ABLE/DOG OPERATIONS
2-3 JAN 1945

INTRODUCTION

The deployment on January 2, 1945, out of Philippsbourg of the 275th's 1st Battalion was ordered by Colonel Charles S. Pettee, the Regimental Commander. Pettee's order was issued to attain objectives assigned to his regiment by the 45th Division Commanding General, the 275th having been attached to the 45th two days before. This subordination to the 45th Division came about in conjunction with the Regiment's move, started on the last day of 1944, from the Rhine plain into the Low Vosges mountains. The original departure time for the move had been hurried up by 12 hours as new intelligence confirmed Seventh Army G-3 expectations of a big enemy attack along its front facing north along France's border with Germany. On that New Year's Eve, LtGen Alexander Patch had met his Seventh Army corps commanders and told them that the enemy would hit during the first hours of New Year's Day. As the enemy's actual zero hour arrived shortly before midnight, trucks carrying the 275th's lead battalion--the 3rd--were arriving at its Niederbronn march objective and those of the 1st Battalion's convoy were soon to pull into Reichshoffen, the next town back along the Regiment's route.

The German offensive struck as expected and, while blunted further west, it made some headway to the east of Bitche, where Task Force Hudelson's thinly spread troops defended. Some 24 hours later, the 45th assistant commander--Col Paul Adams--came to the 275th regimental CP in Niederbronn and discussed the situation with Colonel Pettee. Then Adams, grease-penciling goose eggs on the 275th's operations overlay as he talked, prescribed the Regiment's objectives to be taken in offensive action on the 2nd of January. Two of Adams' penciled ovals outlined the heights Angelsberg and Falkenberg north of Philippsbourg, and their occupation became the assignments of Co's A and B. During the same night of this Adams-Pettee meeting, the first committed of the 275th's battalions, Maj William Shepherd's 3rd, had been in a fight out along the Bitche road from Philippsbourg. Then, even as this skirmish was in progress, LtCol George Barten's 2nd Battalion, deployed astride the Zinswiller-Baerenthal road, was receiving the first of a series of probing attacks out from Baerenthal made by the 361 VG Div force that had taken it that afternoon.

Task Force Hudelson had been formed some 10 days before the German attacks, from components mainly of the 14th Armored Division. The Task Force's mission had been to provide a light cavalry screen covering some 10 miles of the recently much extended Seventh Army front where, running east-west, it crossed the Vosges Mountains. Initially the German attack had routed two cavalry squadrons covering the western two-thirds of the Hudelson front. However, the 62nd Armored Infantry Battalion on the right, gave a much better account of itself.

The enemy's NORDWIND operation comprised two axes of attack the main one at Rimling and the supporting push on the left, that is, an the east side of Bitche. In the supporting thrust, the 361st Volks Grenadier Division had the main effort., with the 256th Volks Grenadier Division covering the 361st's eastern flank and attacking on its left. One of the 361st regiments, the 953rd, had Bannstein as its first objective. The division commander reported that its night attack had been discovered before it had gotten under way, and the objective could not be taken until the next day. The tardy success had needed help of "heavy weapons" (presumably, assault guns) which had had to be brought up to overcome stubborn American resistance. Two of the 256th's three grenadier regiments were employed in Philippsbourg fighting in the first days of NORDWIND. At zero hour, the Division's columns were just beginning to reach their forward assembly areas after two days of marching to get there, and their initial attacks would be notably tardy. The 456th Regiment had Neunhoffen (3 miles northeast of Philippsbourg) as a first day objective. Next it was to send a strong reconnaissance group to probe over the mountains toward Philippsbourg while making contact with the 476th Grenadiers on its right. The 456th had no trouble with the first part of its mission, for Neunhoffen was only lightly outposted by the Americans. A German account of action on January 2nd tersely noted that the 456th encountered enemy resistance in its advance toward Philippsbourg, nothing more. That day a projected 476th attack on Philippsbourg from the west reportedly never got started, poor roads and rugged terrain in the locality being blamed.

NORDWIND HITS 62ND ARMORED INFANTRY

Having been alerted to expect an enemy attack that night, the 62nd's dispositions had all three lettered Companies on line. Charlie Company, on the left, was first to receive the enemy attack before midnight. Then, under mounting pressure, it gradually gave ground. From his CP near Bannstein, the company commander tried through radio contacts to keep abreast of his forward platoons' situation and guide their actions. Co A on the right--below Neunhoffen--remained awaiting the enemy until 0300 of the next morning. Then a triggered trip flare burst to reveal a white-clad enemy patrol at the defensive wire. Able's spirited reaction with fire from its own weapons and that from supporting artillery routed the intruders. After a quiet spell the enemy loosed a counter barrage and followed this up advancing its infantry to hit Co A and then, on its left, Co B. Both units were hard put to contain the attack, which continued past noon. At nightfall Co A took up a position on the southwest nose of Weihersberg ridge, overlooking the Neunhoffen road.

