Elements of the newly arrived U.S. 70th Infantry Division--less than one month in the European Theater of Operations--had been pulled from defensive positions along the Rhine River in the northeast corner of France in early January 1945, and shifted west to the Vosges Mountains to plug holes and create blocking positions behind a Seventh Army front line which was straining under the pressure of the German "Nordwind" offensive.

On the evening of January 10, the 275th Infantry Regiment was called on to assist operations of its sister regiment, the 276th. An attack by the 276th was meeting stiff resistance and so it was felt necessary to commit the 2nd Battalion, 275th, then in reserve in the town of Obermuehlthal.

Division G-3 directed that forces be sent to drive what was believed to be some German observers from the high ground on Hill 364 and an adjacent hill to its north, as soon as possible. This mission was assigned to Company G, 275th Infantry.

The 276th was under orders to take Hill 415, one mile south of Hill 364, and then push on to Hill 390, about one-half mile northwest of 415. Colonel Albert C. Morgan, the 276th's CO, reported that his troops were being held up by artillery fire directed from the area of Obermuehlthal and the Schwarzenberg or Black Mountain (also known as Hill 364), north of the town, preventing them from moving up until this area, on their right, was cleared.

Following their relief on the previous night, the 1st and 3rd Platoons, Company G, had withdrawn to positions along the Zinswiller road near the town of Untermuehlthal. Sergeant Paul McCoy, platoon sergeant, Company G, recalled that after nightfall on January 10, that he, along with the company commander, and a Sgt. Jakubovicz, were called to the 2nd Bn. command post for a briefing. Jakubovicz was to take his squad and check the slope of the mountain on the north side of the Obermuehlthal road to determine whether there was any German troops in the area east of Obermuehlthal. If Jakubovicz found the area clear, a task force composed of the 1st and 3rd Platoons, about 50 men, was to move out following the route of the patrol the next morning. The task force was to drive off any German observation posts (OPs), maintain contact with the 276th Infantry on its left, and assist by fire its attack. McCoy recalled that Jakubovicz's patrol went out shortly after mid-night and returned in a few hours, having encountered no Germans.

Thursday, January 11, was one of the coldest days that the 275th spent in the Vosges Mountains, as the temperature hovered between minus 13 and minus 6 degrees Fahrenheit. Shortly after daybreak, the task force moved out, its route paralleling the original left boundary of the 275th, a boundary which was shifted to the left that morning so as to include Hill 364 in the 275th' s sector. The task force' s mission was further expanded to not only support the 276th, but also to prevent the Germans from using the east-west valley north of the Schwarzenberg to slip in behind Company E on the ridge just north of the valley.

Pfc Eldon McDermeit, 60mm mortar gunner, would normally not have gone on such an operation, but was assigned by 2nd Lt. Eric Denton, Weapons Platoon leader. McDermeit had been temporarily assigned to a rifle squad since two of the five man members of his mortar squad had been wounded and McDermeit's good friend, Sgt. Mike Deasy, squad leader, had been killed in the same foxhole with him only a few days before by a tree-burst of an 88mm shell.

McDermeit and the other GIs had eaten their usual K-ration breakfast then packed a second ration, believing that they would be back by evening. There was about six inches of snow on the ground as they moved out, but it became deeper as they moved higher into the hills. The area was heavily wooded with few clearings.

Sgt. McCoy, acting 1 st Platoon leader, and one of the oldest men in the outfit at nearly 34 years of age, recalled that the task force started out with the 1st Platoon in the lead moving parallel to the Obermuehlthal road along the mountain side to the north of the road. The slope was covered with 8-10 foot pines, their boughs heavy with snow. The column arrived at a point immediately above Obermuehlthal and turned north following the contour around the nose of the mountain. Then the force climbed onto a saddle-back east of the Schwarzenberg I s peak. From there it continued north following a trail which gradually turned west along the lower north slope of the mountain. The north side of the mountain was, in places, bare of tree cover. Then the trail bent sharply to circle around a prominent spur which extended northeast from the summit. Continuing along the trail, the column had just turned west rounding the spine of the spur when it began receiving shellfire. The advance was halted and the men ordered to dig in. Adding to the artillery was long-range small arms fire from the northwest, from positions across the valley. This was the situation about noon.

