HEADQUARTERS 270th ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
APO 461, U. S. Army
28 February, 1945
SUBJECT: Roster of Key Personnel
TO: Commanding General, 70th Inf Div, APO 461, U.S.Army
ATTN: A. G. Historical Section
1. Listed below is a roster of key personnel (Officers) for this command:
MATHESON, DAVID M., Maj. 021757, Comdg
SORTINO, JOSEPH E., Maj. 0337881, Exec Off
MASSEY, ROBERT M., 1st Lt., 01113346, S-1
BODMER, ERWIN E., Jr., Capt., 0394682, S-2
MURPHY, RICHARD D., Maj., 0325544, S-3
CAMPBELL, WILBUR D., Capt., 01107844, S-4
OLSEN, BRUCE C., Capt., 0332159, Liaison Off
TRAMBERT, HARRY L., Capt., 0441860, Bn Surgeon
REYNOLDS, JAMES W., Capt., 0527347, Bn Dent Surgeon
FURMANIAK, HILARY, Capt., 01102248, Comdg Co. A
MORRILL, KEITH S., Capt., 01102395, Comdg Co. B
SIEGRIST, KERMIT, A., Capt., 0375002, Comdg Co. C
ROGERS, ROSS E., Capt., 0340534, Comdg Hq & Sv Co.
For the Commanding Officer:
(signature)
Robert M. Massey
1st. Lt., CE
Adjutant
HEADQUARTERS
70TH ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION
APO 461 U.S.ARMY
9 March, 1945
NARRATIVE: Account of 270th Engineer Combat Battalion period
6 February 1945 to 28 February 1945.
The 270th Engineer Combat Bn., entering a forward zone of
operations for the first time, closed into Lixing-les-St. Avold
(Q2849) at 1600 on the 6th of February 1945. Plans were
immediately initiated for the relief of the 2755th Engineer
Combat Bn. which had been acting as Division Engineer troops for
Task Force Herren. These plans were completed and Engineer
responsibility for 70th Division sector was assumed by the 270th
Engineer Combat Bn. at 1100 on 8 February 1945. The Battalion CP
was moved to Merlebach (Q3262) while the rear echelon, including
motor pool and engineer supply dump, remained at Lixing-les-St.
Avold.
Duties during the period 8 February - 16 February 1945
included Barrier Guards, Road maintenance, and routine engineer
support to the infantry regiments. The Barrier Plan for the 70th
Division Area, published by this Battalion, was not a completely
new plan but was the result of integrating, and adding to,
existing barrier plans. Roads were not only maintained but a
complete re-check of all roads for mines were made. This was to
help eliminate the danger resulting from enemy patrols filtering
through our lines and laying new mines in the roads. No mines
were found in this re-check.
Plans for an attack were announced by Division Headquarters,
for a future date, and the Division Engineer was requested to
prepare plans for Engineer operations. Recommendations were made
to Division Headquarters for the disposition of Engineer troops.
Engineer supplies were massed at foward Company dumps. (see S-4
report) Arrangements were made with the Corp Engineer for the
installation of Bridge Trains in the vicinity of Puttelange
(Q4150). These Bridge Trains were composed of a minimum stock
140ft. of DD Bailey Bridge and 6 Brockway trucks loaded with
treadway. Bridge equipment was to be replaced by supplies from
Corp dumps as it was expended. This system proved successful in
actual operation.
When plans for an attack were announced the road maintenance
program in the Division Area was intensified to insure that roads
would be in good condition during the attack.
One Company prefabricated trestle bents for use with 3
sections of treadway bridge, since it was anticipated that wide
craters and anti-tank ditches would be encountered along the
routes of advance.
Division OP's were constructed under the cover of darkness
in preparation for the attack.
At H-Hour of the 17th of February the Division attack
started and the remainder of the month was devoted to the
execution of the attack plan. Attachments of Engineer Units was
made on Division order as follows: Company A was attached to 274th
Infantry Regiment. One Platoon of Company B was attached to 275th
Infantry Regiment, and one platoon of Company C was attached to
276th Infantry Regiment. The remainder of the Battalion was in general
support of the Division, under control of the Division Engineer; by Battalion
order the general support platoons in the line companies were
further placed in direct support of the corresponding Infantry
Regiments. Attaching platoons were in many instances attached to
Infantry Battalions and were broken up into even smaller units
which were incapable of accomplishing their proper engineer
mission. For details regarding the Engineer support furnished
during this period see the attached overlay and explanatory list.
GENERAL COMMENTS
A. Considerable difficulty was encountered with schu-mines
in the areas over which the infantry regiments advanced. The best
solution to the problem of clearing a lane through these schu-
mines fields was found to be the use of several strands of prima-
cord projected into the mined area with rifle grenades, AT. Some
of the mined areas were readily discernable due to the fact that
mines were on top of the ground instead of being buried.
B. Several AT ditches had to be bridged since they were
across the route of advance of the Division. The use of M1 and M2
Treadway to bridge these ditches was found to be very effective
due to the ease and rapidity of its installation. AT ditches
which interfered with the road net were subsequently bridged or
filled, in order to release treadway for future use.
C. Each company had one tankdozer attached to it for the
operation and the effectiveness of the tankdozer was demonstrated
many times. In many cases an abatis could be removed, or a crater
could be filled under conditions which would make the use of
organic bulldozers impractible.
D. Except in special operations, such as breaching multiple
paths through wire and minefields, engineer troops should never
be employed in units of a size smaller than the squad, which is
the basic Engineer work unit. If employed in smaller groups for
such a special operation, engineer personnel must immediately
revert to normal squad and platoon control when the job is
completed. Even when operating in squad units, Engineers must not
be so scattered that the platoon commander and staff sergeant
platoon leader can not control them at all times. The individual
engineer soldier is not himself a superman; he can carry with him
as an individual neither the equipment nor the ability to do all
the engineer jobs that must be done--but as a member of a working
team he can do them.
E. It is felt that experience to date in this Division has
proven that the book solution of normally employing Engineers in
direct support of the Infantry elements is, in fact, the best
solution. By this means Engineer control and supervision, which
require a certain degree of technical experience, can be
exercised throughout all echelons of the Engineer Battalion. The
company commanders of the Engineer company which is in direct
support of the corresponding Infantry Regiment acts as Engineer
technical advisor to the regimental commander. Priorities for
Engineer work which will best assist the operation of the
Infantry can be arranged directly between these two commanders
without approval by Engineer Battalion or other headquarters. The
full working capacity of the Engineer company is continuously and
promptly available and may be concentrated or dispersed depending
upon the job and the priorities set, providing that Engineer
command and control are maintained. In order for this system to
work, the Engineer company commander must constantly keep the
Infantry regimental commander informed of his companies
operations and capabilities. It has been found that the loss of
control inherent in the attachment of Engineer units has resulted
in a decrease in the assistance which Engineers are capable of
giving.
****Included in the report were two pictures. They are of a
bridge (Q489570), constructed on 13 Feb. 1945 by B Company, 270th
Engineer (C) Bn. Picture A is from the upstream side and picture
B is a detail of construction. These pictures were not sent to me
from the National Archives; only xerox copies.
