Distinguished Unit Citation || L/276 participation

Remarks by the editor of the Trailblazer magazine, Ed Arnold: 53 years have passed since the Battle of Wingen-sur-Moder. Time has blurred memories enough so that men who fought side by side there often have sharply different recollections of the events.

So it is interesting to read an account written only some five weeks after the battle when memory was fresh and when eye-witnesses could-and were-asked to corroborate the tale.

Col. Samuel (Shootin' Sam) Conley commander of the 274th Regiment, sent this account of the battle to Lt. Gen. Alexander Patch, CO of the Seventh Army.

As a result, the Second Battalion of the 274th was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation. Wingen has been the subject of War College classes for years, an example of "coordination" of small units.

For 10 days prior to the assault on the enemy position at Wingen, France, the Second Battalion, 274th Infantry, was maneuvered into eight different defensive positions in an effort to counteract General von Rundstedt's southern drive into the Alsatian Plain in Alsace-Lorraine, France. These moves were made over icy, slippery, snow covered mountains in bitter cold weather. Defensive positions had to be dug in each new location and in most cases the work was accomplished during the hours of darkness. The regiment's forces were split as each battalion was launched on a separate mission in an effort to meet the enemy's thrust over a wide area. Usually the only enemy information known was: that the enemy was on the offensive; his next drive was imminent; and it could be expected most anywhere.

Such was the general situation on Jan. 5 when the Second Battalion was busily preparing several different defensive lines in the vicinity of Puberg, France, having arrived there after an all-night ride from a position along the Rhine River near Drusenheim, France. Word was received that the enemy had broken through to capture Wingen, France, located two miles to the east and that the 276th Infantry was battling desperately to drive the enemy from the town.

At 1400, January 5, the Second Battalion received instructions to seize, occupy, and defend a position overlooking the village of Wingen. Time was short, and the move from Puberg to Wingen was initiated without delay over a treacherous, ice-covered mountain trail. Supplies would follow later, but it was then of the utmost importance to occupy this new position during the hours of daylight so foxholes could be dug prior to dark.

The Second Battalion suffered approximately 20 casualties driving back the enemy covering forces from the eastern edge of the woods overlooking the village of Wingen before it was able to occupy its assigned defensive position. A terrific battle could then be observed waging around the town where the 276th Infantry was engaged in a fierce battle to drive the enemy from the town.

The situation was very vague. All that was known was that the enemy was in the town and the 276th was trying to drive them out. The location of the 276th Infantry was not known except that there were some elements of it several hundred yards to each of the Second Battalion's flanks.

To add to the apparent confusion, shortly after this the Second Battalion was subjected to mortar, tank, and machine gun fire from all directions. This fire had come from both friendly and enemy forces. It was later learned that the forward elements of the 276th did not have knowledge of the Second Battalion's location and fired upon what they assumed to be enemy since the Germans had occupied this position shortly before. Darkness settled down as the battle raged around the town.

By this time the Second Battalion had been operating continuously for 60 hours without rest in below-freezing temperatures and eight inches of snow. Foxholes still had to be prepared though, and the men, although near exhaustion, busied themselves with digging positions and coordinating defenses. Enemy patrols were extremely active throughout the area.

Communications and supply difficulties were soon encountered as enemy patrols were operating to the Second Battalion's rear, along the densely wooded mountain trails between Wingen and Puberg. Telephone lines were often cut, pulled several hundred yards off the road, and then tied around a tree. Supplies were available only by hand-carrying parties over a treacherous, ice-covered cliff. It was impossible for even a 1/4-ton truck to negotiate the steep grade. Several vehicles traveling the supply route were ambushed and destroyed by aggressive enemy patrols. As soon as defensive preparations were well underway, the battalion commander, Lt. Col. W. F. Cheves, accompanied by his S-1, Capt. G.E. Boyea, departed on the long trek back and around to the 276th CP to receive instructions.

At 2100, the battalion commander reported to Brig. Gen. T.W. Herren at the 276th Infantry Regimental CP in Zittersheim. Upon arrival, he was informed that the 276th Infantry was unable to drive the enemy from Wingen and that the Second Battalion, 274th Infantry, was to attack at daybreak the next morning and recapture the town.

The attack had to be launched from the west only since there were friendly troops scattered throughout the area with no time to readjust forces. It was imperative that this town be recaptured without delay for the Germans were attacking desperately from the north in an effort to reinforce the garrison. The enemy strength was unknown, but the few PWs captured were all identified as members of the 12th SS Mountain Regiment, their morale was excellent, and they were supported by numerous automatic weapons. They had succeeded in knocking out two American tanks. All American forces of the 276th in the sector were placed at the disposal of the Second Battalion commander, including an attached tank company. Artillery support would be furnished by the 45th Division, since the 274th and 276th were without their normal artillery battalions.

