275th Medical Det. History

THIS BOOKLET IS DEDICATED
TO THE MEMORY OF THESE MEN
OF THE MEDICAL DETACHMENT
OF THE 275th INFANTRY

Silver, Ezra I.	0 326 744	Major, M.C.
MacAlpine, Orville D.	0 381 377	Capt. M.C.
Ferree, Arthur C.	01 785 697	Capt. M.C.
Lekisch, Kurt	0 555 529	Capt. M.C.
Richardson, Clark M.	0 548 670	Capt. M.C.
Dougherty, Lewis A.	02 048 986	1st Lt., M. C.
Koeck, Thomas J.	02 049 903	1st Lt., M. C.
Brennan, Bernard R.	02 047 931	1st Lt., M. C.
Barker, Armin M.	01 716 520	Capt. M.C.
Giurtino, Francis J.	0 481 497	Capt. M.C.
Landen, Andrew F.	01 703 298	Capt. M.C.

The Medical Detachment, 275th Infantry, was activated 15 June, 1943, at Camp Adair, Oregon as a unit of the 70th Infantry Division with cadre mainly from the 91st Infantry Division, then at Camp White, Oregon.

Basic training was given with the aid of Infantry officers, and unit technical training by assigned Medicil Corps officers. Men showing aptitude as technicians were sent to Medical and Surgical Technicians Schools at Fitzsimmons General Hospital, O'Reilly General Hospital and Beaumont General Hospital.

Training included extensive field work, including problems of battalion, regimental and divisional size. Personnel working in the Dispensary were given the opportunity for practical medical experience concurrently with their training.

In March 1944 Major E.I. Silver, Regimental Surgeon, joined the Detachment. Lts. Brennen and Dougherty, MAC officers, were assigned in May 1944.

The 70th Division moved from Camp Adair to Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo., in July 1944 and continued training, with extensive field problems and detailed technical training being conducted.

The personnel of the Regiment aere examined physically and brought to the standards of POR and POM physical qualifications. Hundreds of cases were prepared for a See X Board that was held at Ft. Leonard Wood in October.

In early November Capts. MacAlpine, Ferre, Richardson, and Lekisch, MCs, Capt. Baker, DC, and Lt. Koeck, MAC joined the organization bringing it to T/O officer strength for the first time. A number of men were also assigned to bring the detachment to T/O strength, most of them without previous medical training.

The 275th Infantry moved by train starting 16 November to Camp Miles Standish, Mass., staging area for the Boston POE. By 20 November all of the unit had arrived.

The 275th, together with the 274th and 276th Infantries composed Task Force Herren. Final supply and qualifications essentials were completed and all personnel were given the required inoculations at this post.

At 1600 on 6 December, the organization sailed from the Boston POE for permanent change of Station outside the continental United States. The ship had its own medical unit for medical service
en route.

On 15 December the organization arrived and debarked at Marseilles, France, moving by motor to Staging-Area CP-2, a short distance north of the city. Administrative bivouac was established in the cold and muddy fields.

Here kitchens and latrines were closely inspected. Bn. and Regimental dispensaries set up, and sufficient medications obtained from nearby sources to keep undepleted the supplies at hand.

Unpacking and distribution of supplies sent as organizational impedimenta and TAT from the U. S. was accomplished, vehicles were issued, and on 22 December, the organization departed the staging area by train and motor.

A Surgeon and technicians established dispensaries on each of the two trains. The trains were 40 & 8 box cars, and the cramped ride and sustained cold is considered the initial phase of much of the cold injury, ground type, of feet that followed.

The motor convoy was likewise cold, but the hourly halts were helpful in restoring circulation. The motor convoy reached Lyon the first night, Dijon the second, administrative bivouac being held outside of these cities for the night.

On December 25th the motor convoy was at Brumath and on the 26th, Regiment moved into its positions on a defensive line along the west bank of the Rhine. Regimental CP and Aid Station were established in Weyersheim, with the Bn. Aid Stations setting up in towns centrally and behind the lengthy lines their battalions were assigned.

