The Battle of Philippsbourg, Jan 1-20, 1945
TFHerren's 1508G Joins Seventh Army

From CP-2 most of the 275th Regiment had moved to the forward area riding in "40&8"s from which the platoons dismounted and fell in to form marching battalions from Brumath, near the northwest fringe of border city Strasbourg on the Rhine. Our train arrivals were on Christmas Day or thereabouts. Those who didn't ride the train were mostly drivers, guards, and maintenance personnel who served the regiment's organic vehicles. After exiting the trains, the battalions marched to designated towns and pitched tents or moved into vacant houses or buildings conforming to the accommodations found in the assigned assembly area. Two days later the 1st and 2nd battalions moved into defensive positions along the Rhine and the 3rd Battalion remained in reserve in its assembly area. The Ardennes Offensive had begun two weeks before, and the Trailblazer infantry regiments had arrived with six more (of 42nd and 63rd divisions) in time to add their muscle and help defeat the German ground forces with finality.

All three divisions had been rushed through abbreviated training cycles, disrupted by periodic drafts of thousands to replace battle casualties. Though these measures were based on careful estimates, they could not have anticipated at the time of implementation that the Nordwind offensive would come when it did. Still when this final German offensive was defeated, the Allied Supreme Commander remarked that the hurrying of those regiments had been a very fortunate expedient.

In the preparations for meeting the German attack, the 275th Regiment was attached to the 45th Division. Its G-3 was prepared to use the newly attached regiment to reinforce TF Hudelson, the 45th itself, or both. In keeping with the acceleration of troop movements, the 275th was notified to cross the IP in its movement at 2030 hours, 31 December, vice 0800 hours, 1 January. The roughly half-day advance in the Regiment's schedule might have signaled a growing atonement of U.S. intelligence to the readiness of the enemy to make his already expected move.

The German attack plan provided for employing the 256th Volks Grenadier Division in reinforced regiments to push through the Low Vosges valleys to their exits at Zinswiller, Neiderbronn, and below Windstein and once there prepare to block countermoves. The zero hour was to be 2300 hours, 31 December. The German planners emphasized the importance of secrecy in assuring surprise, to include these measures: prior to 31 December only top general staff officers were to be briefed on Nordwind plans; movement of troops and materiel in connection with the offensive was to be forbidden after dark on 31 December; movements to forward assembly areas were to be explained as the positioning of forces to counterattack an expected American attack; and regimental commanders and below were not briefed on the Division mission until the morning of 31 December.

At a Philippsbourg meeting at 2100 hours, 31 Dec, the staffs of the 62nd AIBN and 3rd Bn 275th Regiment agreed to have the platoon leaders meet at the 62nd defensive positions to coordinate the relief arrangements. It turned out to be a hurry-up-and-wait proposition, for the 45th G-3 would take a hand in the relief planning and not before Nordwind was launched and pushed its battle line almost to the Baerenthal CP of TFHudelson, where hqs clerks hurriedly packed up the maps while a cordon of Sherman tanks unlimbered their machine guns and drove off scouting patrols.

Shortly before the 2300 Nordwind zero hour, 275th's Co I CO Capt Long had arrived in Long's jeep with driver and gunner at 62nd Co C's CP near Bannstein to coordinate on the relief of Co C by Long's Co 1. The visitors had barely enough time to enter the CP when a field telephone rang there, and the caller reported his position up forward as being under attack. The reporter added that enemy skirmishers in snow camouflage clothing were visible; that the whole countryside was afire set by the exploding shells from the attackers' big guns.