Before dawn of the 2nd, fighting broke out anew when Co B's armored infantrymen in their foxholes detected enemy infiltrators in their midst. The intruders were driven off only to reappear after daybreak and the enemy front was extended eastward involving Co A across the Neunhoffen road in the action. Supporting fires were called for, but the enemy remained aggressive until the defenders' ammunition neared exhaustion. At that opportune moment two Sherman tanks--summoned by the beleaguered battalion's commander-- arrived to enter the fray with guns blazing. The tanks' added fire power and imposing presence seemed to take the scrap out of the attackers, and many of them gave up. Later in the morning, as the fighting died down, the armored infantrymen of Able and Baker were able to break off from the engagement. After the Shermans covered this, they withdrew.

On the battalion left, Co C's men under continuing pressure, gradually drew back to the Bannstein area, where they joined other 62nd elements in holding off the enemy until noon. The 62nd's composite defending force radioed that enemy tanks had been committed and these were systematically clearing the village one building at a time. Learning of this, Charlie's CO ordered his units to withdraw along the road to Baerenthal.

1ST BATTALION MOVES UP TO PHILIPPSBOURG

Toward the end of New Year's Day, the 1st Battalion had fallen out from its frigid, comfortless overnight quarters in the Reichshoffen wire factory and made the short march to the even grimmer confines of the Dietrich iron foundry in Niederbronn. Approaching the war-blasted factory area the Americans learned that the artillery the gunfire of which had been growing in volume to an ear-splitting level was positioned adjacent to the building in which the Battalion would bivouac. The combination of harsh weather, oppressive quarters, and deafening gunfire made the few hours spent there thoroughly disagreeable. One reassurance came from thinking about the hard time being dished out in the nearby cannonading to an enemy whose physical circumstances could not have been any less rugged than those of the Americans.

After a futile quest for a snooze lying on the foundry floor, SSgt Hammond arose to visit his Co A rifle squad's sentry posts. He was supposed to make sure his men were awake and watchful over the artillery crews and their roaring cannons only a stone's throw away and privately had his doubts about the need. After the squad was relieved, Hammond and his men were able to rest briefly before being rousted a couple of hours before dawn to prepare to march. Looking for extra ammo to take along, Sgt LeRoy Bussman found and opened a likely chest. Beneath the lid he discovered a list of names and addresses of girls who, back at a State-side factory, had packed the bandoleers of enclipped bullets it contained. Recognizing the note as an invitation to become pen pals, Bussman, already married, pocketed it to give to a single man.

Nearby, Pfc's Frank Hazmuka and Robert A. Matthews returned from a 2-hour sentry tour, rested briefly, then searched out their LMG squad leader, Sgt Raymond "Stubby" Stevem. After a remark about their tardy appearance, the sergeant told the two to make light combat packs, put their blankets in the squad roll and be ready to move out. He explained that the Battalion was getting ready to march to the next town, Philippsbourg. The 3rd Battalion had made the same march on the previous day.

It was 7:30 a.m. and still dark in Niederbronn as the lst Battalion formed in the street adjacent to the foundry and set out for its objective, about 5 miles away. In addition to the foot marchers in two single files, the column included the Battalion's tactical vehicles--command cars and weapons carriers. In the dark the sound of their engines kept marchers alert to their presence. Another safeguard--the feeble "cat-eye" head- and tail-lights on the bumpers--kept the foot soldiers conscious of the vehicles. These dim slits of light were the only illumination permitted in the prescribed black-out condition.

Co C was in the lead and next came Co A. Its CO, Capt Ross Millhiser, marched with his men until dawn, when the battalion column left the road and dispersed into an assemblv area. Then he took a ride with driver and jeep for the mile remaining to the near edge of Philippsbourg, where the battalion CP had been set up in a farmhouse with attached barn. During the march artillery and small arms sounds had become audible up ahead and grew louder as the column progressed. When the jeep rounded a bend and Philippsbourg itself appeared, some shell explosions became visible.

Finding the CP was no problem after the driver parked the jeep. A sign pointed the direction, and Millhiser dismounted and followed it to the first building on the right side of the road. Entering the CP, Millhiser paused just inside. As he looked around to get his bearings, he felt the blast of a nearby shell explosion which propelled fragments whizzing and smashing into the house, somehow missing any human obstacle. Still shaken, he joined other officers in trying to look composed while moving into the kitchen, reserved for operations use. Battalion Commander LtCol Ronald Pierce and his advance party had arrived in the village several hours before the Battalion. Quickly there had been an alarm when an enemy patrol had been reported detected on the ridge just north of the CP--an investigation turned up some tracks in the area.