The loss at Wingen, a key communication and road net center, was of prime importance to the Seventh Army front, and if not recaptured immediately would probably result in the withdrawal and reestablishment of the entire defensive line in that sector and give the Germans a route to the highly strategic Alsatian Plain.

Upon receipt of the order, Lt. Col. Cheves consulted with various staff officers at the 276th CP to ascertain more information and to coordinate the attack in the morning. The 276th had been attacking for two days and had suffered severe casualties. The companies were disorganized, deployed over a wide area, and their exact location on the ground was not definitely known due to communication difficulties.

The only method of obtaining artillery support would be through the 276th's Forward Observer with an SCR 300 radio. It was already late at night and there was much to be done prior to the attack. Rifle company commanders had not been informed of the forthcoming attack as yet. Lt. Col.Cheves decided to have the First Battalion, 276th, remain in its present position, deployed along the woods south of the town as a holding force, since it was impossible to coordinate an attack at this late hour with any assistance from them in their deployed state.

The Third Battalion, 276th, which had been attacking from the north side of town, would furnish a composite company from the remnants of that battalion, attack, and capture the high ground north of town.

The tank commander was to report to the Second Battalion, 274th OP, the very first thing in the morning.

The Second Battalion, 276th, was not in the immediate area and therefore not in position to assist. Lt. Col. Cheves then returned over the treacherous mountain roads to his CP since there was much remaining work to be done, such as furnishing an early meal prior to the attack, issuance of orders and extra ammunition, and the multitude of other details that had to be worked out prior to the attack. Reconnaissance would be limited to an intensive study of maps.

It was 0200 before all the company commanders and battalion staff officers could be assembled for the attack order which was to be launched at daybreak. Because of the vague enemy situations, it was decided to attack with one company, F, with two companies, E and G prepared to attack on order. A platoon of heavy machine guns from Co.H was attached to Co. F. The balance of H would be in general support.

At daybreak, 0900, the Second Battalion led by Co. F, commanded by Capt. Robert J. Davenport, crossed the LD and moved across the open, flat ground into the town, supported by a 15-minute artillery preparation which was fired to cover area generally as the important enemy locations were not known.

Good progress was made at first as F Company fought through the enemy's outer defense, which consisted of two machine guns on the outskirts of the town supported by snipers that were well concealed in the houses.

However, the advance shortly dwindled to a rugged, bloody, house-to-house battle. It was then that the true estimate of the enemy forces was determined. It was later disclosed that the strength consisted of two battalions of elite SS troops. In addition to the enemy occupying literally every house in the town, they held the dominating high ground to the north which gave them a commanding view of the entire town. This high ground was to be seized by the Third Battalion, 276th.

However, the effect of their attack could not be noticed, and it was learned afterwards that they started the attack late and then progress was extremely slow against an enemy that had to be blasted out of rock caves.

Wounded in Wingen....litter bearers (right) carry wounded infantrymen through the back street of Wingen-sur-Moder to avoid sniper fire that was whizzing along the main thoroughfare. The battle was at its height when this picture was taken by Chester Garstki, the "Trailblazer" photographer.

Capt. Davenport, moving at the head of F Company, was hit twice, refused evacuation, and continued to lead his men relentlessly forward against a determined, fanatical, and cunning foe. His radio operator was also hit but elected to stay with his company commander.

F was now also receiving murderous flanking fire from the high ground to their left as well as from their front. Men were failing on all sides as progress was limited to a house by house, room by room, painstaking, and costly battle for this important French town. The cold bitter snow added to the misery and suffering. The cries of the wounded, both friend and foe, were heard on all sides as any attempt at evacuation was a suicide mission. Many were left to die in the snow from exposure as the attack pushed on. The enemy had no respect for the Geneva Convention Red Cross emblem of the medical aid men, and many medics were casualties along with their doughboy buddies.

The cunning enemy was reflected in the manner in which he withheld his fire until the opportune moment when he would deliver flanking fire while the F men were attacking an adjacent house. Or, as in one case, waiting until an entire squad had entered a shallow ditch for protection before opening fire and killing or wounding the entire squad. The fanatical determination of this enemy was demonstrated by the fact that they would not surrender until completely out of ammunition and any further resistance would have been suicide.

The dead and wounded toll in Co. F continued to rise as the weary men battled slowly but steadily forward. Capt. Davenport was hit twice more and blinded by blood gushing from his head before he relinquished command of his company to Mahon, the executive officer. The radio operator was killed and the radio destroyed. The executive officer was wounded and then killed a few minutes later. F Co. continued to fight forward but the advance was fast coming to a halt. Twenty men had been killed and twenty-six wounded in this bitter struggle.

From his vantage point at the Bn OP, Lt. Col. Cheves summed up the situation. By this time the tank commander had reported. The battalion commander could now make a coordinated attack with E and G Company, supported by the tanks, at 1300.