Communication problems for the 275th were to complicate matters for most of the NORDWIND episode. At the outset, Baerenthal was the location of the TFHudelson CP and at the moment there was no reason not to locate the 275th CP there when a relief was made. However, Nordwind brought about a dent in the Task Force's front which became known as the Bitche Salient as the infantry of the German 257th, 361st, and 256th Volks Grenadier divisions pushed ahead, well supported by towed and self-propelled artillery. The 10-mile front defended by TF Hudelson had been described as "paper thin," for more than half of it was covered by only two squadrons of cavalry reconnaissance troops) thinly spread and very vulnerable to German drive-through and attack-from-the-rear tactics. The threat to the headquarters and its defenders in Baerenthal was palpable, becoming obvious when daybreak arrived on I January. The 275th's Regimental Commander was out of contact while on his way forward, and the Rear CP had no way of contacting him. The 275th's adjutant left Baerenthal to reconnoiter a new 275th CP site and picked Niederbronn, on the designated MSR. It took the better part of a day to establish telephone contact between the 275th and the 45th, which caused troublesome inadvertencies.

Near daybreak on New Year's Day the CO of the 275th 3rd Bn, Maj William Shepherd called the 45th Div G-3 from the 62nd AIBN CP in Philippsbourg and requested permission, in response to the 62nd commander's urging, to commit some part of his battalion to bolster the 62nd's thinly held line. This caused the G-3 to consult with VI Corps before responding to Shepherd. Having done so, the G-3 instructed Shepherd to make all preparations to relieve the 62nd but refrain from doing so until authorized by 45th Division. In the meantime, the 3rd Battalion was to move by truck from Niederbronn to an assembly area occupying both sides of the Niederbronn road just south of Philippsbourg.

The other two 275th battalions had also been moving in trucks--6-bys and amphibious--the 2nd Bn arriving at the Niederbronn foundry after midnight and the 1st Bn halting in Reichshoffen, the next town to the east along the regiment's route. There it ovenighted in a wire factory. U.S. big guns in positions nearby had begun roaring in response to Nordwind's advancing infantry behind German artillery support. Among the units were two Volks Grenadier divisions with which the 275th soon became familiar--the 256th and the 361st--both comprising three regiments, each with two battalions. Attacking Lieschbach on the Bitche road at daybreak, a reinforced combat patrol from the 256th assault battalion was pushed back by the 62nd's Co C using their .50 caliber HMGS. At noon the 476th Grenadiers renewed the attack and in house-to-house fighting, finally breaking through at dusk.

At 1000 hours, the 275th CO Colonel Charles Pettee arrived at the southern exit to Philippsbourg and joined the commanders of his 2nd and 3rd battalions and members of their staffs--at an OP on the southeast outskirts of the town. Pettee had stopped en route from his old CP in Alsace at 45th headquarters at Langensoultzbach. There he had been briefed on Nordwind operations' progress and was updated on instructions regarding his regiment's deployment from Niederbronn. The following had transpired: 3rd Bn had been trucked to an assembly area just short of Philippsbourg from Niederbronn and would remain there, prepared to relieve the 62nd AIBN on command, subject to the approval by 45th CG. Ltc Barten was to move his battalion via Zinswiller to Baerenthal. Barten himself was to go to TFHudelson's CP in Baerenthal and confer with Col Hudelson in this respect. Earlier in the day Barten had moved his battalion from the foundry to the northwest outskirts of Niederbronn, where he had the battalion deploy in a defensive position and dig in.

In the late afternoon the 3rd Bn marched into Philippsbourg, dropped packs, changed footwear and split up the rifle companies into two separate forces, I and K companies in one and L the other. The I-K force moved out the Bitche road, I Co leading with scouts out and in route formation and with K Co in the rear. L Co marched out of Philippsbourg via the Baerenthal road and would not return to Philippsbourg until that town had been cleared of the German troops who had penetrated into the north side in the interim--on Jan 5th. M Co would remain in Philippsbourg, with their heavy weapons dug-in in defensive positions.

