The Schlossberg

South of the city of Forbach is a densely wooded area, approximately 1000 yards from east to west and 500 yards from north to south. This is the Klein Wald (small woods). The northeastern portion of the Klein Wald extends to the outer edge of Forbach, and it is this area that controls the destiny of the town. Rising sharply, this tiny neck of woods offers a complete view of the surrounding terrain: Forbach, the narrow valley to the west of the woods, and the ground as far as Oetingen* (a town close to 2500 yards south of Forbach). To add to the importance of this strip of land is a man-made fortress, perched on a steep rock, overlooking and jutting into Forbach.
[*see "Germany 1:25,000, Forbach 6807".]

This is the Schlossberg, ancient red-stone castle, surrounded by 10-foot thick brick walls. This dominate structure, approximately 400 years old, was being used by the enemy as an Observation Post for the adjustment of artillery and mortar fire. Thus it became of prime importance when plans were made by the 70th Infantry Division to seize and hold the town of Forbach.

The following plan is taken in part from the Regimental History of the 276th Infantry Regiment, 1 February to 28 February 1945.

On 17 February, Companies A and C were to move forward in coordination with the 274th Infantry Regiment on the right and to capture the high ground overlooking Forbach in the northeast corner of the Klein Wald. L Company was to be attached to the 1st Battalion and B and L Companies were to move to Oetingen, clear the city and take the high to the north of the town. Companies I and K were to remain in a defensive position southwest of Oetingen, and to be prepared to assist in taking the high ground to the north of town, or to advance north to take the hills in the Klein Wald. Also A and C Companies were to jump off abreast, and to the right of I and K Companies, if the latter plan was called for.

By 1200, 18 February, the town of Oetingen was cleared. I and K Companies continues to hold the hill southwest of town and I Company sent patrols to reconnoiter the woods south of Forbach for the 3rd Battalion next objective. L Company reverted to the 3rd Battalion at 1315 and now the units of the 1st and 3rd Battalions were in position to take up the Northwest move for Forbach.

Supplementing map-data, the reconnaissance patrols of I Company (led by Captain Herbert J. Andrews, I Co. CO) reported that there were three imposing terrain barriers before the city of Forbach. All were hills covered by the thick Klein Wald, the most imposing of which was the Schlossberg, or "Castle" as it became to be known. This obstacle became an obvious prerequisite to the taking of Forbach as it was the most commanding point of observation in the entire area. The reconnaissance had shown that the Germans were dug-in a well established trench system to the southwest of the castle; a natural avenue of approach. So the element of surprise was added to the attack plan. "Attack from a different direction."

Now that L Company was back with the 3rd Battalion, it joined I and K Companies, and the three Companies (I on the left, L on the right, and K in the rear of I) moved out toward the Klein Wald. By 1734 the three companies were half-way up the southernmost hill. Little opposition was met in the way of small arms fire, but artillery and mortar rounds fell intermittantly in the woods. The main difficulty in the operation thus far was the transportation of supplies and weapons. The roads were cratered by shell-fire, plus the fact that the supply route necessitated crossing the deep anti-tank ditch in front of Oetingen* The engineers were active throughout the day, making routes of advance possible and bridging the ditch. Even these measures were not enough to permit vehicular movement, and all supplies had to be hand-carried most of the day. Sergeant Yarborough, one of the men in charge of bringing up supplies summed the difficulties up with - "It was hell. It was done mostly at night and if you didn't hit the ground when a shell came close, you stumbled accidently. Try climbing that hill without carrying anything and you'll see what I mean."
[*See "Germany 1:25,000, Forbach 6807".]

I, K, and L Companies continued to work their way to the southernmost hill in the late afternoon. Companies A and C who advanced on the right of I, K, and L Companies met little resistance and had already begun to dig in on the prominence northeast overlooking Forbach. They were receiving heavy artillery fire, particularly from 88mm guns. The intermediate objectives of the 3rd Battalion were taken by dark and the order was to "hold and dig in". Far into the night the men were busily engaged in cutting timber to cover their fox-holes, and the effectiveness of their efforts are shown by the Regimental Report for the 24 hour period ending 1800, 18 February. "Six killed, 28 wounded."

Now that the two of the three obstacles in the Klein Wald were taken, the Regimental plan for 19 February was for the 3rd Battalion to attack the final highpoint, Schlossberg. I Company was to make the attack on the castle, with L Company protecting its right rear flank and K Company protecting its left rear flank. When Company I closed in Schlossberg, K Company was to move up and occupy the former positions of I Company. Lieutenant Colonel Sidney E. Iverson decided to attack at 0830. He submitted his plan to Colonel A.C. Morgan, the Regimental CO, and it was approved. If the castle was taken by 1300, the 1st Battalion was to attack Forbach at that time.

NOTE: Now that the large over-all picture has been established, the action from this point on deals entirely with Company I of the 276th Infantry Regiment.

At 1335 Captain Andrews deployed his men in the thick woods around the castle and completely surrounded it. At this point, he checked communications through his SCR 300 and still had contact with L Company on the right and K Company in the rear. The absence of any small arms fire from the vicinity of Schlossberg gave reason to believe the enemy had evacuated the fortress. By word-of-mouth the order was passed around the ring of men to "close in." Crouching low, the doughboys of I Company rushed past the close-in defenses (fox-holes), scaled the walls and were in Schlossberg. It was deserted! Captain Andrews reported to Battalion at 1510 that the objective had been cleared of the enemy. He received orders to "set up for the night." At this time heavy artillery and mortar fire began falling in the vicinity of the castle, and between barrages the men set up a perimeter defense around the castle; utilizing, when possible, the ex-German fox-holes.