Pfc Frank P. Collo, 1st Scout, from Staten Island, New York, recalled being subjected to an artillery barrage in an area of tall trees. The men could hear the shrapnel from the tree bursts hitting the ground all around them. Collo remembered that they took quite a few casualties. Pfc James Phillips was ten feet in front of Collo, on his knees resting against a large tree. There was a rasping sound coming from his body. Collo: "He died right there."

As the infantrymen were establishing their positions an artillery lieutenant arrived. The artilleryman was trying to get information on the location of the German OP. Sgt. McCoy and the lieutenant proceeded up the mountain seeking a vantage point from which a visual reconnaissance for the enemy artillery OP could be conducted. The two men found a huge rock near the crest and scaled to the top. They were there only a few minutes when a 4-man German patrol filed passed the base of the rock. McCoy then realized that he had only four rounds in his rifle. Nevertheless he opened fire and scattered the patrol. He and the lieutenant quickly withdrew before the Germans had a chance to return. When the two returned to where the Company G men were digging in, the lieutenant left, going back down the trail along which the task force had originally come.

Pfc McDermeit and his comrades ate their single K-ration about noon--it was to be their last meal for the next couple of days. McDermeit takes up his story: "After lunch we proceeded onward and ran into some small arms fire. But we kept moving forward and heard a yell coming from in front of us. It was a German soldier, about 45 to 50 years old, who appeared to be starving. He had been hit in the arm. We took him prisoner and kept going. Soon we came under machine gun and mortar fire. We halted. When we tried to move again we again received fire and took several casualties--two dead and three or four wounded. We had taken a medic along with us. He was busy and would continue to be so in the days ahead."

Lt. Denton, Weapons Platoon leader, was also assigned to the task force, although the larger part of his platoon was with the 2nd Platoon holding Obenmuehlthal: "The Germans were able to drop shells on to our positions with surprising accuracy, and apparently right close to their own forward observers. Because of the confused situation and the mixing of our positions with that of the Germans, communications within our own task force were every difficult."

As the German shellfire pummeled the troops sporadically during the afternoon a number of the men were wounded and several more were killed. The company commander was paralyzed with uncertainty--incapable of making a decision or deciding on a course of action. It was apparent to all present that the Captain was not able to command and something had to be done before the whole unit was wiped out.

Recollections as to exactly what happened next differ.

Seeing no other way out of the situation, Sgt. McCoy came to the end of his patience. Taking the only action left open in order to save what was left of the unit, he took charge.

The quasi-official unit history, "Ordeal in the Vosges," by Donald C. Pence and Eugene J. Petersen, records that after several hours of being shelled, the company commander called his platoon leaders together: 2nd Lt. William R. Taddei, 3rd Platoon leader, McCoy, and Lt. Denton.

The commander asked the men what they thought ought to be done about their situation. McCoy spoke up saying that he thought it was pointless for them to stay where they were and continue to take it. He suggested that they establish a supporting base of fire and assault the area where the OP, which was directing the shelling, was suspected to be. McCoy: "When our two lieutenants nodded their agreement, the company commander proposed that I plan and direct the operation. Being only a staff sergeant in the presence of three officers, I was astounded. However, they seemed to be sure that was what they wanted."

Pfc McDermeit recalled the crisis: "While the official history indicates that Sgt. McCoy had suggested a plan of operation to the company commander and two lieutenants, the only officer present was the Captain. The Captain had tried constantly for two or three hours to reach Battalion headquarters by radio. As it was nearly dark, McCoy became irritated that the Captain couldn't reach a decision. He finally told him that he'd give him ten more minutes to decide what to do or that he (McCoy) would. When the time limit expired, McCoy told all of us in a loud voice that from then on we were to take our orders from him and not from the Captain. Then he turned to the Captain and told him to keep his mouth shut. I was 20 years old at the time and in awe of officers and their power over enlisted men. I had never heard and enlisted man raise his voice against an officer."

