After completing my paper--"Hitler's Last Offensive: Operation NORDWIND" for this conference I read Ambrose's book "Citizen Soldier". He posed a key question when discussing General Marshall's plan for an eight million man Army. This was "Could we provide the leaders for this multi-million man Army"? This really resonated with me since I went through the entire leadership cycle during our mobilization from an ROTC 2nd. Lt. Infantry platoon leader in June 1940 to infantry battalion commander four years later in combat in Europe.

In the post WW I period our Army ranked sixteenth, behind the Romanian Army. It is hoped that as I recount my experiences that you will have a better understanding of the training of' not only your leaders, but our soldiers during the mobilization which expanded our small peace time army. Faced with Ambrose's question of "could we produce leaders" I decided to revise my paper to include an overview, of mobilization and training to illustrate how our small peacetime Army was converted into the massive multi-division force needed to win the two front war against Germany and Japan. I decided the most effective way would be to use a personalized Oral History approach recounting the trails and tribulations of an Infantry 2nd. Lt. called to active duty a week after commissioning and ending up as an infantry battalion commander four years later.

As a result of our W.W.1 experience the first step of our mobilization plan "was to bring our small nine division peace time Regular Army to war time strength. Step two was to call the National Guard to active duty, along with selected officers from our pool of Reserve Officers. The importance of this pool of Reserve Officers is illustrated by the fact that in 1938 that the strength of the Officers' Reserve Corps was more than double the number of Regular soldiers in army combat units. The contribution of ROTC officers as further highlighted in General Marshall's Post War Report. He noted that "though ROTC graduates comprised only 12% of the war time officers they were immediately available. Just what we could of done without these men I do not know." Step three was the activation of' our Reserve Divisions. (Appendix One)

I attended the University of Washington ROTC program from 1936-40. During this Post WW I period ROTC programs were designed to provide 2nd. Lts. for our Organized Reserve Divisions which consisted mostly of an officer and senior NCO cadre designed to provide the nucleus for the activation of these divisions. Our U of' W ROTC Cadet Corps program furnished platoon leaders for the area's Reserve 91st Infantry Division.

In the fall of 1939 WW II broke out when Germany and Russia attacked and dismembered Poland. Across the country the National Guard launched a vigorous recruitment program to fill their under-strength units just in case we became involved. At that time a number of our Cadet Corps felt that it was inevitable that we were headed for war and volunteered to enlist in the local 41st Infantry National Guard Division. Alarmed by intelligence reports of the effectiveness of the Stuka bombers in the Blitzkrieg in Poland the Army embarked on a crash program to form Anti-Aircraft battalions. They were looking for bodies to activate these units and using the old saw "that in the land of the blind the one eyed is king" senior- ROTC cadets in the 41st National Guard Division were looked at as prime candidates to fill the initial cadre for an AA Battalion. An example of the "crash expansion" was our battery commander who had been a pilot in WW 1. And I, who couldn't type, was selected as a company clerk and given a 15 year old high school enlistee as an assistant. Our First Sergeant, a veteran corporal from W.W. I who answered the "call to the colors", made it clear that I was responsible to read the manual he gave me and turn my assistant into a company clerk. He said "when mobilization comes, all you college boys will be leading platoons".

"When I graduated on 8 June 1940 I also received my commission as an Infantry 2nd Lt. Since I had volunteered as a mobilization augmentee I was ordered to report on 16 June to the 7th lnfantry Regiment for my annual two weeks of active duty training. They were at peace time strength of 1 officer and 90 men. We were equipped with W.W.I weapons - Springfield bolt action rifles, BARS, water cooled heavy machine guns and 3" Stokes mortars with a range of under l000 yards. My anti-tank platoon was equipped with 50 cal. machine guns. While with the 7th infantry Regiment I received orders for a new active duty program which I had signed up for just before graduation. My first orders were to report for a Heavy Weapons Course at the Infantry School Fort Benning, Georgia the first week in July. We were the first crash Reserve Officers class since W.W.I.