Pierce was still a little edgy as he gave his assembled company commanders their orders. These reflected Col Pettee's instructions based on objectives he had been given the night before by the 45th Division's Col Adams, Assistant Division Commander. Accordingly, A and B companies were to advance to objectives northeast of Philippsbourg and C Co would be deployed close in and around the village. At the assigned defensive positions, field fortifications were to be prepared. Co D heavy weapons sections were to accompany the forward rifle companies and lend support. One HMG section was sent to secure a Y junction on the Neunhoffen road--the route to Co B's objective and part way to Co A's., Two Co D sections--one armed with 81mm mortars, the other with HMG water-cooleds--were to remain in Philippsbourg.

Back in the 1st Bn assembly area, the march column reformed as each company exited its sector tagging on at the end of the column in its prescribed place. Up ahead, the lead company reentered the road and turned toward Philippsbourg. In a few minutes the edge of the village was reached and there the column halted and waited. Company A's Wpns Plat jeeps were braked in the column at the south entrance of the village. LMG gunner Pfc Frank Hazmuka dismounted and joined others in stamping feet, waving arms and otherwise exercising to combat the freezing morning temperature. The sounds of gunfire and shell explosions, which had grown as the column advanced, held the men's attention as they tried to accustom their ears to different sounds and distinguish those that indicated a threat to the immediate area.

Further back along the column, a shell explosion nearby scattered members of a D Co mortar section, among them James Holt. Leaving the roadway he raced for cover in a cow stable and shouldered back the heavy door to make way for his entry. Without pause he pitched the mortar baseplate he was carrying in front of him as he took a dive, burying his face deeply into the floor litter. In a moment he became aware of its stench and came up for air. Only then did Holt realize that he was in the company of an aged farmer standing by his cow. The American felt very silly, especially when he noticed the unperturbed look on the old Frenchman's face as he took his seat again and resumed his milking.

The wait of the column had seemed much longer than it actually was when the company commanders returned to their units from the CP. Then they briefly huddled with their lieutenants and noncoms before the column was reformed and moved on. However, only Baker and Able companies and attached heavy weapons sections from Co D were in it, and each company now had related but separate missions. The rest of the Battalion remained behind. Noises of combat suddenly grew louder as the head of the column turned right onto the Neunhoffen road, where it joins the road to Bitche at the main street's north end. There came a welling up of explosions punctuated by a series of loud sharp cracks--later realized to have come from high-velocity tank guns. At the moment it was evident that a vigorous fire-fight was going on and the column came to halt. Then, after a few minutes, the firing died down. Later two Sherman tanks hoved into view up ahead. Back-peddling from the skirmish, their big guns were still trained toward the enemy. On each side of the street, the single file of riflemen gave the metal monsters plenty of room as they clattered and jerked their uncertain path to the rear.

After the orders came for the column to move out members of the weapons platoons, who had been riding jeeps, had joined the riflemen as walkers. The MGs and mortars had been removed from their jeep-drawn trailers and shouldered by squad members who served them. Lugging his light machine-gun, Hazmuka remembers being startled to see approaching a column of about 60 men with hands clasped behind their necks. Their ankle length overcoats and soft caps identified them as Germans and accompanying GI guards indicated that they were POWs. Some of the prisoners bore the bloody scars of battle, and some, supported by fellow prisoners, mirrored agony an their faces stemming from marching on frozen feet. When the whistle of an incoming shell signaled its near approach, some POWs were seen to join the Americans, including SSgt Hammond and his men, in breaking out of the column to hit the ditches together. One of the GI escorts joined the scramble into the same ditch next to Hammond, who learned from him what outfit he was with--he was an infantryman from the 14th Armored.

Co A was followed closely by the two Co D weapons sections--one, machine gun and the other, mortar--assigned to Able's support. Having left Philippsbourg on the Neunhoffen road, the Company passed the little hamlet of Mambach less than a half mile out. A hundred yards beyond it the column turned right off the road and started up the steep slope of Weihersberg ridge.

(Writer's Note: After the skirmish between the Sherman-supported 62nd riflemen and the German attackers that morning, there should have been a n encounter between the advancing Co A/275th column and withdrawing 62nd troop units before Able's men met the withdrawing Shermans. Aside from 62nd guards escorting German POWs, this has not been noted in any accounts that this writer has become aware of. Perhaps, as has been identified as standard procedure, the 62nd infantrymen after disengaging loaded into their armored personnel carriers which, seen in the withdrawal by 275th observers, were remembered only as withdrawing U.S. armor.)

With the Co D mortar section behind the Co A riflemen, James Holt remembers hiking a little over a mile before leaving the road and confronting an imposing hill (Weihersberg), which the mortarmen labored up packing along the mortar components and ammunition. The jeep and trailer weapons carriers which had accompanied the Co D sections thus far had to halt, the route followed by Co A walkers being too steep. One jeep was sent to scout the trail skirting the southeast foot of Weihersberg as an alternate route--seemingly the route was never so employed. As the mortarmen continued, they passed the remains of a demolished enemy machine gun and shot-up crew before halting about two-thirds the way to the crest. After a long halt the next leg of the march brought the section moving northeast along a trail well below the crest of the Weihersberg ridge. On this trail the mortarmen caught up A's rifle elements, which had forged ahead during the mortar section's halt.