These positions, that were to be overrun some weeks later by a German attack, were extremely quiet. The miles of battalion front were scouted to familiarize the Bn. Medical Sections with the routes of evacuations and small sick call, as no casualties from the scattered shelling were encountered.

On 31 December Task Force Herren was attached to the 45th Infantry Division, and received orders for immediate movement. A night motor march brought the 275th Infantry into Niederbronn, France, during the early hours of 1 January, and troops were quartered in a large abandoned wire factory for the remainder of the night.

On the morning of 1 January, 1945, the Regimental Medical Detachment moved into Niederbronn, France, and established all aid station in the forward (N,W) end of town. The Regimental CP was in the center of Niederbronn, approximately ten blocks away.

The Medical Battalion of the 45th Division made contact, and attached a liaison sergeant and six ambulances to the Detachment. These were assigned one to each aid station, two in reserve.

The Regimental mission was the defense of the north flank of the 45th Division salient pointed at German-held Bitche. The lines ran across mountainous, heavily wooded terrain, creased by narrow, north-south running valleys, and facing German forward positions at Baerenthal and Dambach.

The second battalion was on the left flank of the Regiment in the hills facing Baerenthal, where a small group of houses comprising the village of Muhlthal was used as the Battalion CP. The 2d Battalion Medical Section established an aid station in one of the houses, chosen for a direct litter entrance, convenient location, and sturdy construction.

The 3d Battalion had the ground to the right, over rugged terrain to the next valley, where the town of Phillipsburg was just ahead of their first positions. The 62d Battalion of the 14th Armored Division had just stopped a German advance immediately to the front of Phillipsburg and were preparing to withdraw.

On the morning of the 2d of January, the 1st Battalion moved up from Niederbronn into Phillipsburg on the right of the third. Its mission was the defense of the town of Phillipsburg and the hilly area to its right front, with the highway that formed the main street of the town being the 1st-3rd Battlions boundary.

The 3d Battalion Aid Station set up in a beer hall at north end of town where all forward roads leading to their lines converged. When the 1st battalion moved into Phillipsburg they chose the vestry of a

church as their Aid Station, as it had two entrances without stairs, and the church courtyard offered parking space for the vehicles.

The withdrawing armored battalion had collected and evacuated all of their own casualties, but had twenty unevacuated wounded prisoners in their station which were turned over to the 1st Battalion Aid Station. Companies moving into position reported German wounded still in their areas. Their positions were all on steep hillsides, necessitating a strenuous Litter carry to the roads where a jeep could meet them.

Many of the prisoners were severely wounded, all were suffering from exposure, and the bulk of the days work was taken up with their treatment.

To facilitate clearing the Aid Station, the Regimental Section sent their 2« ton truck to be loaded with prisoners. This accelerated clearing of the Battalion Aid Stations proved its value when evacuation became a problem some hours later.

Before dawn 3 January 1945, Phillipsburg received concentrated shelling. Machine gun and sniper fire at daybreak revealed the enemy had infiltrated in some strength and had positions on the left rear of the town. An emergency call from the 1st Battalion CP was answered by the Battalion Surgeon, Capt. Ferree and two men making a run with aid kits through the artillery and small arms fire.

A number of casualties at the CP, one a sub total amputation of the leg, forced the decision to set up all aid room in the barn of the CP building. Casualties were now occurring rapidly throughout the town. Litter bearers in teams of two because of the relatively short carries brought the wounded to either the church or the barn Aid Stations, whichever could be reached.

Casualties reported in positions forward of the town to the first battalion were reached by Lt. Dougherty and Cpl. Munoz in the ton. One jeep evacuation was accomplished, but when the vehicle returned to the front Cpl. Munoz was wounded and subsequently captured, and the MAC officer unable to return for two days because the enemy had moved between him and the town.