Second Lt. William A. Darrin, Company G exec: "I do not recall Sgt McCoy's outburst (not being present at the time), but I certainly agreed with his action....the inept handling of the mission so far by the Captain was very evident."

Pfc Collo also recalled that the Captain had been trying to get through on the radio and couldn't make a decision. "We could not stay where we were so the sergeants made the decision for the Captain. I believe it was [Sgt] Paul McCoy and another sergeant that took over."

The company now moved to give back some of what they had been taking. McCoy told the other platoon leader to move his men to a position from which they could bring flanking fire to bear on the suspected area while he readied the 1st Platoon to make the assault. When he was sure that the 3rd Platoon was set, he moved his men forward. The advance took the GIs westward, diagonally up-slope until they reached the crest of Schwarzenberg at its west end. Although McCoy's scout was killed during the assault, the GIs succeeded in driving off the Germans from the OP--securing the position around 1600 hours.

With communications out, it was decided to send a messenger to report that the objective, the German OP, had been taken. At Muehlthal, the messenger was ordered to return to the task force with further instructions. The task force was directed to move to its next objective--a hill north of and adjacent to Hill 364. Company A, 275th, which had been committed on the south side of the Schwarzenberg, to the left of the task force, had received instructions to launch a coordinated assault with the Company G task force on Hill 364 and the hill to its north. But Company G never received these orders.

Collo recalled the situation on the hill: "... at dusk [we] dug in along the crest. While we were digging in we were hit with another barrage. The trees in the area were smaller and a shell hit above the foxhole next to mine. I was hit in the left rear shoulder. During the night I ate snow to quench my thirst because the water in my canteen was frozen solid."

McCoy had ordered the men to circle like a "wagon train" and dig in. The foxholes, placed 30 to 40 feet apart in the dense forest, isolated the men so that they were only able to see the next man on their left and right. During darkness the troops did not move outside their holes. Anyone moving about was considered to be the enemy.

The company continued to take a pounding. Pfc McDermeit: "In the evening, we were setting outside our foxholes. I was talking to a guy in the next foxhole when the shelling began again. We both jumped for our holes. He was a little late and a mortar shell cut his arm off above the elbow. The medic assisted him through the night, but he died the next morning."

Shortly after midnight, January 11/12, Colonel Barten, Regimental CO, sent his exec, Major Bottenfield, and a wire team to re-establish communications with the Company G task force. But when over two hours passed without word from Bottenfield's party, around 0300, Barten decided that he could wait no longer and summoned Lt. Cruell, leader of the 2nd Bn. Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon. Barten briefed Cruell on Bottenfield's route and told him to follow with another patrol. The route ran directly west from the junction of the Obermuehlthal and Zinswiller roads, on the slope north of and parallel to the Obermuehlthal road. Cruell set out with three men. They had barely completed the climb up the slope and gone on a couple of hundred yards when they came across Bottenfield's party. Bottenfield and his men had lost their bearings, and, after several hours, had come across their own phone wire--they had been circling. The two groups returned together to the Muehlthal CP.

Barten now told Cruell to take a patrol, along with a wire crew, and try again to find Company G, determine its status, and establish wire communications. Cruell took three A&P Platoon members and two wire crewmen. He first took his party to Obermuehlthal. There they found several members of the 2nd Platoon, Company G, and discussed the probable location of the balance of the company. Nobody knew anything for certain. It was thought that they had last been moving west on the other side of the mountain. It was now shortly before dawn.

One of the men from the 2nd Platoon agreed to guide Cruell's party part of the way in their search. They proceeded through Obermuehlthal, turned north and climbed up and over the saddleback ridge. Their guide gave them directions and then returned to Obermuehlthal. Cruell's patrol headed west along the north slope of the Schwarzenberg, observing in the dim light at daybreak the valley on their right and the ridge on the far side of it. As they approached the mouth of the valley the sounds of small arms and mortar fire could be heard coming from up ahead, but seemed to die away as they grew near. Along their route of march they came upon signs of Company G's passing and a sense of its ordeal--shatter trees, shell craters, and bodies of GIs. As they continued west they climbed higher until they were well up the slope of the Schwarzenberg.