In their jeep, Able's Supply Sergeant Jim Larson and his driver trailed behind the marching column until it left the road. There the driver halted and, dismounting, Larson followed the Company's route upslope to come upon the destroyed German machine-nest, the only crew member survivor badly wounded. The Co A exec Lt Perry Woodward was already at the scene when Larson arrived. Woodward told Larson to take three men to evacuate the wounded German to the aid station in Philippsbourg and there pick up additional ammunition to be brought back. The downhill carry of the wounded man was no easy task and proved to be futile--the man had died by the time the jeep was reached. Leaving his carrying party behind, Larson and driver continued on his ammunition supply mission to Philippsbourg.

To the northeast the security point of the Co A column approached the bottom of Weihersberg ridge and arrived at a saddle between the north noses of Weihersberg and Angelsberg. Here the trail followed by the Company joined with four others (Col du Modoch) and the view of Angelsberg's summit and north nose was unobstructed. The advance was halted and further back in the column, Weapons Platoon members were passed by their lieutenant David Scobey on his way forward.

A few minutes later Hazmuka and Matthews heard a volley of shots from the front, then came a call from Scobey summoning the machine guns forward. The two LMG squads arose and hurried ahead. Frank Hazmuka felt a glow as he received an encouraging wink from a reclining riflemen. Arriving where Scobey waited, the two crews hit the ground at designated positions and joined in firing alternating bursts in the direction indicated by Scobey's pointing arm and hand. Although Scobey made no sign to adjust the aim of either gun, a perplexed Hazmuka asked his assistant gunner how anyone could be expected to hit an unseen target. Matthews was equally frustrated and voiced his hope that the Company's own positions were equally hard to see for the enemy. From that position, there was no visible harm done by the LMG (or rifle) firing during the exchange, but after it had died down an A Co rifleman passed escorting four disarmed Germans with hands raised to the rear--the first prisoners taken by Co A.

Back up the trail along the flank of Weihersberg ridge, the Co D mortar section heard the outbreak of small arms fire and hit the ground. In the scramble, a can of peaches in his pack became dislodged and fell to the ground and, as Holt watched sorrowfully, rolled noisily downslope and out of sight. He had liberated his prize from mess supplies early that morning and had enjoyed the anticipation of a the tasty relief of his growing hunger. Now that promise was gone.

CO A ARRIVES AT ANGELSBERG

The advance resumed midafternoon after the firing died away. The company moved eastward to the lower slopes of Angelsberg, then halted and dispersed while platoon and squad positions were selected and assigned. The two LMG squads' positions were selected by David Scobey--low down on the north nose. Hazmuka and Matthews noticed theirs overlooked a trail running northeast as it skirted the edge of the massif in which Angelsberg stood. As the two were digging in, Scobey joined them. Studying the outlines of the 2-man hole, the lieutenant told the men to make room for him--as he said--in case of emergency. Nearby two ammunition bearers in the squad were also at work. As darkness arrived and deepened, any unfinished digging became unprofitable. With this pause came thoughts of rest, but then it was realized that the jeeps with the squad rolls hadn't arrived. Among the men of Co A there on Angelsberg the only comfort was the realization that the misery was equally distributed, and that was scant comfort.

The Co D mortar section remained in place after the fire-fight had died down and the Co A elements had moved on to Angelsberg. Section leader 2ndLt Leonard Klein went forward and returned after some time with Capt Millhiser's orders--the section was to locate a firing position to the rear from which to support Co A in its defensive positions, then being prepared. Led by Klein, the heavy-laden mortarmen worked their way eastward to reach Angelsberg and the trail running along its western face. They turned south on it and walked to a sharp left turn where the trail rounded a nose, behind which Klein picked their position on the downslope from the trail. Behind the position the slope formed one side of a draw running roughly west. Then the men went to work with their overmatched entrenching tools pecking at the frozen and rocky ground. After nightfall, some of the exhausted men managed to fall asleep between wakenings by the piercing cold.

It was late afternoon when Ssgt Jim Larson rejoined his carrying party where he had left them, adjacent to the Neunhoffen road at Co A's earlier point of exit. He was arriving from Philippsbourg, his jeep loaded with spare ammunition. rations, and mail from home. By the time the party, hand carrying just the spare ammo, started up the Weihersberg slope, it was getting dark. The jeep had been stashed with its remaining cargo. Having arrived at the crest with the darkness, the noncom decided to wait for dawn's light to assist them in locating the Company. The ammo was cached and the party settled down grimly expecting a rough night of waiting.