After completing the course at Fort Benning I reported to the 20th Infantry Regiment at Ft. Warren, Wyoming. Their rifle companies were also at a peace time strength. Stunned by the fall of France Congress passed the draft and soon new draftees poured in to bring these companies up to war time strength of over 200. In those days each Army Post kept in their mobilization warehouses enough weapons, equipment and clothes to bring the regiments up to war time strength. The new draftees would report to supply to draw this gear which had been packed at the end of WW 1. We were issued boxes of clothing and hobnailed boots that in many cases were older than the Lts. supervising the issue.

The 20th. Infantry and the 1st. Infantry, also at Ft. Warren, Wyoming, were two of the three infantry regiments of' the regular army 6th. Infantry Division. Our third regiment, the 3rd. Infantry, was at Ft. Snelling, Minnesota. Early in 1941 the 3rd. Infantry Regiment was ordered to Newfoundland. Since draftees could not serve overseas the division had to form another Regiment, the 63rd. Infantry, to replace the 3rd. Infantry. Regular soldiers through out the division were transferred to fill the 3rd. Infantry while a new shipment of draftees brought the 1st., 20th. and 63rd. Regiments back up to full war time strength.

By June 1941 the Division was concentrated at a new camp being constructed at Camp Leonard Wood, Missouri. The next couple of months consisted of expedited individual and combined training plus exercises for the upcoming Louisiana maneuvers between the 2nd. and 3rd. Armies. This maneuver was designed to give the senior staff' at Corps and Army level practice in the problem of moving and supplying entire armies in the field. This was a task which they had not done since WW 1.

With the Japanese sneak attack on 7 December 1941 the war was on. Phase 2 , the mobilization of National Guard Divisions was being completed and the next phase of mobilization started, the activation and training of the Reserve Divisions. It is at this time that the Mobilization Training Program (MTP) really came into its own, scheduling the activation and training of the existing Reserve Divisions. The 6th. Division was ordered to form the cadre for the 91st. Reserve Division in June 1942. By this time I was a Captain, rifle company commander, and assigned to the 91st. Division cadre as a Company Commander.

91st Infantry Division

A complete division cadre included personnel from company through divisional level as noted on the MTP. At division level a CG, ADC, Arty. General and senior General Staff' and Special officers were selected from army wide assets. The junior divisional staff positions and other cadre officer slots were filled from within the division furnishing the cadre. Commanders and staffs were also designated at battalion and regimental level. At Company level this consisted of' a company commander plus a 1st. Sgt., Mess Sgt., Supply Sgt. and 4 platoon Sgts.

The infantry regimental commanders and their officer cadre reported to Ft. Benning, Georgia for the New Division Infantry cadre training course for one month. This course was designed to clarify the Mobilization Training Program (MTP) and Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) requirements. This New Division Course also consisted of classes covering the reception and standardized training phase for the new draftees sent to the division. This was followed by instruction on maneuvers and details covering Final rail and transport movement overseas. Classes also included tactical map exercises of combat situations.

During this cadre training period the artillery officers received instruction at the Artillery School while the other branches received training applicable to their branch at their service schools. During this phase the Division CG and Staff completed a New Division course at the Command and General Staff School which also covered all aspects of the activation and training of' a new division. While this training was being received by the officers, the enlisted NCO cadre remained with the division and received practical on the job training for the positions they were to be assigned in the new division.

After completing this training the 91st. Infantry Division HQ cadre moved to a new mobilization training camp being built at Camp White, Oregon. Here the Division cadre was joined by the officer and NCO cadre. The next phase was a 91St Division special "in house" cadre training period which entailed the preparation of' detailed basic and advanced training schedules for 15,000 incoming draftees. Initially when I arrived at Camp White I was assigned by my old battalion commander, now the Regimental CO, for a couple of months as the CO of the Regimental Headquarters Company of the 361st Infantry Regiment. I was next promoted to S-3, Operations Officer of a Battalion. We were deeply involved with the individual training cycle, which was scheduled to be followed in 1943 with battalion live firing exercises, maneuvers and Army Ground Forces (AGF) tests.