They had advanced a couple of hundred yards after the sound of firing had ceased when, close to the crest of the mountain where the Company G group had bivouacked the night before, they came face to face with seven grim looking GIs. The men identified themselves as the rear guard of the Company G task force. They appeared jumpy and had ahnost fired on Cruell's party. They may have done just that had not Lt. Denton, Weapons Platoon leader, not recognized Lt. Cruell. Cruell: "Denton wanted to know where in the hell we had come from and how we had gotten through. I didn't understand and answered we hadn't had any trouble. When I asked why we should have had trouble, Denton explained that he and his men had repelled a German attack only five minutes before, an attack that had come from the identical direction of my patrol's approach. No wonder they had been so ready to fire on us!"

Cruell explained the patrol's mission to Denton--to find the task force, get the telephone wire to them, and check with the CO about his force's situation. Denton informed Cruell that he (Denton) would get word to the CO that Cruell had been there (that he had talked to Cruell) and then he insisted that Cruell take his men and leave the area at once, asking that Cruell take with them one of Denton's men who had seriously wounded. Denton also told Cruell that the unit had only about 25 men left--having lost 50 percent of the original force in a 24-hour period. Cruell tried to persuade Denton that he should proceed on to the company's position, but Denton would see things no other way. So Cruell left the wire, took his men and the wounded litter case, and started back. Cruell would conclude later, regarding Denton's attitude, that Denton may have been under orders from his CO to prevent any non-essential troop movement, since they might attract enemy fire, given that German mortar and artillery shelling had already inflicted serious losses on the Company G task force.

Lt. Denton: "We were shelled and harassed by mortars, I don't think that the Germans had artillery up there, but the mortars were heavy [large caliber]. They seemed to have outposts all around and could drop the shells right up to their own positions. I didn't know much about what was going on with the main body because I was in charge of the rear guard. I was afraid that the Germans would use the wire that Cruell had brought up to pinpoint our position."

The return trip was not without its difficulties. Cruell's men hadn't gone more than a hundred yards they were hit with mortar, artillery, and small arms fire. Cruell: "The incoming shells were causing tree-bursts all around us. It probably took us a little over an hour to reach the saddle above Obermuehlthal, but it seemed to take ages... It was a miracle that none of us was even wounded. We dove for cover repeatedly as we heard the sound of an approaching shell--behind fallen trees or even a corpse or two when no other shelter was handy. As we moved through trees, we could hear and see shell fragments plugging into nearby tree trunks."

Pfc Collo takes up his story back at the Company G position: "The next morning they decided to send the walking wounded back to headquarters. One of the wounded had died during the night from loss of blood and the cold. The group consisted of a sergeant, a prisoner [probably the old German captured the previous day], and five or six armed, but wounded soldiers. The sergeant led off with the prisoner. I followed two or three paces behind him. In a short while we were hit by small arms fire on our left flank. We were caught in an open area with only one tree large enough to provide cover, and the German prisoner was crouched behind that. During the firefight he kept glancing at me. I think he was afraid that I would shoot him. At the sound of gun fire I had dropped to the ground. I was behind a tree that was only about 6-inches in diameter. Pfc William Manser, our wounded BAR-man, was to my left front. He was on one knee trying to get his frozen gun to operate. He died trying."

"I spotted a German in a white parka with a black beard advancing on our position moving from tree to tree. They (the Germans) were in an area with large trees. Whenever he stuck his head out from behind a tree, I aimed and fired, but he did not react. After firing several [what I thought were] well aimed, but unsuccessful shots, I concluded [that] my sights were off and even tried hitting the tree to see where the gun was firing. Meanwhile, the German I was shooting at was getting closer. I fired a whole clip without success. When I went to reload another clip it came apart and the bullets fell into the rifle's receiver. I had to get on my left elbow to turn the rifle over and shake the loose shells out. They all came out, but one, [which] I managed to feed into the chamber. I fired again and the German dropped flat on the ground and crawled quickly away. The firing in the area stopped after I fired the last shot."