At the Angelsberg position Capt Millhiser returned to his observation point after again checking the platoon positions and progress in their preparation. The men's difficulties digging in the rocky, frozen terrain worried him. So did the lack of contact with Philippsbourg added to his unease, the Company's SCR-300 radio having been found ineffective in a test call to Battalion. To be sure, there had been a visit by a Co C patrol bringing lst Bn's reminder about the need for lateral contact. However, no wire team had arrived. Finally Millhiser sent for TSgt Pannell, Wpns Plat Sergeant, and told him to go to Philippsbourg and report the Company in position preparing defenses and request the dispatching of a wire team.

Earlier, right after the Company's arrival on Angelsberg, Pfc George Wildi had left carrying a Millhiser message to Battalion. He had followed the out-bound route of the Company and reached the foot of Weihersberg as darkness was setting in. At this point in Co A's advance that afternoon, the route followed had become obscure owing to the broad front of the Company's formation during the fire-fight. While he searched darkness deepened and Wildi realized that he had lost the trail. Still he went on. Sometime later he arrived breathless atop an icy slope only after sliding back to the bottom on his initial attempt. After a breather he started on only to be halted by a whispered challenge. Groping ahead, Wildi had run into the Supply Sergeant's party as it waited out the night. Larson's sentry went through the identification ritual with Wildi and readily recognized his fellow Co A member. The sentry was able to reorient the messenger and send him an his way. He had also been informed that the Supply Sergeant's jeep had mail for the Company on it, but whatever was for Wildi was lost in the confusion of the next days.

THE SECOND DAY--JANUARY 3

Pannell succeeded in making it to Philippsbourg without incident. In the Bn CP he found and reported to Capt John Carrier. lst Bn S-3, who then asked Millhiser's sergeant to wait until the Battalion Commander could see him. Waiting next to the operations center set-up in the kitchen, Pannell soon became aware that the Colonel was upset--there had been continuing commo troubles and such news as was getting through was bad. At last Pierce called for Pannell and curtly told him that the wire crews were tied up and to go tell the Co A CO to get his company back to Philippsbourg--that was all. Accordingly, Pannell made his way back to Angelsberg, again without difficulty, and arrived at the Company's positions before dawn. He reported Pierce's order to Capt Millhiser.

At their position, Hazmuka and Matthews had spent a restless night listening for outgoing shells whispering overhead. An occasional enemy round impacting in the general area added to the tension. The alternating watch period arrangement with an adjacent rifle squad had proved to be hardly necessary-- discomfort had prevented any appreciable amount of sleep by anyone. Between snatches of conversation, there was self-pummelinq with hands and stamping of feet to fight numbness. Conversation was mostly about food--there'd been no rations distribution in 30 hours. On Weihersberg ridge to the west, Larson and his ammo party were sleepless too and watched as friendly projectiles seemed to barely clear the nearby crest of the ridge--they could make out the spinning projectiles with spirils of vapor trailing behind.

Cpl Lee Miller, at his Co D HMG gun position deployed with the Co A defenses on Angelsberg, worried about the two chests of belted ammunition that had been inadvertently left at a gun position occupied the previous afternoon. The piercing cold and the bleakness of the mountain position compounded his discomfort making the waiting one of misery. At first light he set out alone, hurrying nervously along the deserted track left by the Company the previous afternoon. He soon found the place and slid down a steep decline to the old position. After an anxious search he recovered the chests, scrambled straining with them up to Co A's beaten path, and headed back. Crossing a trail, he glanced up it and spotted a pair of GIs walking toward him. Miller stopped and at closer range recognized from his own company 2dLt Leonard Klein and a member of Klein's mortar section. Miller received a bawling out from the officer--said Klein--for being on his mission all alone. Klein presumably had been conferring with the Co A leadership over administrative matters such as communications and supply. The machine-gunner and mortarmen quickly went their separate ways and were back at the respective firing positions in minutes.

THE ATTACK ON CO D MORTAR SECTION

A snow fall is remembered to have arrived soon after dawn falling thickly enough to make visibility difficult for a time. Then an hour or so after daybreak Klein and his mortarmen were startled by an outbreak of shooting--it came from higher ground to the front and right front. It was rifle and automatic weapons fire and was aimed at them! Quickly some of the advancing attackers were less than a 100 yards away. The enemy group may have gotten past the Co A left flank and perhaps had been the force whose passage during darkness had made enough noise to be noticed by the CO and Exec (as noted below) and surely many other sleepless Able soldiers. However the Co A right flank, like the left, was "in the air" with a much bigger (mile-wide) gap to the east affording a better opportunity for the enemy to slip through unnoticed. It was a gap caused by NORDWIND pressure driving back and lengthening the American front, which was left with gaps as U.S. units were shuffled in the effort to blunt the German thrusts.