This advance of the enemy reached the 3d Battalion Aid Station building. With a German tank outside their front door firing down the main street, they gathered all portable equipment and left by a rear win-

dow, making their way along the hill to the position of the 1st Battalion Station.

Here they reformed in the next barn. The enemy now held the northern end of town, and throughout the day a flow of casualties, some walking and many litter wounded, entered the first and third battalion stations. Vehicles of both stations had been either damaged or captured, but their use would have been impossible as the road remained under direct and constant fire.

By evening of 3 January, forty enemy had been taken prisoner from a house commanding the evacuation road south of town, and sniper fire was ineffective in the blackness. The Regimental Surgeon sent two ambulances, three 2 1/2 ton and one 3/4 ton trucks into town for the evacuation of the wounded. Capt. Landon, DC, and litter bearer and technician reinforcements were also sent forward by the Regimental Surgeon during the night. Casualties liglitened, and by the light of burning buildings the trucks were loaded and the peak of evacuation was passed by daybreak.

On 4 January Capt. Richardson, the Third Battalion Surgeon, established a station in a farmhouse about a mile south of the town. Under this plan the forward station in Phillipsburg could give immediate treatment to casualties, who could then be brought back as conditions permitted to the rear station where ambulances could be brought forward to initiate second echelon evacuation. Medical personnel were rotated between the two stations to give opportunity for small rest periods.

By mid-morning of 5 January the entire town of Phillipsburg had been cleared of enemy but remained subject to accurate mortar and artillery fire, and the 1st and 3d Battalion sections continued their combined two station plan until 6 January.

Meantime the 2d Battalion Medical Section was experiencing an equally narrowing but more orthodox initiation to combat. Their companies remained in contact and in reasonably stable position in the face of enemy attack by infiltration, by tanks, by concentrated mortar and artillery fire, and by strafing and bombing from the air. Forward collecting points were established near or in Company CPs, from which 1/4 ton evacuation was used to the Aid Station. Capt. Kurt Lekisch, aggresssive 2d Battalion Surgeon, visited the companies daily in their positions for sick call.

When the original Aid Station neared demolishment from bombing, the station was moved to a suitable house about a quarter mile to the rear. A large basement afforded resting quarters for the litter bearers, and the ambulances were kept in a concealed, well defiladed draw about one hundred yards away.

From this position the 2d Battalion Aid Station gave excellent support to the troops for a two week period. Casualties from adjacent units were often among those evacuated through the station. In one week ninety seven trips were made forward of the aid station by jeep. For their medical support throughout the period of this tactical situation the Aid Station received commendation from the Battalion Commander.

A battalion of the 274th Infantry reinforced the Phillipsburg positions on 6 January, and the 3d Battalion, 275th, moved left to hill positions west of the town. Third Battalion Aid Station established a forward station in the basement of the CP building, and continued the rear Aid Station they had established on the 4th. Though the intensity of shellfire had mitigated, the casualties had to be reached on mountainous terrain, and evacuated over exposed ground. On the night of 8 January two K Co wounded required five hours arduous litter haul. Their positions on a rugged slope forced a litter carry down the enemy-facing side of the hill, through a mined field around the hill, and hours of exposure to mortar and rifle grenade fire.

The 3d Battalion remained in these positions and operated efficiently along these plans until the 14th of January. They received high praise for their handling of twenty three casualties when a 274th Company CP was shelled. On 7 January the lst Bn moved back through Niederbronn and up the mountain to positions on the forward slope of a high range to the right rear of Phillipsburg. No buildings were in this area, the dangerous, unimproved road which was under enemy observation could be used only in darkness, snow covered the ground a foot deep, and the cold and wind continued. The medical section dug in personal positions after pitching and camouflaging the Aid Station tent for emergency blackout use. The insecurity of a tent in the woods where tree bursting shells were a terror was obvious. In the frozen, rocky ground a station suitable for action was seen to be a Herculean task. A rear road was scouted and

found difficult but possible for daylight evacuation. It was four miles long, passable only by jeep, so a rear Aid Station was set up in a house at the intersection of the road and highway, where further treatment, checking and plasma could be given before transfer to ambulances which could be stationed at this point.