"Soon after the firing stopped three soldiers from headquarters joined us. I believe they scared the Germans away. The survivors--myself, the German prisoner, and the sergeant, who was shot in the shoulder during the attack--returned with the three to the 2nd Battalion aid station."

Lt. Denton: "The next morning we were receiving more shell fire onto our positions. At one point the shelling had stopped and word was passed down the line to us to move on out. As we got to our feet, I heard the whistle of a shell coming in and threw myself to the ground. A man on either side of me was struck by shell fragments and killed."

"Some time the same morning Sergeant McCoy got word to me that our Captain had totally withdrawn himself and was unable to provide any leadership. McCoy stated that he had decided to step in and take control, but suggested that I could take over command if that was what I wanted. At this point, I told him to carry on since I felt that he had the support of his entire platoon, had a better feeling for our situation, and could provide the leadership that was needed to get us out of a very bad position."

Lt. Darrin recalled that on the morning of 12 January the Captain [apparently now back in charge] decided to send a patrol back to report the unit's situation to headquarters and to get rations and ammunition. The Captain initially assigned acting 1st Sgt. Arnold Hawvermale [or Hawvermill], the communications sergeant, to the patrol. Hawvermale had only been made First Sergeant a few days before by Lt. Darrin as the unit was being moved from the Rhine. Darrin and Hawvermale were each expecting the birth of their first child and had been discussing fatherhood just before going into action. Lt. Darrin objected strenuously to placing the patrol under an NCO, feeling that a commissioned officer's report would be taken more seriously, and given the hazardous nature of the assignment. So Lt. Darrin was assigned to go with the patrol.

The patrol had just started out when they began to receive fire from their front. Sgt. Hawvermale was caught in the first volley and killed with a slug in the head. As they hit the ground they also began taking fire from the rear. Returning fire they succeeded in driving off a small German patrol.

Besides Hawvermale, two other men had been killed and several were wounded, including Lt. Darrin. All of the other wounded could walk, but Darrin had been hit in the ankle. Two of the GIs tried to carry him, but it was obviously he was going to delay the patrol, so he told them to leave and send a stretcher back for him.

"I don't know how long it was, but quite awhile later Sgt. Bernard (Sandy) Sandoval, of the 2nd Platoon, sent from headquarters, came along [by himself]. He had been sent to locate the company. I told him where I had last seen them and had heard gun fire [coming] from that direction. He went in the direction I had pointed out, and some time later, after locating the company, picked me up [and] put me over his shoulder and headed back to headquarters. We came in contact with a stretcher team and he left me and went on."

According to Sgt. McCoy, on the morning of January 12, the men of the task force formed in extended order and started down hill heading west. They had gone no more than a few hundred yards before they were forced to halt, low on the western slope of the Schwarzenberg. An order to dig in was passed. Sgt. McCoy viewed the position as unfortunate as the fields of fire were badly obstructed by dense woods. The digging of individual shelters continued into the afternoon. McCoy: "Then the word was passed around to get ready for another move. Shouldering our packs, we formed and started west again. We had barely gotten out of the area of our last position when the artillery came in heavy. We quickly became disorganized and scattered--some of the men returned to the slit trenches they had left only a few moments before."

Pfc McDermeit: "On 12 January the low temperature was -9. We ate snow to relieve our thirst. I had a few sugar cubes and pieces of candy I'd saved from a K-ration. I even ate some powdered bouillon sprinkled on snow. These did little to relieve the hunger or to provide strength or warmth. Just walking through the snow became an effort.

"On the night of 12 January, about 10 o'clock, we were told to form a column, a sort of 'follow the leader.' We were going to try an walk out--back to our lines. It was a bright, moon-lit night.