With only their pistol sidearms to fight back, the defenders nevertheless blazed away upon Klein's order. However, the enemy was determined and advanced aggressively shooting many burp guns and yelling wildly. The action did not last very long. Klein called for a withdrawal having judged the enemy, starting with a position advantage, to be superior in both numbers and weaponry. After a hasty disabling of the mortars, Klein's section succeeded in breaking off the engagement, moving down the draw to the west. Pfc Norman Wheeler had been wounded during the exchange. His wound seemed to embolden him and he attempted single-handedly to fire mortar rounds directly at the attackers. After the withdrawal began, Wheeler was last seen advancing toward the enemy firing his pistol. Somehow he miraculously escaped capture or further wounds and joined the withdrawing Co A column which arrived on the scene some time later. That Klein's mortar section broke off the fight so easily and evidently without casualties might have been due to the distraction of the attackers by a threat--the Winderman patrol?---from the American unit (Co A) in position behind them.

From the abandoned firing position, Klein led his mortarmen on a westward course, down the draw and over a low ridge to reach the trail skirting along the south foot of Weihersberg and running into the Neunhoffen road. As the crow flies, the distance thus covered was about a half-mile. The column turned left on the Neunhoffen road and quickly approached Mambach. Bringing up the rear, James Holt was watching as the Lieutenant neared the first building, before which lengths of palisade-like log fencing formed a gateway through which the road ran. Passing through this gate, the lieutenant halted and raised his hands seemingly in response to directions that Holt could only imagine, then moved out of sight. The same thing happened to those behind.. one after the other. After that, Holt backed away and found cover in a large clump of trees. A short distance away he found and joined several Americans whose 57mm antitank gun had been disabled in the German attack on Philippsbourg that morning. Eventually this group made it back to Philippsbourg by circling to the south and west.

Earlier on Angelsberg, Hazmuka and Matthews at their LMG position could hear behind them snatches of a whispered conversation--the discussion of Capt Millhiser with his exec Lt Perry Woodward. The night's quiet had been broken by various artillery noises, mostly distant and identifiable as friendly or otherwise. Then the sounds of a fire-fight had erupted long before dawn when the enemy surprise attack was launched in the rear of Philippsbourg and continued fitfully until after daybreak. Shortly before dawn had come a variety of new noises heard coming from nearby on the left which, from training experience, the listeners identified as troops on the move, probably enemy. The two Able officers agreed the enemy was up to something which might need investigating. Then, an hour of so after daybreak. came the sounds of gunfire from the enemy attack on the Co D mortar section and the return of fire by Klein's men. From the direction and identification of weapons noises it was not hard to infer the nature of the action--it seemed like the Dog mortarmen with Co A were in trouble. Here was a definite and immediate threat, and Millhiser decided to wait no longer.

THE WINDERMAN PATROL

(Writer's note: The sequence of events that morning can only be arranged using educated guesses with a combination of what little documentary information has become available with the remembrances, some quite time-worn, of the Americans who were there.)

Millhiser sent T/5 James Dorsey of his headquarters group to get Lts Winderman and Scobey. It was evident to him that more than a recon look-see would be needed, for now his command was involved in a fire-fight. When the two officers arrived, the CO reviewed the situation with them and, after a brief discussion, issued his order. The patrol was to go to the scene of the on-going action and ASAP send a situation report back via messenger. Then Lt Winderman with the force available to him would give such assistance to Klein's mortarmen as he could, pending the arrival of reinforcements. The patrol would be composed of SSgt Hammond's rifle squad from Winderman's platoon and Sgt Evans' LMG squad for support. It has been remembered that consideration was given to sending along one of the Co D water-cooleds, but the idea was dismissed. While the Winderman patrol was being assembled and briefed, Millhiser sent for the remaining platoon leaders and sergeants. He had decided to order the Company's withdrawal, the preparations for which would begin at once and without interfering with the Winderman patrol's departure.

In the dull light of the morning overcast Hazmuka and Matthews could make out members of the other Co A LMG squad as they passed to the rear of their LMG position. Lugging LMG and ammo, Pfc's Alfred Heard, Lester Hiltenbeitel, Ned Smith and other squad members followed their leader, Sgt Evans, disappearing around a bend in the trail where SSgt Hammond and his riflemen awaited them. It seems unlikely that the engagement between the Co D mortar section and its attackers could have lasted very long, because of the advantages held by the Germans. Minutes after the patrol's departure there erupted a staccato chorus of German burp guns responded to by a few pop-pop-pop's of LMG and BAR fire. Their much slower firing rates made the American weapons seem feeble to American listeners on Angelsberg. Then silence. Almost at once, T5 Dorsey came hurrying from that direction followed by four POWs (unexplained) under a guard from Winderman's party. Breathlessly Dorsey announced that Ned Smith had been killed. Hearing of this, Hazmuka remembered that Smith was married man with two small children.

After Dorsey reported Ned Smiths's death to the CO, Lt Scobey went looking for and found Robert Budnik at his BAR position. Since dawn Budnik and his ammo bearer Neil Crawford had resumed work to improve their foxhole. The lieutenant explained that there was trouble to the Company's rear, and telling Budnik to follow him, departed in the direction to the trail. Grabbing his BAR, Budnik ran to catch up. Later the two men, hurrying along the trail south along the Angelsberg west slope, slowed as they spotted a figure sprawled in the trail up ahead. The body was indeed Ned Smith's and, after staring moodily at his dead LMG ammo bearer, Scobey started looking for some trace of the patrol. A burst of firing sound gave him a clue and the two men turned right off the trail.

