OETINGEN RAID
by
BG Theodore Mataxis, Ret.

On 16 January 1945, the 2nd Bn, 276th Inf, closed in on Theding and vicinity, France, relieving elements of the 411th Inf, 103rd Inf. Division, in defensive positions in the area. The Bn. CP was located in Theding. Co. E moved into Gaubiving, Co. F into Bousbach, and Co's G and H into Folkling. All positions taken over lay on open, unbroken terrain which rose steadily to this high ground above the town of Oeting.

A few miles beyond Oeting lay Forbach the 1st French city of any size between our forces and the great industrial valley of the Saar and its capital, Saarbrucken.

The Bn. held these positions for the remainder of January, a period marked with active patrolling by both our troops and the enemy. At higher headquarters, meanwhile, plans were taking shape for the forthcoming Allied push to the Rhine. It became obvious that an important phase of such a drive would be an aggressive attack in this sector which would drive the Germans out of Forbach, across the international boundary into the Saar region and, eventually, from the Saar to the Rhine. In January, however, there was no extensive information on the strength or disposition of the enemy in the Forbach sector. At 1700 on 4 February 1945, the Battalion Commander issued Field Order No. 2, containing operational orders for a raid on the hostile positions above Oeting by the 2nd Bn, with Co. K attached. The 93rd Armored Field Artillery Bn. was to be in direct support. The operational mission of the raid, as it was described in the field order, was to seize and occupy the high ground east and west of oeting. The real significance of the raid, however, lay in the strategic importance of gaining information of the resistance the enemy would be able to muster in their sector.

By this time, our reconnaissance had determined the existence of a strong enemy defensive organization on the ground to be attacked. A long anti-tank ditch, approximately 16 feet in depth, crossed the entire area. A system of communicating fire trenches lay on either side of the ditch, protected by triple concertina rolls of barbed wire. In addition, there were numerous bunker concrete emplacements and dugouts. Booby traps, Teller mines and anti-personnel mines peppered the area.

In phase I of the operation, Co's. E and F were to attack from the MLR at 0001 hours, 6 February 1945, to seize and occupy Hill Zebra. To Co. E went the task of taking the trench system west of Gaubiving-Forbach road. Co. F was to take the portion of Hill Zebra east of the road and south of the anti-tank ditch. A platoon of Co. H's heavy machine guns were to protect the Bn's. right flank once the hill had been seized while both rifle companies prepared to assist in the assault on Hill Yoke.

Phase II of this operation, as planned, would see Co's. G and K attacking Hill Yoke at 0630 hours, 6 February 1945, or sooner, if the Bn. so ordered. A third phase, the seizure and occupation of the town of Oeting was also planned.

In preparation for the attack, the 1st Bn. 276th Inf. took over the 2nd Bn's. positions, beginning a 2355, 4 February 1945. By 0630, 5 February 1945, the relief had been completed. At 2140 the same day, the 2nd Bn. established its forward CP at Folking and at 0001 hours, 6 February 1945, the operation began as scheduled with Cos. E and F jumping the attack from the MLR toward Hill Zebra. Visibility was at a minimum as the attack began. Contact between individuals was maintained only with the greatest difficulty, although the men were wearing white arm bands for identification. A February thaw had set in two days earlier and the ground was deep in mud and slush.

Within half an hour of jumping off, the attacking companies encountered opposition in the form of heavy small arms fire and automatic weapons fire. Running into the enemy's barbed wire defenses, the troops used bangalore torpedoes to blow their way through. One part of Co. F hit machine gun FPL fire along the barbed wire and had to pull back and attack the defenses at a different point.

By 0200, despite the darkness and fury of the enemy's resistance, both companies were in the first row of hostile trenches. Here there was furious fighting. The enemy were in dug-outs within the trenches and had to be rooted out with bazookas, grenades and bayonets. The closing with the enemy at close range, there were numerous examples of great personal heroism. One officer, later decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross, fired two bazooka rounds into a dug-out, then leaped in and bayoneted three Germans to clear the position.

After clearing the first row of trenches, the companies moved in toward their objective, the anti-tank ditch, known to be part of the enemy's main line of resistance. Here again bitter fighting took place before the trench was finally seized by 0500. Both companies then dug in and prepared to hold the ground.

When daylight came, carrying parties attempted to reach them with food and ammunition. Many enemy, by-passed in the darkness, were so harassing in the rear of the two companies, however, that it was necessary to send a platoon from each company to mop up the enemy remnants. By 0930, this had been completed. Hill Zebra was securely ours. More than 40 prisoners had been taken and at least that many killed.

Phase two of the operation began at 0630, as scheduled, with Companies G and K jumping off in a driving sleet storm. Opposition was encountered almost immediately. It was necessary for the troops to attack up an extremely precipitous slope. The hillside had been heavily mined and both companies sustained losses from mines. In the face of heavy enemy fire, the two organizations fought a slow, dogged, uphill battle for 6 1/2 hours until they reached the top of the hill. They were then ordered to dig in for the night.

Throughout the afternoon, the enemy artillery and mortar fire intensified. Prisoner interrogation revealed that troops were being rushed from other sectors to meet our attack, the only action on the 7th Army front.

During the night of 6-7 February 1945, there were indications that the enemy was actively rallying and reorganizing. At 0700 on the 7th, he counterattacked in company strength supported by tanks. The enemy artillery fire continued to be intense, making movement all but impossible. The men's holes were knee deep in water. Weapons had become so clogged with mud that in one platoon only three would fire.

The brunt of this attack fell upon Co's. E and F on Hill Zebra. Despite the overwhelming handicaps of the situation, they were able to repel the thrust. Later in the morning, the strength of the blow shifted to Co. G's area, where tanks and infantry struck vigorously. This counterattack was also broken up, although heavy losses were sustained. Again the gallantry and heroism of our troops was responsible for our ability to hold our ground. In one instance, a machine gunner whose tripod had been shattered by mortar fire leaped to his feet and fired the weapon from the hip to disperse the enemy charge.

At 1900, the enemy counterattacked once more with tank support. Hitting the right flank of Hill Zebra, where our lines were lightly held, the enemy penetrated into Co. P's positions, inflecting many casualties, and taking the high ground on the flanks, made Co. E's position very precarious. At this time we were ordered to withdraw by Regiment. Gathering together the remaining men of Co. E and carrying the wounded, Co's. E, F, G and K executed skillful withdraws under cover of darkness while in contact with the enemy.

By its bold and aggressive raid, the 2nd Bn. and its attachments gained invaluable information of the enemy's strength, dispositions, and tactics. In two days of violent action, it smashed through strong enemy positions under the most difficult terrain and its gains against ruthless counterattacks, then executed a brilliant and successful withdrawal while in contact with the enemy. Fewer than 100 casualties were sustained in the engagement. The entire operation was characterized by energetic and resourceful leadership and heroic and determined spirit among the troops.

The value of information acquired in the raid was revealed three weeks later, when an attack was launched in regiment strength, through the same sector which led to the capture of Forbach and eventual conquest of the Saarland.

BG Mataxis, commanded the Oetingen Raid (as a Major). He is a veteran of three wars; WW2, Korea and Vietnam. BG Mataxis is deceased.