Fortunately battle casualties were light. Trench foot was a major problem respiratory infections, self-inflicted wounds, combat fatigue also comprised problems. In the dark of the night of 10 January the 1st Battalion, relieved by a battalion of the 274th Infantry, moved off the hill and into the town of Niederbronn.

Reorganization began on the morning of the 11th, and a formal sick call was held in the Railway Station where the troops were housed. A foot inspection of the entire battalion was held. Almost all feet were suffering from cold injury, ground type. Mild frostbite and early trench foot could not be evacuated without seriously affecting the mission at hand, already being executed with less than fifty percent battalion strength. Discoloration and swelling were evacuation standards, and proved themselves practicable ones.

In these ten days the Regimental Aid station had not only functioned in immediate and sometimes co-lateral support of the battalion stations, but had initiated certain policies that were retained in later activity.

Tactically they had used their station personnel as reinforcements for Battalion Section personnel, as needed. Overloads of casualties at Battalion Stations had been evacuated directly to Regiment, on vehicles secured and sent forward on the Regimental Surgeon's direction. They found it necessary to act as a control point for Collecting Company ambulances, sending them to the battalions as the tactical situation demanded and permitted.

Also certain of the battalion companies had worked into positions to the rear of the Battalion Aid Stations, and these units were supported and evacuated by the Regimental Aid Station.

To conserve all possible fighting strength the Regimental Surgeon initiated two foot care procedures. A Regimental Rest Camp was initiated at Reichshofen, 3 kilometers south of Niederbronn, where foot evacuees were sent. Under the direction of the Regimental Surgeon and

the immediate care of trained technicians, all cold injuries, ground type, of feet were cured for and observed it this camp. If improvement was not satisfactory within 48 hours, or if duty status was not probable within a few days, evacuation was effected front the rest camp. Over fifty percent of the foot casualties were returned to duty within five days by this system.

Although the original motive for this camp was our non Division status and the slow replacement depot return of all men evacuated beyond Regiment at the time, the plan, with modifications and extension to other than foot troubles, proved useful even after we received our own Division medical installations.

Bottles of "Trench Foot Oil" (liquid petrolatum) were filled and distributed to squad leaders, with instructions for use printed on the labels. These were enthusiastically received by the troops, and detailed as the responsibility of the lowest echelon of command, thus encouraging close supervision.

The oil was meant to serve two purposes. Psychologically a "Trench Foot Oil" appealed to and was used by the troops with a fidelity that could not be attained by preventive-medicine lectures. Actually the petrolatum was cleansing, the application technique aided circulation by manipulation and massage, and such care of feet as drying and sock changing encouraged by the direction of attention to the soldier's feet.

To these intensive prophlylactic measures and continuous supervision is attributed the success in the prevention of much trench foot. From 1 January to 15 January, 177 trench foot cases had been evacuated. In the next 15 day period only six cases required evacuation.

On 11 January Regiment moved to Zinswiller, at the mouth of the valley reading to Barenthal. Regimental Aid Station was established in a house in town, and the 1st Battalion moved through Zinswiller to a mobile reserve position in the valley immediately behind second Battalion. The 1st Battalion Aid Station pitched their aid tent, and dug in on the wooded hillside. That night the aid tent, while unoccupied, was twice riddled with shell fragments, which would have produced casualties if the tent was being used at that time.

The next morning the 1st Battalion received orders to attack a commanding hill position to the left front. Reconnaissance indicated the

area of casualty density would be on the ridge, a mile by steep slope to the nearest road capable of being reached by ambulance.