D.C. Knott, BAR-man with Hammond's squad, is the only survivor of the Winderman detail known to have written about this incident. According to him, the enemy force was of company size and simply overwhelmed the Winderman patrol by attacking suddenly with burp guns blazing. The enemy fire on the patrol started with rifle shots, one of which killed Smith. Leaving the trail and going downslope obliquely to the right, the patrol reached a narrow shelf on the decline and from there attempted to return the fire with all weapons. Visibility, somewhat limited by trees, some with evergreen foliage, favored the enemy who for a time stayed motionless in firing positions, on the rise across the bottom from Angelsberg's west slope. The patrol was taking casualties, among them two men on the LMG, killed. Afterward Knott kept his BAR busy for a time as the rifle fire faltered. Sensing this, the enemy advanced, firing as they came. Then Knott, witness to the enemy's deadly firing effectiveness and with an empty magazine in his BAR, made no attempt to replace it. The attackers arrived and Knott held his breath as they walked among the fallen checking bodies. The other two survivors of the patrol, Lt Winderman and SSgt Hammond did likewise.

The Germans left suddenly, perhaps to take firing positions as they sensed the approach of Scobey and Budnik. Knott was watching when they arrived and saw the lieutenant pass, position himself on the edge of the shelf, and begin shouting angrily in German. The blast of answering fire killed David Scobey. Working on his troubled BAR, Budnik remembers seeing that the lieutenant's movement would expose him to enemy fire and calling a warning to him. The firing that killed Lieutenant Scobey seemingly occurred as the enemy still at the scene was ready to withdraw. They could have been a rear guard of a larger force already departed--the rear guard later spotted by Capt Millhiser and fired on by Hazmuka (see below). The only members of the Winderman patrol to join the Co A column as it withdrew were Winderman (wounded), SSgt Hammond, and D.C. Knott. Sgt Leroy Bussman, of Hammond's squad, was killed. The remainder were missing, some of them wounded, and all presumably captured.

Soon after this the head of the withdrawing Co A main body came along the trail, and Hazmuka was one who recognized Ned Smith's body, on or close to the trail. Those of two other known KIAs, Heard and Hiltenbeitel of Evan's LMG squad, were downslope on the shelf, which was not found as the Company passed by. Sgt Evans was rumored to have taken a chest wound and been MIA for several days before making it to American lines. In Niederbronn late that day, Capt Millhiser reported that his force had sustained 42 casualties, including 14 killed, on the Angelsberg mission.

THE CO A WITHDRAWAL

The attack on Klein's mortar positions confirmed his concerns. and Millhiser ordered that preparations be made for the Company's immediate withdrawal. Since dawn another factor had impressed itself on the Captain's thinking in this respect--enemy artillery fire. During the time since the Company's arrival on Angelsberg, enemy shellfire had been a desultory threat helping keep the Able foxhole diggers more purposeful. However, since daylight it had increased in volume and accuracy. The marked improvement in its accuracy suggested that the enemy had gotten an observer close in, arguably on the adjacent ridge--Weihersberg. Regarding his decision Millhiser has written: "It was the fight (attending the enemy attack on Klein's mortar positions) and the intensification of enemy shelling of our position which caused me to decide to delay no longer the Company's withdrawal, authorized or not."

Pannell: "Captain Millhiser- called a meeting of all platoon leaders--those who were left--and platoon sergeants. We discussed our situation, Our route options, handling of wounded and prisoners. and, particularly, march security. We were gathered around his foxhole. There had been snow and an overcast limited visibility; so a routing of the march to keep near the ridge line was favored to avoid being ambushed from higher around. After specifying the march order, the CO left with the lead platoon behind its point."

It took an appreciable amount time after the Company's point moved out to attain the proper interval between march elements and, as well, between individuals in single file marching along the trail. Back where Able's trailing elements--two rifle platoons--waited to move out, the men's attention was drawn to movements up on higher ground on Angelsberg, to the rear of what had been the Company's defensive position. Quickly it was realized that there was a substantial number of Germans up there. They were taken under fire by those men who were in position to do so, and the enemy returned the fire. Sgt Peter Haugen recalls that he and his riflemen inflicted some casualties. Could this have been the force that had hit Lt Klein's mortar section or Lt Winderman's patrol or both? Eventually the Co A withdrawal was joined by those who had been engaged with this enemy force. In their turn, the Germans made little attempt to maintain contact and the engagement simply died away. The actions that morning involving Co A and its Co D attachments an Angelsberg were evidently consequences of enemy thrusts by elements of the 456th regiment carrying out its mission for January 3--"to probe over the mountains toward Philippsbourg."