Wire was run to the two adjacent companies, and the Company Command Post was set up in the castle.

At 1920 a battery of 88mm guns began shelling the castle with deadly accuracy. The barrage was continuous and a few of the men -- this, their first day in combat -- staggered from their fox-holes to the castle. "I shook them," said Captain Andrews, "but they were really far gone. Their eyes were glassy and they couldn't even speak."

Under cover of the shelling, the enemy began infiltrating troops. It was pitch dark and it was a simple matter for them to cut our wire*. In the dark the enemy was able to crawl close enough to our fox-holes to throw in concussion grenades with unerring accuracy. The range was so close that it was possible to often roll them back before they exploded. The screams of the Germans testified to the effectiveness of this counter-measure.

Then the main body of the counterattacking force moved in. The time was 2040.

Proceeded by a stepped-up artillery barrage, plus German rifle-grenade fire in the tree tops, the enemy began rushing the castle from "all directions at once." The men of I Company were well dug in and at least five of the infiltrating force were caught in the open by their own artillery fire.

Private Donald L. Shirk testifies that the enemy came forward screaming wildly. "Just as though they were all doped up."

The men who came back into the castle were completely incoherent as to the strength of the enemy. The reports varied from "only about a platoon", to "at least two companies."

In one corner of the room, Staff Sergeant Albert M. Crum (M Company) was frantically calling for heavy mortar fire, and getting it. Too dark to observe, he had the fires placed on the previously "shot-in" defense line.

In another corner, Lieutenant Vilas T. Walhood (Weapons Platoon) was asking Private Earl W. Colman to "look at the scratch on my back." The "scratch" was a shrapnel wound. Captain Andrews told Private Colman to take the Lieutenant to the aid station. "Hell, no. I wouldn't miss this for anything." He stayed.

Platoon Sergeant Rufas H. Upton (Second Platoon) reported by messenger that the Krauts were all around our holes. Captain Andrews made his decision.

"Crum, bring those rounds in closer!"

The messenger was told to have the men keep down.

An 88mm shell hit directly in a room filled with men. Wounded lay moaning on the floor, and above the sound of the steady artillery and mortar fire were cries of "Medic! Medic!"

Due to the extreme darkness, Sergeant Crum had to adjust his mortar fire entirely by sound. Closer and closer he brought his concentrations, until the 81mm rounds were landing directly on the defensive line around the castle. The din was terrific and amid the noise and confusion, a German prisoner was dragged into the Command Post. On being interrogated, he stated that the men of his unit had been forced to attack by their fanatical German non-commissioned officers.

"How many men are in your force?"

He didn't know.

"Repeat fire for effect! Repeat fire for effect! ordered Sergeant Crum.

The small arms and automatic weapons fire seemed to fade. The wild screaming charges of the Germans subsided. Sergeant Kenneth A Hatfield (Platoon Sergeant, First Platoon) came into the castle.

He nodded to Captain Andrews.

"That's all, Sergeant Crum," the Captain said.

"Cease firing."

The counter-attack was broken.

The wounded men were given aid (there were 35 of them); the men in the fox-holes were brought into the castle in shifts for hot coffee, and one by one dropped wearily to sleep. It was midnight.

NOTE: In this engagement, 250 rounds of 81mm mortar shells were fired.

The next morning, in excess of 40 dead Germans were found around the base of the castle.

The following questions pertain to the plans incident to the attached report, and were asked of the three commanding officers in the action.

Q. Were there any other plans developed in addition to the one executed? If so, briefly what were they.

Colonel A. C. Morgan: No, we made our original plan ast to the best way to attack Schlossberg and we stuck to it.

Lieutenant Colonel Sidney E. Iverson: No. Our plan was made after a thorough reconnaissance.

Captain Herbert J. Andrews: No.

Q. What information and what conditions influenced your decision as to the plan employed?

Colonel A. C. Morgan: Our G-2 reports and the information from patrols.

Lieutenant Colonel Sidney E. Iverson: Patrols were sent out to "feel out" the defenses of the Klein Wald, and to work as far as possible up "Castle Heights". The information brought back was the deciding factor in organizing our attack.

Captain Andrews: Our reconnaissance showed us that Jerry was well dug-in on one side of the hill -- a natural way for our troops to approach. So we went the other way.

Q. Now that the operation is completed, is it your opinion that the plan decided on was followed? If not, how does the executed plan compare to the contemplated results?

Lieutenant Colonel Iverson: The original plan was followed.

Captain Andrews: Same answer as above.

Q. Had you to do it over again, how would you have altered the plan? What additional troops or fire power, or both, would you have employed?

Lieutenant Colonel Iverson: I wouldn't change a thing. (When asked if an aerial bombardment would have softened-up the castle, the answer was, "It wouldn't have helped a damn bit.")

Captain Andrews: Well it worked.

Q. Wherein did the plan fail to fulfill the mission?

Lieutenant Colonel Iverson: It didn't fail.

Captain Andrews: It didn't fail, but came darn close when they counterattacked.

Q. In the course of the operation, was there any change that you would have made, but which conditions prevented you from making, such as lack of ammunition or units too heavily engaged?

Lieutenant Colonel Iverson: No.