.We had only gone about 100 yards when a machine gun opened up and killed four or five guys at the front of the column. A mortar shell exploded at what seemed to be about two feet in front of me, knocking me flat on my back. The guy in front of me was killed and the guy behind me took a piece of shrapnel in the arm. Word was passed to return to our foxholes.

"The members of the patrol kept wondering if anyone was looking for us. Every time we moved we came under shell fire. The enemy held the high ground all around us."

The GIs were badly shaken and there seemed little notion as what to do next. The men were hungry and discouraged. The unit was spent, its effectiveness gone.

Back at the American lines the Battalion was trying to organize rescue efforts. On the morning of the 12th, Lt. Lawrence Southard, with Company F, received a message from Battalion directing him to report to Colonel Barten's command post in Muehlthal. Upon his arrival, Lt. Southard was told that he was now the Company G commander and was pointed out the last known map position of the company. It may be that the messenger who returned with information about the task force's taking of the German OP position on the Schwarzenberg might also have reported on the group's command situation. The Lieutenant was directed to take food, water, and ammunition, find the missing unit, and move them to their next objective by nightfall--the hill just north of Hill 364. Colonel Barten told Southard that 10 to 12 men from Company G's 2nd Platoon were in a house in Obermuehlthal, about half a mile from the CP, ready to go with all the supplies needed.

Southard proceeded to Obermuehlthal where he found the carrying-party waiting. Around noon they set out. They had barely gotten underway when mortar shells began falling, forcing them to return to their starting point. The GIs were held up for the next two hours until the German mortar barrage spent itself When it let up Southard had his men shouldered their packs and headed out again. Southard: "This time we made it well up into the mountains. The sergeant leading me to G Company's last known position indicated that we were near it; so I stopped the men." It's likely that the sergeant guiding Southard's party had received information on Company G's location from Cruell's patrol when it had stopped in Obermuehlthal during its return.

Southard went forward with the sergeant and soon found the Company G bivouac area that had been used the previous night, but found no sign of the missing task force. During their journey the two men passed a number of corpses, recognized by the sergeant as members of Company G. As the two were in the bivouac area the Germans began shelling the mountain side.

Southard: "It was about 1600. The sergeant and I jumped into a hole and stayed there until the shelling stopped. We then went back to get the men with the supplies, but they were gone and the supplies were scattered down the trail from where I had halted the carrying-party." Apparently the barrage had also fallen on the area where Southard's carriers had been waiting. Southard therefore, decided to return to Obermuehlthal.

The members of the task force, scattered and isolated, got back to the American lines by whatever means they could. Pfc McDermeit recalled his particular situation: "On 13 January [after another night in the field], morale was pretty low. McCoy said he didn't know how we' d get out and that we were about out of options."

"About 0900 we were surprised to see an American reconnaissance plane fly over, then circle and come back low over us. The German mortars and artillery were quiet, as they seemed to know that the plane could quickly call in our own artillery on them. McCoy gave orders for us to run single file, in a line parallel with the front lines. As we were running we ran into a German rifleman who was dispatched by one of our guys. We continued running and eventually turned toward our lines. The guy in the plane kept circling us all the way back. I believe that we owed our lives to the guy."

"Twelve of our men were killed while on the patrol, several others were wounded and immediately evacuated upon our return. Except for frozen feet, I was not in bad shape." "Shortly after our return the Captain was relieved of command and transferred to a staff assignment. I think that the official story was probably slanted so as to reduce repercussions regarding the Captain."

Out of the men sent with the task force only four were fit for immediate duty after their return. Company G had arrived in France with 195 men and five officers just four to five weeks before. By the end of the action it was reduced to just 72 men and two officers. Sgt. McCoy would later receive a battlefield commission to second lieutenant, eventually being promoted to captain and company commander, but also loss an eye to a white phosphorus shell.

The company was relieved by members of the 36th Engineer Combat Bn. Shortly afterwards the 70th withdrew to a new defensive position the Seventh Army had established along the Moder River.