Near the head of the withdrawing column, Hazmuka came to the spot where lay the body of Ned Smith--perhaps the first Co A casualty of that day. This was the only evidence he remembers seeing of the Winderman detail's ambush. He is certain that, from the trail nothing of the Winderman patrol could be seen to the right or left and that the slope--upward to the left and downward to the right--was extremely steep. It is not known whether search parties were sent or flankers were told to keep a sharp watch for the patrol. However that may be, having marched only a short distance past Smith's body, Hazmuka came upon Millhiser standing beside the trail. Seeing Hazmuka with his LMG, the CO gestured away from the trail--pointing almost due west--and Hazmuka, peering, presently spied an enemy group dashing from cover to cover. Hazmuka and Matthews quickly set up the LMG and fired a half belt of ammo traversing along a thicket into which the Germans had sought concealment. A defiant burst of fire was returned, but only after the crew with its LMG had moved on. Almost immediately, the column was hit by concentrated artillery fire, seemingly directed by an observer, arriving in volleys of three. The third valley included a shellburst immediately over Hazmuka, wounding him and killing Foley, the ammo bearer.

Concerning the intensity of the enemy's artillery fire, Bonnie Pannell remembers: "Shortly after we started pulling back a heavy barrage of enemy artillery started falling on us, and the heavy, timber was causing tremendous tree bursts, really effective. I remember thinking that if that artillery kept up and we stayed in the heavy timber, our casualty rate was going up dramatically. Our luck was that the enemy lifted his artillery." The accuracy of the German artillery as described by, Pannell and Hazmuka strongly suggests that it was controlled by observers' pinpointing of the Co A location. The lifting of the enemy's fire probably resulted when the rounding of a turn by the Able column took it into defilade and masked the observer's line-of-sight to his target.

The column halted and the men dispersed during the barrage, then reformed and moved on after its lifting. However, Hazmuka found he had only one serviceable foot--he had taken some shell fragments in one thigh. He had to be helped along by Co A companions until picked up by a pair of German POWs with a stretcher. The stretcher arrangement proved to be useful on the level but on steep stretches required that Hazmuka dismount and hop alongside hanging onto the stretcher. It was the end of the machine-gunner's brief but action packed combat career-- Hazmuka was medically evacuated that day.

The choices which shaped the march route after Co A left the south end of Angelsberg were made to avoid arriving back at Philippsbourg itself which, from the sounds of battle--growing more distinct as the withdrawing force got closer--was judged to be at least partially in enemy hands. So, by switching from trail to trail, the heading was kept generally south according compass bearings and map checks by the CO. When the ridge was reached with its overlook down to the Philippsbourg-Neiderbronn road--on a trail which ran along the eastern slope of the prominent Wintersberg height--the Company was halted and dispersed while the road was kept under observation. After a time a south-bound vehicle was heard approaching and on sighting recognized as a jeep with a GI at the wheel. Halted, the jeep's driver turned out to be a lst Bn staff officer, who after talking to Millhiser drove back to the Bn CP. There his report brought the lst Bn exec Major John Duffie back with instructions for Co A's next movements.

The 275th Inf CP daily log has an entry made at 1945 hours on January 3: "Capt Millhiser reported Regtl CP (in Niederbronn) with approximately 125 EM." A reasonable deduction from this is that Captain Millhiser, himself, was at the 275th's CP in Niederbronn at the time indicated. His "125 EM" surely weren't with him, but the entry could have indicated the number of rations and blankets Co A needed or Millhiser's estimate of the effective strength of his battered company. In any event, it being still the critical day of January 3 with German pressure continuing in Philippsbourg, it seems most likely that Millhiser's Co A and a still intact Co D HMG section were being kept much closer to Philippsbourg than to Neiderbronn. Seemingly Colonel Pettee, in virtue of his high esteem of his Cannon Company's importance to the defense of Philippsbourg, would see to it that, Co A was assigned to an outpost line defending Capt Thomas' cannons in their firing positions. That did in fact happen.

Back in Philippsbourg on January 3rd, Co A's Supply Sergeant Jim Larson learned mid-afternoon at the lst Bn CP of Co A's location an the Philippsbourg-Niederbronn road. He was also told that Capt Millhiser needed transportation to the regimental CP in Niederbronn, where he was to meet with Col Pettee. By this time Larson had become familiar with the supply situation in Philippsbourg, such as it was. He found and delivered back to his CO a serviceable jeep (with Co D markings). By this means Co A's CO was able to report at "1945 hours" and undoubtedly talked to Pettee in Niederbronn. Concerning the Co D jeep, nothing was said until a general inventorying of equipment was ordered many days later, after the Philippsbourg crisis had abated. As a company supply sergeant, Jim Larson naturally became interviewed. By this time, however, neither Col Pettee nor Capt Millhiser were available to support the Sergeant's description of the emergency which led to the separation of its jeep from Co D.