Considerable coordination must be made, especially between the rifle companies and the platoon of tanks that was to be used in the attack. E and G would attack abreast through F Company, E on the right. F would reorganize and become reserve when passed through; one platoon of heavy machine guns to be in direct support of both companies. The 81 mortar platoon was to be in general support. The Second Battalion Anti-tank Platoon was now in position, firing at opportune targets, having traveled across the hazardous, icy mountain trail from Puberg. The guns had to be pulled through the deep snow and lowered into position with a series of winches. The battalion Ammunition & Pioneer Platoon was having unusually difficult supply problems, but by use of hand-carrying parties managed to keep the ammunition supply adequate over the icy, slippery mountain paths. Snipers still lurked in the woods and no place in the area was safe from enemy fire.

The second attack jumped promptly at 1300, preceded by a heavy artillery preparation. Enemy resistance continued as fierce as ever from both the town and the high ground overlooking the town. E and G Companies, commanded by Capt. L. A. Sisson and Lt. Fred Cassidy respectively, moved slowly forward through F Company. There they were met with a concentrated enemy machine gun, mortar, hand grenade, and rifle barrage. Undaunted, the men moved forward aggressively, taking advantage of any available cover as protection against the flying steel. There was very little cover available and the flat streets gave the enemy perfect fields of fire. The tanks could move only over one road and this was shortly after discovered as being mined. Although one tank had managed to maneuver through the minefield, an ambulance was knocked out a few minutes later when it attempted to get through the field in a desperate and brave effort to evacuate the many wounded who were now dying from exposure to the cold. A detail from the Bn A & P was called upon to clear the road. Led by Sgt. John Rybicki, these men exposed themselves to a hail of enemy fire and almost certain death to clear the field to permit the tanks to advance. The roadblock was finally cleared and the attack continued.

House by house, E and G stubbornly advanced, sustaining heavy casualties, particularly from the high ground to their left flank. The 276th had been unable to advance on this high ground and the Second Battalion companies were now an estimated 600 yards ahead of their adjacent unit from which they were separated by a steep embankment and a railroad track. It was difficult to neutralize this area accurately for fear of hitting friendly troops whose foremost location was indiscernible.

Dusk approached as the fighting companies blasted their way toward the far edge of the town with their mission practically accomplished. The town was aflame from the burning buildings and the sky was brightly illuminated as the blaze soared skyward. The supporting tank platoon withdrew to Zittersheim to refuel and reload with ammunition.

At this psychological moment, the Germans counterattacked. The hill on the Second Battalion's left flank, which had been producing devastating enfilade fire against their flank all day, against which elements of the Third Bn, 276th had been unable to advance successfully, now became alive with Germans yelling Re madmen as they swooped down over the railroad embankment into the flank of G Company which, through necessity, bore the brunt of this counterattack.

This ferocious charge succeeded in splitting and isolating the attacking companies. Everything was utter confusion as G Company locked in a death struggle with these fanatics. Co.E on the right, also felt the impact of the counterattack, but not as heavily as G had. The fires from the many burning buildings to the rear of E and G proved more of an advantage to the enemy as it afforded them silhouetted targets whenever the men attempted to move. Scenes of death were everywhere as the two forces intermingled in a battle for life amidst exploding hand grenades, bazooka rounds crashing through buildings, and detonating artillery shells.

The enemy counterattack was successful insofar as delaying the attack was concerned and the main forces of E and G were required to establish a defensive position for the night some 200 yards to the rear of the furthest point of advance where a reorganization could be effected. Numerous gallant groups of both companies held out all night in isolated buildings surrounded by the enemy and intermittent small battles waged forth until dawn. These brave men frustrated every attempt to continue the attack and inflicted such heavy losses on the enemy that the German positions became untenable and an enemy withdrawal began.

F Company, in the meantime, had been reorganized and although the company strength had now dwindled to only 80 men, they occupied an advantageous defensive position that protected the Second Bn's flank and prevented the enemy from exploiting the temporary success of his counterattack.

Ammunition supply was given preference over the meager supply routes, which meant the men spent another sleepless night in the extreme cold weather without blankets. The entire night was spent reorganizing and making preparation to continue the attack at daybreak.

The Second Battalion completed its reorganization during the night, plans were made, and by daybreak was prepared to resume the offensive. The tanks returned at daybreak and moved out with one platoon of F Company, accompanying them for protection against snipers. A detail from the A & P Platoon was again called upon to clear the roads ahead of the tanks as they advanced. The tanks moved up to F and G position and the attack flared forth.

Progress was rapid this time and house after house was systematically cleared. Coordination between the tanks and infantry was perfect. The tanks would stand back and blast away at houses and when the fire lifted the infantry would charge, throwing hand grenades into the buildings. All enemy resistance within the town ended by noon and the town of Wingen was again completely in American hands.

In one church building within the town E Company liberated approximately 250 American prisoners who had been captured the night of Jan. 3 when the Germans attacked with such swiftness to capture the town.