Soultz Sous Forets - Seltz.
Capabilities 3 and 1 were favored in that order. G-2 explained
his reasoning as follows:
The most logical and
economical employment of forces now in contact and known to be in
reserve would be in demonstrations, threats, infiltrations and
limited objective attacks designed to contain the Seventh Army in
its present positions.
Indications of enemy concentrations and build-ups in the
Saarbrucken area and in the East Rhine Valley are disturbing,
however, and the Nineteenth Army's determination to hold the
Colmar bridgehead may shortly assume added significance. Certainly
the recovery of Alsace, in addition to its military value, would
provide a tremendous uplift to German morale, particularly if the
attack in the Eifel area fails to achieve any substantial success.
Additional confirmation of the Saarbrucken and East Rhine
Valley area build-ups will tend to favor Capability 1. Conversely,
identification of the 21st Pz and/or other mobile units of the
First German Army in the Eifel area will be indicative of less
ambitious enemy intentions in Alsace.
The current success of the Third U.S. Army's counter-attack
from the South, and the enemy's apparent emphasis on operations to
the northwest in the Eifel sector, tends to discount Capability 2.
As this picture of enemy intentions grew clearer, Seventh Army
preparations for defense were intensified; and the sense of anti-
climax gave way to a sense of immediate danger. Sixth Army Group
instructions of 21 December had directed Seventh Army to be
"prepared to yield ground rather than endanger the integrity of its
forces." During the early part of the last ten days of December VI
Corps had begun to prepare an alternate main line of resistance in
the Maginot Line. Both VI Corps and XV Corps had been preparing
counterattacks against possible enemy penetrations as well as
consolidating lines of defense. At the end of the year the 2nd
French Armored Division, recently attached to XV Corps, was being
brought into the corps area prepared to counterattack any
enemy penetration of the line. In the VI Corps area the 14th Armored
Division was strategically located with a similar mission.
Lieutenant General Patch offering one of his men a cigarette,
during his visit to XV Corps Command Post at Fenetrange
". . . On New Year's Eve General Patch visited
the XV Corps Command Post at Fenetrange and there warned both
the XV Corps and the VI Corps Commanding Generals that
an enemy attack was to be expected during the early hours of New
Year's Day ..."
During the last two days of the month these preparations
were completed. A radio message from Sixth Army Group, received on
30 December, warned the Seventh Army
that a hostile attack
against your flank west of Bitche may force you to give ground
from your main position. To meet such a possibility, it is
necessary that your west flank be protected by a reserve battle
position. With this in mind, reconnaissance and organization of a
reserve battle position will be instituted without delay along
high ground on the general lines: Hill east of
Landroff-Bennestroff- Sarre-Union-Ingwiller. One half of each
division and attached troops currently earmarked as SHAEF reserve,
located in your area, may be employed at any given period of time
to assist in organization of ground, provided troops so employed
can be reassembled and prepared for movement on eight hour notice
...............
These directives were carried out by New Year's Eve. XV Corps
prepared its secondary main line of resistance with its western
anchor in the Maginot Line. The SHAEF-earmarked 36th Division and
12th Armored Division, as well as the 2nd French Armored Division
upon its arrival in the XV Corps zone, were ordered to be ready to
counterattack against enemy penetrations. Both corps planned to
defend on their forward lines until ordered to withdraw and to fight
delaying actions back to the secondary line. The 14th Armored
Division, in VI Corps reserve near Bouxwiller, was ordered to
prepare for counterattack to the right flank of XV Corps, in the
Strasbourg area, or to the south toward Selestat.
On the Seventh Army left flank Third Army was "limiting the enemy
offensive and ... preparing to counterattack." On its right flank
the French First Army contained the Colmar Pocket and prepared
"defensive positions in depth." On New Year's Eve General Patch
visited the XV Corps Command Post at Fenetrange and there warned
both the XV Corps and the VI Corps Commanding Generals that an enemy
attack was to be expected during the early hours of New Year's Day.
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