Darkness was falling by the time the I-K force had reached the last row of houses north of the frozen town pond. It took only a few minutes to reach and pass through and beyond Lieschbach when a guttural challenge evoked the Captain's "Hit the dirt!" response, then an eruption of gunfire--the angry buzz of at least two German machine guns, the tracers of which probed from positions on both sides of the road. The Americans were not long in firing back, first two riflemen, then a BAR-man opened up with short bursts mixed with voices exchanging info and orders, yells of pain and calls for first aid. Perhaps 30 minutes after the original burst of firing there was a fading as intervals of silence grew longer. Litter bearers arrived and, accompanied by whispered directions, removed the litter cases. Then Long's remaining men pulled back leaving behind the always busy Elmer Martin, still checking for overlooked wounded. Back at Lieschbach where medics had parked their jeeps, a weapons carrier arrived with spare weapons to rearm men whose weapons had been lost in the confusion.

The leading 1st Platoon pulled back from the ambush site, entering Lieschbach and nearly reaching its south end where a footbridge gave access to passengers and rail-line cargo and passengers. Earlier, at the outburst of the ambush firefight up the road, 3rd Platoon riflemen and both lmg crews took positions on a knoll west of the road and had waited watching for activity along the railroad, their vision aided by snow on the ground. The Trailblazers, sensing an approach, held their fire when a sizeable German patrol materialized and turned from the railroad bed to the footbridge. When the head of the column reached it, they opened fire. Though the enemy took up firing positions and doggedly returned the fire, they were at a disadvantage, eventually withdrawing and leaving behind seven dead or badly wounded. This partly repaid the enemy for the 23 casualties Co I had suffered in the action.

Postwar German Critique:

In the sector of the 256th Volks Grenadier Division the principal objective for the Nordwind second day had been Philippsbourg. Within that sector some assault groups had fallen behind schedule or simply failed to take the assigned objective. Explanations in German after-action reports were: 1) The strict security precautions seriously crippled reconnaissance and limited information about terrain and road conditions. 2) The plan had been to attack with two battalions of the 476th Grenadiers maneuvering in the area bounded by the Baerenthal and Bitche roads; the rugged terrain forced a wide separation of routes such that visual contact between battalions was lost. Consequently coordination broke down long before the objective or intervening terrain features could be sighted. Therefore the advance of both units was halted. At least for January 2, it became evident that the attackers' force was insufficient.

At a midnight meeting between the 45th Div Asst CG Col Paul Adams and the 275th's Col Pettee at the 275th CP in Niederbronn, the 45th officer, in effect, issued requirements necessitating Pettee's committing his 1st Battalion. Talking as he penciled goose-eggs on his host's map overlay, Adams defined the objectives to be taken by the 275th: (1) Falkenberg, between the fork formed by the Neunhoffen road and the Sturzelbronn road; (2) Angelsberg, the ridge just to the east of Weihersberg (the ridge between Angelsberg and the Neunhoffen road); and (3) Hill 30 (arbitrary number assigned by Col Adams--hill was north of Bitche road ). Falkenberg was assigned to Co B. Angelsberg went to Co A. Hill 30 was assigned to Co I. Co C was assigned close-in security in Philippsbourg, with rifle platoons covering the Main Forks at the intersection of the Bitche and Neunhoffen roads and the entrance of Philippsbourg from the south. The other rifle platoon, the 2nd, had remained in Niederbronn as security for the regimental CP.

Meanwhile, the 62nd AIBn was in the process of withdrawing from its sector, which it had defended with some success. Accordingly, the 275th S-3 at 1300 hours on Nordwind's 2nd day reported to the 45th Division G-3 that the 62nd's last elements had cleared Philippsbourg at 1100 hours that morning. Meanwhile the 275th S-3 reported deployments of three of its rifle companies to defend Adams' prescribed terrain features, as of 1200 noon:

The actual attack on Philippsbourg was made on 3 Jan and was partially successful. I plan to provide at least two more installments to cover the Battle of Philippsbourg, which was yielded back to German occupation when the pull back of the Seventh Army ordered by SHAEF was implemented on 21 Jan 1945.