The troops passed through the small village of Obermuhlthal and procedcd up the slopes ahead. The Collecting Co had sent two teams of litter bearers to the 1st Battalion. These were sent up the hill in the wake of the troops, which were proceeding under heavy artillery fire. The two remaining four-man litter teams from the Aid Station (3 litter bearers had been evacuated from Phillipsburg) also followed the troops.

Once the ridge was reached a new attack order made the exhausting many-houred litter evacuation from the hill impractical. A long, steep, rutted trail, navigable by jeep, was scouted to the hilltop. Plans were made for the Aid Station to set up a station in a basement in Obermuhlthal, with a forward collecting point at the jeep trails terminus atop the hill.

Shell fire and tree bursts were intense. Sorting of casualties for priority of evacuation in the dark and insecurity of the hastily contrived forward positions was difficult. It was found that determination of the severity of an injury without facilities for a thorough examination was difficult. A patient walked into the forward station with fractures of both legs and both arms. A Casualty with a sucking wound of the chest carried in a patient with minor wounds.

Jeeps were borrowed from other Battalion sources to effect the evacuation to Obermuhlthal. There ambulances, waiting at the 2d Battalion Aid Station, were notified when a load was ready. They entered the constantly shelled town quickly, loaded and departed. When two jeep-loads of casualties were sent off from the hill, one was directed to the 2nd Battalion Station to stop the clogging of casualties in one station, as had been previously arranged. Here again, as in the past and future, the cooperation of two Aid Stations on an evacuation problem was seen to work effectively.

On 14 January the 275th Infantry was relieved from these positions and moved by motor southwest to Lampertsloch. Here the battalion took positions in the hills in Maginot line fortifications, but no action occurred until they were relieved and moved by day-long motor march on 15 January to positions on a defensive line south of Saarbruchen.

The mission was defense of a line running west from Saargemund on the Saar River. Regiment and the Regimental Aid Station established sites in the town of Guebenhausen. The 2d Battalion was on the right

with their Aid Station at Hundling, the lst Battalion in the center with their Aid Station at Nousseveiller, and the 3d Battalion on the left with their station at Diebling. The companies were in forward towns and in field positions. The extensive area, both in width and depth, made a central rear position practical for Aid Station locations. In cases of casualties, vehicles would go forward to the Company CPs, to which casualties would be brought by the litter bearers.

Personnel was readjusted here, and companies were assigned new aid men from the station personnel to make up for their losses. (Of the 29 Medical Detachment men lost as a direct result of enemy action, 26 were aid men.)

Cold injuries, ground type, of feet were still prevalent though in less serious degree. The Regimental Rest Camp continued in effect. With housing improved and the situation more static, Battalion Stations initiated minor hospitals of one to five patients who were not fit for duty but judged to be returnable with one or two days rest and treatment.

Gastro-intestinal disturbances became common. They were characterized by severe diarrhea and often accompanied by nausea. All water was condemned except from an Engineer Water D. P. Kitchens were inspected daily and competitive prizes offered to mess personnel to encourage the highest kitchen standards.

Bismuth subcarbonate, paregoric, belladonna in various doses and combinations were used, but their effectiveness was dubious. Treatment with castor oil was tried and found beneficial.

A Shower Unit was installed in a central town. Here men received a hot shower and a complete change of clothing. A technician was detailed to the shower to check the feet of all the men, and to give instructions on foot care and the use of "Trench Foot Oil" and foot powder.

Sick call was held at the Company CPs by the Battalion Surgeons. Monthly physical inspections and hygiene lectures were given. As only a small number of men could be withdrawn from line positions at one time this consumed much more time than such duties would normally entail.

The defensive positions were maintained for one month before the next drive began. Except for scattered artillery and mortar fire casualties the main combat injuries were incurred on raids and large

patrols. A detailed account of the Battalion Sections attempts to support these activities would consume disproportionate space in this account for the conclusions reached. These were: that long range reconnaissance patrols cannot be supported medically; that combat patrols cannot demand medical accompaniment unless of near platoon strength, in which case the platoon aid man can participate, but evacuation to or near our lines must be accomplished by the men involved.