70th Infantry Division

The next shock was an unexpected order from Army Ground Forces for the 91st. Division to form a cadre for the 70th Infantry Division. The 70th was one of the first divisions to be activated in WW II which had not fought in World War I. By this time the shortage of trained officers to fill vacancies had become critical. For example one requirement for the cadre for the new Division's Staff was a graduation from the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Due to the shortage of' experienced General Staff Officers I was assigned as Assistant G-3 for the cadre. I was placed on orders for the 12th. General Staff Course at the CGSC so I could fulfill the cadre requirements for a "trained General Staff Officer".

On completion of the 12th General Staff Course I was ordered to attend the 13th. New Division Course with the 70th Division cadre staff. This illustrates the scarcity of experienced officers at this stage of the war, which when added later to chaotic training and canceled MTP maneuvers combined to erode the overall combat effectiveness of these last divisions formed during WW II. The remainder of the officer cadre followed the standard MTP schedule of' branch school instruction for one month. On completion of this course I was promoted to Major and assigned as the Ast. G-3, Training officer of the Division.

Due to the unequal experience and training of the 91st. Division a new technique was used for selection of the 91st Division's enlisted cadre. An "A" and a "B" cadre list was established. The two cadres were balanced with the experienced company commander paired with the new cadre 1st. Sgt. and the cadre company commander paired with the experienced 1st. Sgt. A final selection from the A and B cadre list was made just before departure for the 70th Division.

The 70th Division cadre moved to Camp Adair, Oregon for activation. When the cadre arrived at Camp Adair we received our quota of officers and started developing detailed MTP training schedules for the influx of' draftees. The mobilization training for the Division continued smoothly until February, when a large levy of approximately 3,000 was transferred to replace overseas combat losses. The influx of untrained fillers required the division to reorganize and conduct basic training for these new replacements while still attempting to continue advanced tactical training. This ad hoc approach derailed the MTP and caused chaotic training conditions. In the summer training was further eroded by a move to Camp Leonard Wood, Missouri. From this point on the fate of the unit was not determined by the MTP but the turbulence caused by the growing replacement crisis!

REPLACEMENT CRISIS OF 1944

As noted a major problem which plagued overseas US combat operations after Normandy was the shortage of personnel, particularly infantry replacements. This was not only difficult for Eisenhower in the European Theater, but reflected an Army wide problem. This shortage was caused by the fact that the combat losses in the Pacific, Africa, Sicily and France had increased beyond the capability of the Replacement Centers to train enough replacements for the combat losses. Infantry divisions in the US, such as the 70th scheduled for later deployment to the combat theaters, were called upon to provide replacements. Their shortfall was then filled by drawdown and disbandment not only of service and supply units but also drawdown of' other units, such as anti-aircraft, supply, an Air Force cadet pilot trainees, which at this stage of the war were deemed non-critical.

This crisis peaked in 1944 when General Marshall was faced with disbanding10 Infantry Divisions or drastically reducing the College Army Specialized Training Program. (ASTP). The ASTP program was reduced and the trainees were distributed among the 35 division to bring them up to strength approximately 4 months before deployment. He also proposed to Eisenhower that some infantry regiments from selected divisions be sent to France early where they could continue their training until the remainder of their division arrived.

By October 1944, the shortage of infantry replacements was so critical that Army Ground Forces implemented Marshall's plan and selected the 42nd, 63rd, and the 70th Infantry Divisions, each to send a Task Force consisting of their three infantry regiments under the Ast. Division Commander ahead of the remainder of the division to Europe. These divisions were among the last divisions activated in 1943 before the projected army force goals were cut back. The plan visualized that once they were in Europe they would not only be able to complete their combined training, but also be able to furnish individual infantry replacements in case of an emergency.

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