Raids must be made in force, must maintain their objective for several hours, must have in most cases a night withdrawal tittle, and must be willing to assist in their own evacuation, if they are to be successfully supported.

On the 17th of February the Regiment, now having Division control and Division medical support from the 370tli Medical Battalion, moved off on the initial advance toward Saarbruchen. The 2d Battalion objective was the town of Grossbliedersdorf on the Saar River, the 1st Battalion was to the left with the town of Lixing as its objective, and the 3d Battalion was to secure the hills and Brandenbush forest ahead and left of these towns.

All three Battalion Medical Sections established Aid Stations in Ruhling, the closest secured town to the objectives and oil the main evacuation route to the rear.

Soon after the troops entrance into Lixing the 1st Battalion established a forward station there, evacuating by 1/4 and 3/4 ton vehicles to Ruhling as soon as the road was cleared of mines. The 2d Battalion Aid Station moved through Lixing and laterally east down the road to Grossbliedersdorf, setting up their station while fighting was still going on in the town.

The 3d Battalion Aid Station remained a day in Ruhling, and then moved into the heavily shelled town of Etzling, almost on line with their troops.

Regimental Aid Station moved up to the old 1st Battalion location at Nousseviller, with the Regimental Surgeon making constant personal supervision of the battalion sections. He coordinated with the Collecting Company Commander, the ambulance runs when the battalion sections felt they could not be brought to their forward positions.

Litter bearers from Company B, 370th Medical Battalion, attached to the Battalion Stations for forward-of aid-station evacuation, proved alert and capable in their first combat assignment. The hills ahead of the newly won towns offered strenuous litter hauls, and the blackness of the night and the unfamiliar terrain demanded initiative on the part of medical personnel.

Positions on the wooded hills overlooking the next valley were consolidated in the next few days. with few casualties. On 21 February the Regimental Station moved to Ruhling.

On the 22d of February the Regiment moved across the remaining valley and up the high hills that lay before Saarbruchen. The 3d Battalion objective was Spicheren on the right, the 1st Battalion, Alsting in the center, and the 2d Battalion, Zinzingen on the left, and the high ground immediately ahead of these towns.

Reconnaissance showed the attack jumped off down a steep slope into the valley towns. If heavy opposition was met, evacuation was scheduled to be up this slope for approximately 50 yards by litter to woods where a jeep haul could be initiated. Fortunately Zinzingen and Alsting were taken quickly, and the 1st and 2d Battalion Sections established forward stations there soon after the first casualties occurred. When the few casualties occurring before these towns were reached, had been treated and evacuated by the rear stations, they moved forward to join the advance sections.

Meanwhile the troops had moved out from the towns and across the valley under intense mortar fire, and were attacking up the steep slopes of the Stiftswald through which the border line of Germany ran. Resistance was frenzied, and casualties from both small arms and tree bursting artillery were numerous.

The 3d Battalion was meeting fierce resistance at Spicheren. Two of their companies continued attacking the town and two bypassed it and moved on to their objective in the Stiftswald. This move made one station support of the battalion untenable, so Capt. Richardson and two teams of litter bearers moved up to Alsting by the circuitous road through Grossbliedersdorf, and Lt. Brennan and the remaining station personnel supported the Spicheren attack from Etzling.

In Alsting the 1st Battalion Station was in a convenient building near the foot of the road leading to the troops ahead. As 1st and 3d Battalion troops were interjoined on the hill, Capt. Richardson moved out to the hill with the litter bearer teams of both battalion sections to control the collection and emergency treatment of the troops. From the positions in a German trench used as the collecting point, casualties were then evacuated by vehicle down the steep, muddy, rutted road to the 1st Battalion Station, where further treatment, tagging and transfer to ambulances could be effected.

It is believed this plan made possible the next few days evacuations, for the next three twenty four hour periods, 135 casualties, 110 casualties and 90 casualties, respectively, moved through the 1st Battalion Station. A high percentage of these were seriously wounded.

Spicheren Secured After the second day Spicheren had been secured and 3d Battalion moved into an Aid Station there. A chalet on the forward peak of the hill, overlooking Saarbruchen but concealed by the forest, was reached and made a forward 1st Battalion CP and Aid Station. A week later a Sanitarium on the hill was cleared of enemy and used in the same manner by the 2d Battalion Aid Station.

These positions were subject to constant shelling and frequent attack in the next several weeks, and casualties, though greatly decreased from the early figures, occurred daily. To be reached quickly and treated adequately litter bearers and Aid Station personnel were essential in this area, (a few hundred yards from the front lines). However, ambulances could not be brought that far forward, and evacuation by litter haul would have been extremely inefficient over the several miles of difficult terrain to a suitable ambulance loading post. Also the conveniences necessary for stable aid station operation were absent.

This situation again proved that the operation of forward and rear aid stations in many combat conditions is the only method of fulfilling the entire mission of first echelon medical support.

On 23 February the Regimental Aid Station moved to Lixing, and on 14 March moved to Zinzingen, lateral with the Battalion Stations, in anticipitation of the impending Saarbruchen attack. Despite the combat pressures, advantage was taken to instigate routine health measures.

A more elaborate shower unit with two day rest camp facilities was established at Grossbliedersdorf. Here cots, recreation facilities, and

daily sick call all were available within a mile of enemy field positions. A dental technician cleaned teeth, and technicians for medical aid were present.

As units were taken out of line positions for short rests they were given physical inspections, foot inspections, Venereal Disease lectures, dental survey, and oral hygiene lectures. Mess halls were inspected and reported on daily.

Non-battle casualties were slight at this period, partially because of Battalion and Regimental one and two day treatment facilities while carrying the men on a duty status.

Several difficult evacuation problems occurred to support probing of the dragon's teeth that lay between our positions and Saarbrucken, confirming previous conclusions on the difficulties of supporting raids and patrols, although some successful evacuation of challenging situation was accomplished.

Plans were made and re-made for moving on Saarbrucken, all promising a difficult time. When on March 21 the move on Saarbrucken began, very light resistance was met, and the Battalion Aid Stations all set up positions in the city that night. Regiment moved into Saarbrucken 22 March, and as the enemy had withdrawn from our front, readjustments to non-combat conditions commenced. All troops were now housed in buildings and inspections of quarters as well as other routine inspections, were intensified.

On 26 March the Regiment moved by motor, northeast to Queidersbach. The mission was the screening and policing of captured but unoccupied areas, and each company was in a separate, or several separate towns. To hold sick call and complete inspections the surgeons had considerable territory to cover daily. The health of the command was good.

A motor movement on 1April brought Regiment to Gau-Augelsheim. The Battalions were stretched from Coblenz on the north, site of the 3d Battalion Aid Station, to Oberhilbersheim on the south where the 1st Battalion was located. In addition, one company remained in Saarbrucken, further stretching the Regimental area. The same mission and medical plans continued.

A second dental officer, Capt. Guirtino, joined the Detachment here. One dentist had been evacuated in early January, and Capt. Baker, as the only dental officer, had established an awesome record of work, having in three months of combat held 700 dental sittings.

Capt. Baker received personal commendation from the Commanding General of the 70th Division for his meritorious work as Regimental Dental Surgeon.

The Regiment moved again on 11 April, all units moving to Frankfurt and vicinity relieving, a Regiment of the 5th Division. Here the closeness of the 12th Evacuation Hospital and later the 180th General Hospital, offered facilities for more definitive medical work being initiated for the command, and closer checking of dubious cases.